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PREFACE
In this study, I assume that the written word provides a 
valid source of information about the ideas and issues of 
central importance to a particular culture at a particular 
historical moment. I have further assumed that the verbal 
meaning of a text is determinable and stable and that, 
accordingly, the act of textual interpretation is comparable 
to the acts of observation that express the methodology of 
natural and social sciences.
These assumptions are not as radical as they might 
appear on first reading. In the late nineteenth century, 
textual interpretation received support by the work of the 
influential philosopher and social scientist, Wilhelm Dilthey 
(1833-1911), who proposed a science of hermeneutics that 
would serve as the basis for interpreting all forms of 
writing in the human sciences, including literature, the 
humanities and the social sciences.1 In Dilthey's 
formulation, the determinate meaning of a text consists of an 
interaction between the meaning of the text as a whole (made 
explicit by reference to the general norms of the language of 
the culture, time, or discipline; the author's cultural 
milieu and personal characteristics and biases) and the 
meaning of the text's constituent parts (the meaning of 
particular words and sentences; the use of particular 
metaphors and analogies to convey ideas). According to 
Dilthey, it was possible to achieve a valid interpretation of 
a text by a sustained, mutually qualifying interplay between 
the reader's evolving sense of the whole and retrospective
vi
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understanding of its component parts.
I submit, in this regard, that the procedures employed 
by scientists are similar in kind: In both the natural and
social sciences there exists a sustaining and mutually 
qualifying interplay between a whole (defined as theory or 
hypothesis derived from theory) and the scientist's 
retrospective understanding of the low-level observations and 
measurements that constitute the theory's "component parts."2 
In the sciences and in textual interpretation, hypotheses can 
be confirmed or disconfirmed by continued reference to the 
data: in the humanities, by reference to the text; in the
sciences, by reference to original or replicated 
observations. If the alternative hypothesis is disconfirmed, 
it can be replaced by an alternative hypothesis which 
conforms more closely to all the components of the text or to 
all relevant observations. The most that can be achieved in 
either textual interpretation or in scientific observation is 
to arrive at the most probable interpretation. In textual 
interpretation, according to Abrams, "this logic of highest 
probability...is adequate to yield objective knowledge, 
confirmable by other competent readers concerning the 
meanings of both of the component passages and of the 
artistic whole in a work of literature."3
The central objective of this study is to compare 
expressions of the concept of consciousness in nineteenth- 
century psychological and literary texts. The success of 
this endeavor relies on the validity of the interpretation of 
passages drawn from these texts. These passages serve as the
vii
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"data" from which I draw conclusions about similarities, 
differences, and changes in the way consciousness was 
conceptualized in nineteenth-century American discourse. The 
purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which 
discipline-specific methodological commitments (in 
psychology, to objectivity; in literature, to the recreation 
of subjective experience) determined the way in which 
consciousness was conceived. Accordingly, my conclusions are 
valid only to the degree that the passages I have selected 
for analysis adequately embody the conventions adopted by 
nineteenth-century proponents of these traditions. For this 
reason, I have selected passages from the works of those 
writers and psychologists who are routinely cited in the 
secondary literature as major contributors in these areas. 
Specifically, I have judged a passage to be "representative" 
of a particular genre and author if it is in substantial 
agreement with the conventions adopted by the leading 
proponents of the genre (as elucidated by the secondary 
literature) and if it is in accord with relevant aspects of 
the author's stated or implied personal biases and objective 
(as understood from careful reading of an author's major 
works, autobiographical statements, correspondence, etc.).4
In interpreting the meaning of these passages, I have 
relied on the method advanced by Dilthey and elaborated by E. 
D. Hirsch in his Validity and Interpretation published in 
1976.5 According to Hirsch, meaning is conferred on a text a 
priori by virtue of the hypotheses or theories a reader 
brings to the text. In this study, I have derived hypotheses
viii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
about the potential meaning of a particular text or passage 
from the study of the characteristics of a particular 
discursive tradition as these characteristics have been 
elucidated and described in the secondary literature. In the 
case of literary realism, for example, these characteristics 
include: internationalization of action within a central
consciousness and reference to the commonplace, the ordinary. 
These hypotheses may be confirmed if they correspond to the 
author's verbal intention, ascertained by his or her use of 
disciplinary-specific verbal conventions; by reference to an 
author's stated or implied agreement with those conventions; 
by reference to an author's statements (implicit or explicit) 
about his or her own work and intentions; and by 
consideration of the extent to which a passage accord with 
those conventions and intentions. "Meaning" in this context 
is thus a measure of the extent of agreement between a 
component part (word, sentence, passage) of a work and the 
whole (the work from which the passage was drawn, the 
author's corpus, the literary genre, the disciplinary 
tradition). Following through on the above example, we may 
say that the meaning of a passage drawn from the work of 
Henry James (realist) is constituted by his adherence to that 
convention of literary realism that relates the action of the 
narrative within a central, sentient consciousness; by his 
repeated statements substantiating his acceptance of that 
conventions; and by the observed correspondence of that 
passage with his work as a whole. Where such correspondence 
exists, we can assume with high probability that James
ix
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intends the passage to reflect a particular, quasi-implicit 
"theory" of the nature of consciousness.
This statement of method and procedure is intended to 
allay qualms about the validity and reliability of my 
conclusions, which I hereby submit to the reader's own theory 
of meaning.
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Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 197 0); Larry Laudan, Science and 
Hypothesis: Historical Essays in Scientific Methodology
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel).
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4 The specific details of selection are not discussed in 
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5 E. D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, 
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ABSTRACT
THE RHETORIC OP REALISM: AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY AND AMERICAN
LITERATURE, 1865-1910
by
Sandra L . Webster 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1994
The period following the end of the Civil war in America and 
extending to just after the turn of the century witnessed the 
emergence of an independent discipline of psychology as well 
as the emergence of a uniquely American literary tradition. 
Though these developments occurred independently and operated 
out of different traditions, they shared a common interest in 
the concept of "consciousness." The present study is a 
comparison of models of consciousness expressed in 
psychological and literary texts of two periods: The first
period covers the emergence of literary realism and American 
philosophical psychology (1865-1885); the second period 
covers literary naturalism and the emergence of psychology as 
a science (1886-1910). Content analyses of selected passages 
revealed that psychologists portrayed consciousness as a 
unidimensional entity, divisible, in principle, into various 
"powers" or aspects of perceiving, thinking, reasoning, and 
the like. Novelists, in contrast, portrayed consciousness as 
a multi-dimensional, feeling-toned arena, indivisible and 
unclassifiable. However, both psychologists and novelists of 
the early period depicted a passive consciousness wholly
xvii
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contained within the experiencing subject; while in the later 
period consciousness was readily depicted as actively engaged 
in on-going interaction with the world. These developments 
are discussed within the context of the particular 
methodological commitments and traditions attending the 
nineteenth-century development of two American disciplines: 
the science of psychology and the American novel.
xviii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study has two objectives: to examine changes in
theories of consciousness in American literature and American 
psychology from the end of the Civil War to just after the 
turn of the twentieth century; and to compare selected 
passages from literary and psychological texts for the 
purpose of assessing the extent of interdisciplinary 
exchange. Because this work focuses on a single concept-- 
consciousness--and a defined time-period and culture 
(nineteenth-century American psychology and literature), it 
represents a more finely-tuned analysis than other surveys of 
the connections between psychology and literature. 
Nonetheless, such recent work as Michael Kearns's comparative 
study of metaphorical representations in eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century literature and psychology and Gordon 0. 
Taylor's work on the analysis of models of mind/consciousness 
in nineteenth-century novels provide useful background.1
Kearns compares selected psychological and literary 
British and American texts of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries for examples of the metaphorical language of mind. 
His purpose is to "analyze how the actual language used to 
talk about mind changed during these two centuries and how 
the changes correlate with changes in the concept of the 
mind."2 Comparing across literature and psychology for the 
two-hundred year period, Kearns finds that the dominant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2metaphor of mind in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries in both disciplines is that of the mind as a 
material entity that can be segmented into distinct elements- 
-ideas or faculties--which receive "impressions" from the 
external world. The metaphors associated with this "mind-as- 
entity" perspective depend on analogies with the physical 
world: Locke's definition of mind as "white Paper, void of
all Characters" or Hume's conception of mind as "nothing but 
a heap of collection of different perceptions, united 
together by certain relations" are salient examples of the 
mind-as entity world view.3 In the works of Locke and Hume 
(as well as in the work of the Scottish philosophers which we 
will examine), the mind was seen as a passive "corpuscular 
system [in which] each impression was discrete, each idea was 
a unit, and consciousness consisted of a string of ideas and 
impressions or a train of thoughts, coupled together but 
still separate."4
One advantage of the mind-as-entity metaphor, according 
to Kearns, was that it enabled psychologists and physicians 
to assume a strict correspondence between mind activities and 
brain activities and a correspondence between physical 
obj ects and the the mind's knowledge of those obj ects.5 
Viewing mind and consciousness as passive responders to 
sensory input without the capacity to organize or transform 
that input allowed nineteenth-century
philosopher/psychologists to assert a) that the analysis of 
mental phenomena was not different from the analysis of 
physical phenomena, and b) that our knowledge of the world 
was direct and unmediated. The first assertion justified the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3use of introspection as a methodological tool because the 
objects of the introspected act--simple or complex ideas and 
sensations--were assumed to be independent of the will; the 
second assertion--that our knowledge of the world was direct 
and unmediated--allowed philosophers to side-step issues 
related to a mediating "self" imposing its own interpretive 
structure on external events; as we will see, such issues 
could not be easily encompassed within an avowedly 
classificatory system of nineteenth-century science.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, this 
conception of mind was "extended," according to Kearns, in 
the literary works of Henry James and George Eliot.6 The new 
conception of mind, the concept of mind-as-sentient-being 
employed in on-going interaction with the world, is 
identified with a questioning self whose aim is to make sense 
of his or her experience. In this perspective, 
"mind/consciousness, " the "self" and even the individual 
"will" were conceived as complex interactive processes 
through which sensory information was ordered into knowledge 
of both internal and external worlds. This idea, the idea 
that consciousness served a dynamic constructive function, 
was taken up by nineteenth-century novelists whose goal was 
to portray (in the words of Henry James) "the very drama of 
[a] consciousness (at once] bedimmed and befooled and 
bewildered, anxious, restless, fallible,"7 but always as an 
active agent engaged with the world, where "engaged" is to be 
understood in the special sense of acting and being acted 
upon.
Despite the fact that novelists of the mid-nineteenth
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
century adopted this or similar perspectives on mind and
consciousness, Kearns notes that most psychologists of the
time continued to describe mind in predominantly
physicalistic terms as an entity (rather than a process) that
existed apart from a knowing self. In fact, for most
psychologists of the mid-nineteenth century, "mind" and
"consciousness" were described as distinct entities,
essentially, and for all practical purposes, passive
recorders of external and internal events, respectively.8
Gordon 0. Taylor's intent is to describe the changes in
psychological representations in American fiction in the
period 1870-1900.9 Unlike Kearns, Taylor does not rely on
metaphors to establish units of comparison between
psychological and literary ideas. Instead, he writes:
We must first consider the novelist's psychological 
assumptions as they can be inferred from his text and 
seen as a set of related ideas about the mind and its
workings  [We must also consider] the ways in which
the novelist uses the techniques of fiction--diction and 
imagery, characterization...point of view, narrative 
method...--to make his psychological assumptions 
operative in the fictive world....The relation [between 
technique and assumptions about mind and 
consciousness]...will be one of our principal concerns.10
Thus, Taylor's main interest is in assessing the relation 
between literary techniques and theories of mind and 
consciousness represented in the works of mid to late 
nineteenth-century American novelists, specifically, Henry 
James, William Dean Howells, Stephen Crane, Frank Norris, and 
Theodore Dreiser. Like Kearns, however, Taylor describes a 
shift in psychological representation in the American novel 
from a view of the mind as composed of static, discrete, 
mental states with an emphasis on the typicality of those
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5states "toward a concept of organically linked mental states 
requiring representational emphasis on the nature of the 
sequential process itself,"11 a shift that parallels Kearns's 
descriptive categories of "mind-as-entity and "mind-as- 
sentient-being." His intent is to describe these changes in 
terms of the development of specific literary techniques that 
provide the novelist with the means to create mimetic 
reproductions of the more complex experience. That is,
Taylor is less concerned with comparative assessments of 
psychological and literary texts than he is with assessing 
the "goodness of fit" between literary technique and a 
novelist's assumptions about mind and consciousness. His 
purpose is to correlate changes in literary technique with 
changes in the representation of conscious experience that 
occurred in the period 1870-1900.12
Definitions of Crucial Terms 
It is the purpose of this dissertation to describe 
theories of consciousness as they were expressed in literary 
and psychological texts of the late nineteenth century. 
Because I am drawing on literature from two separate fields, 
my task will be facilitated by providing definitions for some 
of the terms I will be using throughout this work.
-Con s c jp us nes_S
There is no single definition of this term that 
successfully encompasses the variety of meanings and 
intentions of this literature. However, several important 
points should be emphasized at the outset. First. Although 
post-Freudian readers are accustomed to consider 
consciousness in opposition to an unconscious--the source of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6instinctual wishes and repressed ideas that bedevil our 
conscious lives--late nineteenth-century Americans were 
either unaware of the concept of "unconscious ideas" or 
unwilling to consider that ideas could exist outside of 
consciousness.13 The concept of consciousness, therefore, in 
the years before Freud's work became known, encompassed a 
much wider range of mental phenomena--including altered 
conscious states, hypnotic trances, and psychopathology--than 
our current understanding would acknowledge.11 Though this 
idea will be taken up at length in Chapter 5, the important 
point to remember is that the concept of consciousness 
evolved in nineteenth-century America in the absence of a 
viable understanding of what would later be called "Freudian" 
processes, a fact that may account for the variety of 
meanings and functions of different models.
Second. In this work, I make an explicit distinction 
between the concept of "mind," and the concept of 
"consciousness." This distinction is warranted by the fact 
that virtually each of the psychological theorists of the 
early period (1800-1885) whose work we will examine put forth 
a similar distinction. The reason they did so is a direct 
consequence of their epistemological objectives: Their
intent was to formulate an account of the mental operations 
of sense perception, concept formation, judgment and 
reasoning; the task was inherently reductive in that it led, 
quite naturally, to analysis of these operations as 
relatively independent processes originating in an "entity" 
they called "mind."15 The role of consciousness in these 
early models was that of reliable observer of these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7processes.
In contrast, models of consciousness of the later period
(1886-1910) were necessarily more complex. "Necessarily,"
because the function of consciousness was conceived as
active, not passive; integrative and selective, not discrete.
In neither period, however, was consciousness conceived as
identical to mind, but rather more often as "mind-full." It
might "observe" mind and "record" or "accompany" its
operations; it might "select" and "attend;" but it could do
so only as long as it remained distinct from mind in some
unspecified sense. The problem of the nature of the relation
between mind and consciousness was an important part of the
debate among mid-nineteenth century psychologists (Asa Mahan,
Mark Hopkins, James McCosh); and the different solutions to
that problem are a singular part of this story.
Third. That novelists of this period made a similar
distinction is one of the interesting results of this study,
one which I will address in depth at a later point. In
general, however, it suffices to say that the novelists of
this period were less concerned with epistemological
questions than they were concerned with the portrayal of
subjective experience, including sensory experience and the
experience of emotion. Perhaps because of this emphasis on
felt-experience, consciousness, rather than mind, was the
primary object of their interest. A quote from Henry James
is indicative of this tendency:
Experience is never limited, and it is never complete; 
it is an immense sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web 
of the finest silken threads suspended in the chamber of 
consciousness, and catching every air-borned particle in 
its tissue. It is the very atmosphere of the mind; and 
when the mind is imaginative--much more when it happens
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to be that of a man of genius--it takes to itself the 
faintest hints of life, it converts the very pulses of 
the air into revelations.16
In Henry James's novels and short stories, it is always 
consciousness that assumes center stage, distinct from mind, 
within which sensory experience is converted into 
revelations. And Henry James is not alone: Virtually all of
the authors I will examine in this study gave to 
consciousness the unique capacity to make contact with the 
external world and to learn from that contact. 
Rhetoric/Discourse
Both "rhetoric" and "discourse" refer to the 
descriptive, explanatory, and narrative texts of nineteenth- 
century American psychology and literature. I do not intend 
the use of "rhetoric" in the classic sense, that is, of 
language that seeks to persuade or influence. I use the term 
in the more general sense as "the art or science of literary 
composition, particularly in prose, including the use of 
figures of speech." Similarly, by "discourse," I mean "a 
communication of thoughts by words; the expression of 
ideas."17
The use of these terms assumes that different discourses 
are structured along different lines, depending on the 
intentions or objectives of the writer. In their 
epistemological and empirical quest, nineteenth-century 
philosopher/psychologists sought general laws of mental 
operations; accordingly, discourse assumed an objective 
posture, devoid of self-reference and subjective 
interpretation. Novelists, in contrast, sought to describe 
the individual experience; accordingly, discourse assumed a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9subjective posture, drawing on the notion of individual, 
multiple realities and seeking to convey the on-going felt 
experience. As we will see, the concept of consciousness 
received different treatment in these distinct discourses. 
Realism
In literary theory, "realism" refers to that particular 
mode of fiction writing which takes as its common theme the 
accurate reproduction of experience amid cultural and 
material change. The term is opposed to "idealism," a mode 
of fiction-writing that described man and man's experience as 
transcending and transcendent, and which upheld the notion of 
a permanent stable order (Emerson and Thoreau are well-known 
examples of this school) . M. H. Abrams describes the typical 
realist as one who "sets out to write a fiction which will 
give the illusion that it reflects life and the social world 
as it seems to the common reader....[one who] prefers the 
average, the commonplace, and the everyday over the rare 
aspects of the social scene."18 Donald Pizer, however, argues 
that there is a greater diversity in the subject matter of 
American realism and a more subjective and idealistic view of 
human experience than is generally recognized.19 Nonetheless, 
the central focus of literary realism is the internalization 
of action within a central consciousness. In general, this 
action involves the presence of a moral dilemma which is 
resolved by the story's end with a consequent increase in 
self-awareness.
American literary realism is to be distinguished from 
philosophical realism on two levels: First, literary realism
is intended to describe a literary genre--a style of writing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that purports to describe the common experience; it does not 
necessarily imply a philosophical position on the independent 
existence of physical objects and events. In fact, a more 
appropriate term--and one which has become part of the 
language of literary theory--is "psychological realism," a 
term which defines the literary realist's explicit aim of 
rendering the ordinary experiences of life through a single 
interpreting consciousness. Second, to the extent that 
literary realism does assume the independent existence of 
physical objects and the direct perception of them, the 
primary interest remains the individual consciousness 
irrespective of epistemological issues.
Chronological Development 
Throughout the forty-five year period of this review 
(1865-1910), American psychologists and novelists were 
engaged in a process of defining and articulating the goals 
and objectives of their disciplines.20 In the early years of 
this period, American psychology was largely a philosophical 
enterprise under the dominion of Scottish philosophical 
psychology; by the end of this period, American psychology 
was established as an experimental science with its own 
laboratories and recognized professorships.21 In the same 
forty-five year span, American literature sought its 
particular voice in the representation of common, ordinary, 
human experience and developed a set of methods to ensure 
that the "new realism" of the mid-nineteenth century would 
capture the American experience.22 By the turn of the 
twentieth century, American writers had yielded to the spirit 
of "naturalism," espousing Darwinian themes (along with a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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deterministic pessimism) and portraying humankind at the 
mercy of biological and social forces.23 Within each 
tradition, the concept of consciousness underwent a series of 
conceptual refinements.
Psychology
In the early period (1800-1885), American psychologists 
were intent upon constructing models of mind and 
consciousness that would account for the acquisition and 
structure of knowledge. That is, they were concerned with 
such epistemological issues as a) the role of sensory 
information in the formation of ideas of physical objects; b) 
the compounding of simple ideas into complex ideas; and, c) 
the "powers" of judgment, reasoning, abstraction, and the 
like. One problematic issue these thinkers confronted was 
the relation between "mind," often conceived as a 
constellation of powers or "faculties," and "consciousness," 
variously conceived as part of mind, distinct from mind, or 
some uneasy combination of these two alternatives.2'1
Coincident with these epistemological issues about the 
relation between mind and consciousness was a more specific 
concern with the nature of consciousness itself. Is 
consciousness merely an adjunct of mind, acting as a sort of 
passive recorder of the mind's activities? Thomas Reid, for 
example, asserted that consciousness is just that "immediate 
knowledge which we have of our present thoughts."25 Is it the 
very essence of the self, the certain knowledge of one's own 
existence? Virtually each one of the psychologists whose 
works v/e will examine assumed that consciousness is the 
source of the self-concept. Does consciousness itself have
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specific powers of selection and association independent of 
mind activities? Not until William James's work in the 
1880s would consciousness be described as the "realm of pure 
experience," with the power to select, order, and integrate 
sensory information, a conception already employed by his 
novelist-brother nearly a decade earlier.26
In the mid- to late nineteenth century, these questions 
were not minor concerns; by the fourth quarter of the 
nineteenth century, they served to direct the focus of 
debate away from epistemological concerns toward issues more 
explicitly "psychological," that is, toward the description 
of consciousness as a series of feeling-toned sensations, or 
toward the description of altered conscious states (hypnotic 
trances, psychotic episodes, or s l e e p ) I n  psychology, this 
objective took the form of an analysis of the development of 
the faculties of knowing, feeling, and thinking, the 
"phenomena of consciousness."28 In contrast to the earlier 
period, psychologists of this later period (1886-1910) were 
concerned with both the content and function of 
consciousness: They wished to describe not only conscious
states, but their development over time; to describe not only 
conscious acts, but their role in the complicated adjustment 
of an individual to the environment.29 in this post-Darwinian 
period, the concept of consciousness was indeed "extended"
(to borrow Kearns's terminology) to include the means by 
which an individual acquired the knowledge to adapt to a 
world that operated according to immutable natural laws.30 
Literature
American literature of the immediate post-Civil War
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period (1865-1885) explicitly and self-consciously took 
subjective experience as its cardinal theme and sought to 
portray the "common, the ordinary, and the true" of human 
existence as it was known to the experiencing subject.31 
Readers of realist fiction were asked to identify with a 
moral dilemma fought within a central consciousness, an arena 
in which sensory experience, conscious reflection, Puritan 
morality, and practical necessity must have their say.32 The 
moral dilemma, the conflicted consciousness, was not new to 
realist fiction; it emerged out of a long tradition of 
theological questioning. What was new and different--what 
marked this period off from the period which preceded--was 
the idea that consciousness might serve an adaptive function. 
Rejecting both the Poe-like descent into madness as the 
inevitable result of a mind turned inward upon itself as well
as the transcendent visions of an Emerson or Thoreau,
American realists adopted the belief that conscious 
reflection would yield positive gains in terms of an 
individual's knowledge of his world and his place in it. For
consciousness to serve such an adaptive function, they
reasoned, it must be receptive, it must be modifiable.
This theme is pursued by each of the three American 
realists we will examine. Readers of realist fiction were 
invited to participate in a developmental process--to 
witness, as it were, the gradual "unfolding" of a self-aware 
consciousness. For Henry James, this objective was met by 
reference to a central character whose intelligence and 
sensitivity and personal integrity were extraordinary, 
capable of ever finer discriminations, as he writes in the
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following excerpt from the Preface to his New York edition of 
The Princess Casamassima:
This in fact I have ever found rather terribly the 
point--that the figures in any picture, the agents in 
any drama, are interesting only in proportion as they 
feel their respective situations; since the 
consciousness, on their part, of the complication 
exhibited forms for us of their link or connection with 
it. But there are degrees of feeling--the muffled, the 
faint, the just sufficient, the barely intelligent...the 
acute, the intense, the complete, in a word--the power 
to be finely aware and richly responsible. It is those 
moved in this later fashion who "get most" out of all 
that happens to them and who in so doing enable us, as 
readers of their record, as participators by a fond 
attention, also to get most. Their being finely aware-- 
as Hamlet and Lear, say, are finely aware--makes 
absolutely the intensity of their adventure, gives the 
maximum of sense to what befalls them.33
A finely tuned consciousness, according to James, would serve 
characters of great depth and complexity. Variations on this 
theme will be seen in the work of realist novelists selected 
for this study: Elizabeth Stuart Phelps's The Story of Avis
(187 9), William Dean Howells's The Rise of Silas Lapham 
(1885), and Henry James's Roderick Hudson (1876) and What 
Maisie Knew (1897) .3t
Realist authors of this early period recognized a clear 
demarcation of subject matter and style between their work 
and that of the preceding Romantic era ( 1 8 4 0 - 1 8 6 5 ) The 
demarcation between nineteenth-century American realism and 
"naturalism" is, however, less clearly defined, though 
present-day literary historians generally agree that by the 
fourth quarter of the nineteenth century a new literary style 
emerged.36 In contrast to the realist affirmation of the 
human potential for growth through sensitive self-awareness, 
late nineteenth-century naturalist writers viewed humankind
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in perpetual struggle against "natural" forces--whether 
biologically or culturally driven. In the words of literary 
historians Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury, these authors 
wrote within an atmosphere of Darwinian pessimism, "in search 
not just of the 'facts' but of the iron laws behind them that 
'really' determined existence--the biological constitution of 
man, the impersonal machinelike operations of society, the 
functions of evolutionary process."37 This literature, in 
contrast to the moral liberalism of Phelps, Howells, and 
James, assumes a characteristic 'scientific' posture: an
image of humankind at the mercy of large impersonal forces. 
Donald Pizer notes, however, that it is just this 
deterministic ethos that allows the naturalist writer to 
create characters who find meaning and dignity not in the 
resolution of a moral dilemma, but in the battle against 
forces beyond their control,38 whether those "forces" be 
social and cultural or biological. In this context, moral 
"laws" were as fixed and immutable as any laws of the 
physical world, as this brief quote from Theodore Dreiser 
shows: "[Others] did not believe, as I still did, that there
was a fixed moral order in the world which one contravened at 
his peril."39 The theme of struggle and survival is 
characteristic of each of the literary texts published under 
the rubric of "naturalism" I have selected for this study: 
Henry Adams's autobiographical work, The Education of Henry 
Adams (1907), Charlotte Perkins Gilman's short story, "The 
Yellow Wallpaper" (1892), and Theodore Dreiser's novel,
Sister Carrie (1900) /° Table 1 lists the psychologists and 
novelists by period whose works form the basis of this study.
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Table 1
The table lists the four comparison cells containing the 
names of the psychologists and novelists whose works forms 
the basis of the present study.
Period Psychology Literature
1800 - 1885 Thomas Reid Elizabeth Phelps
Laurens Hickok William D. Howells
Asa Mahan Henry James
Mark Hopkins
James McCosh
1886 - 1910 William James Henry Adams
George T. Ladd Charlotte P. Gilman
James Mark Baldwin Theodore Dreiser
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Method
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to 
which discipline-specific methodological commitments 
influenced the development of models of consciousness in 
nineteenth-century psychological and literary discourse. 
Because the comparisons I wish to make are between 
disciplines (broadly understood) and not between persons, I 
have selected passages from the works of those writers and 
psychologists who are routinely cited in the secondary 
literature as major proponents of the conventions adopted by 
each discipline during each of two time periods:41 1865-1885 
(philosophical psychology and American realism); and 1886- 
1910 (experimental psychology and American naturalism) .
These period divisions reflect the end (in 1886) of a largely 
speculative American psychology (George Trumbull Ladd 
published his widely celebrated text Elements of 
Physiological Psychology in 1887); and the beginning in 1887 
of a new strain of realist literature, one which is often 
distinguished from its predecessor by its allegiance to an 
"iron" determinism, a belief that existence is controlled by 
forces beyond human control.42 Included in the survey of the 
first period of (pre-experimental) psychology are Laurens 
Hickok, Asa Mahan, Mark Hopkins, and James McCosh; and 
American realist novelists, Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, Henry 
James, and William Dean Howells. In the second period of 
experimental psychology I cover psychologists George Trumbull 
Ladd, William James, and J. Mark Baldwin; and naturalist 
authors Henry Adams, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Theodore 
Dreiser. Chapter 2, a discussion of the Scottish philosophy.
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is intended as necessary background to the later chapters. 
Selection of Passages
My procedure involves a comparative analysis of passages 
about consciousness or conscious processes selected from the 
major psychological and literary works of the writers and 
psychologists identified above. Like Kearns and Taylor, I 
selected passages that are both characteristic of the period 
and the discipline as well as characteristic of a particular 
author or psychologist. In the first instance, 
"characteristic" was assessed against those objectives that 
defined a particular discipline during a specified period: 
for example, epistemological and scientific/empirical 
objectives in psychology and the reproduction of subjective 
experience in the literary tradition. Thus, a passage could 
be said to represent late nineteenth century psychology, if, 
in describing consciousness, it gave prominence to 
classif icatory issues or addressed the mind/body problem or 
described the function of consciousness within the human 
psyche.
In the second instance, "characteristic" was assessed in 
accord with all that was stated or could be inferred about 
the model of mind/consciousness assumed by the author or 
psychologist of interest. In general, it was not difficult 
to draw very precise conclusions about the models of 
mind/consciousness proposed by the psychologists because 
their primary concern was to clarify issues concerning human 
mental function and the models they proposed were described 
unambiguously. The novelists, however, whose concern was not 
to clarify mind/consciousness issues, but to portray the felt
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experience, posed a certain challenge. Inferences about 
their models were drawn from close readings of their work 
(including critical essays, autobiographical works, and 
correspondence) and re-evaluated against a selection of the 
vast secondary critical literature that exists of the periods 
under review. A passage could be said to "represent" a 
particular model of consciousness if it accorded with the 
general model of consciousness assumed by the author.
This procedure of checking each passage--first, against 
the more general objectives of the discipline and, second, 
against the more specific model of consciousness stated or 
implied by the author or psychologist of interest, yielded a 
selection of passages that may be reliably considered 
representative of late nineteenth-century discourse 
concerning consciousness. This purposive selection process 
rests on a careful analysis of the objectives of each 
tradition as well as the methods used to achieve them. These 
analyses are reproduced in text where appropriate, along with 
a descriptive account of the models proposed by the authors 
and psychologists included in this review.
Textual Analysis
Because models of consciousness are often couched in 
metaphorical language, the selected passages will serve as a 
source of key words and phrases that signal a particular 
approach to consciousness. A salient example of this method 
of identification can be seen in the analysis following this 
passage drawn from Laurens Hickok's Rational Psychology of 
1849 :
The pure object [of experience] is put within this 
[mind's] light, and thus the mind possesses it in its
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own illumination, and this is the same as to say that 
the object stands in consciousness. Not as an act, but 
as a light; not as a maker--for that is the province of 
the intellectual agency--but rather as a revealer: 
after such analogies shall we doubtless best conceive of 
consciousness, and which may thus be termed the "light 
of all our seeing."43
Consciousness, as Hickok conceived it, had no power to 
create; nor did it function as a source of ideas. In this 
passage, Hickok explicitly identifies consciousness as that 
"light" in which the separate mental powers--reasoning, 
perceiving, intuiting, and willing--played out their distinct 
roles. Wholly passive, its function was conceived as similar 
to that of the action of a single spotlight upon an actor 
during a lengthy monologue. This "spotlight" theory of 
consciousness is unique to a psychology that gave to 
consciousness unspecified "transcendent" powers. The passage 
serves its purpose in providing a salient example of the 
method I will be following in this study.
While psychological models of consciousness will be 
analyzed in terms of such key metaphorical terms, analysis of 
literary passages turns on drawing out the implications of a 
writer's theory of consciousness in accord with 
characteristic (realist or naturalist) objectives and 
narrative strategies for achieving those objectives. A brief 
analysis of one passage will illustrate the procedure I 
intend to follow. The passage is chosen because it serves as 
a characteristic example of literary realism, and the 
analysis which follows is intended as an example of the 
procedure I will be following in the ensuing chapters.
The passage is from Elizabeth Stuart Phelps's The Story 
of Avis. published in 1879:
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A stillness and strangeness deeper than a bruised 
muscle could strike, came upon her when she closed the 
door of the long-deserted place, and, striking a fire in 
her little grate, sat down to warm her hands. The 
autumn sun stepped in, and stood cool and calm against 
the wall, like the friend who never forgets, or suffers 
as to forget, the resolve or the aspiration which we 
once expressed....Avis looked about her with a 
singularly defensive feeling, as if she were summoned by 
some invisible tribunal to answer for an impalpable 
offense. She had something of the recoil which a man 
has in turning to his books or his business after a 
night's dissipation.11
Elizabeth Phelps is writing in the realist tradition 
with the objective of relating the story through a central 
consciousness. It is immediately apparent that Phelps, 
working within the realist tradition, is not interested in 
the physical realities of existence, except to the extent to 
which they dramatize the subjective experience. In the 
passage, a narrator reports the confusion of barely- 
articulated feelings of guilt, loss, and regret, feelings 
that are conveyed metaphorically: She is met with the 'cool
autumn sun' whose 'calm presence' reminds her of her former 
self; her guilt is established by an 'invisible tribunal' 
against which she has no worthy defense. The context is not 
one in which any one mental operation--perceiving or judging, 
for example--dominates. "Consciousness," as Phelps describes 
it, is an arena of fleeting impressions and half-articulated 
thoughts each competing for dominance. This concept of 
consciousness is not unique to realist literature, but it is 
one of its most salient characteristics, as we will see.
Prospectus
My intent is to describe developments in the 
representation of consciousness in both psychological and
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literary discourse in the last half of nineteenth-century 
America. Accordingly, the chapters are organized 
chronologically: the first period (Chapters 3 through 4) 
details the ideas of the Scottish school, American pre- 
experimental psychology and American realism; the second 
period (Chapters 5 through 6) examines American experimental 
psychology and American naturalism.15 In Chapter 7, I 
conclude by examining changes in theories of consciousness in 
literature and psychology from the end of the American Civil 
War to just after the turn of the twentieth century as a 
function of disciplinary objectives and I compare selected 
passages from literary and psychological texts for the 
purpose of assessing the extent of interdisciplinary 
exchange.
I have deliberately selected a chronological arrangement 
for this study because my primary interest is to compare 
across disciplines within a particular time-period. Other 
formats might have been selected. Kearns, for example, 
adopts a loose chronology subsumed by the two categories of 
mental metaphors he proposes: mind-as-entity and mind-as­
sent ient-being. Though this approach reflects clear trends 
in the language of the mind, it tends to overlook movements 
within psychology or literature that may not be easily 
encompassed under those headings. Though both Locke and Reid 
adopted a mind-as-entity point of view, for example, their 
analyses of mental function were quite different. Kearns 
clearly recognizes this difference,16 but his analysis 
obscures issues that are central to intradisciplinary 
development. These issues--disciplinary conventions and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
methodological commitments are central to this study. The 
final chapter (Chapter 7) will address these issues in some 
detail. As we will see, the issues that concerned 
psychologists and the themes of literary realism and literary 
naturalism (respectively), though drawn from movements 
outside either discipline, were shaped by those conventions.
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CHAPTER 2
MIND-AS-ENTITY AND THE HUMAN WILL
Throughout the 1800s, Scottish commonsense philosophy 
dominated American psychological thought.1 Indeed, the 
influence of the Scottish philosophers was so profound that 
many of their ideas about the mind and consciousness 
persisted in American psychology even after American 
students, returning from study abroad, brought with them the 
ideas and experimental methods they encountered in European 
laboratories and universities."“Supported by the ideas of 
Scottish philosophers, nineteenth-century American 
psychologists justified their science on the basis that it 
had a defined subject matter ("the science of mental life") 
and a legitimate method of investigating it - introspection.3 
Because the history of American psychology in the nineteenth 
century is a history of the Scottish influence, I begin this 
chapter with a brief summary of the models of mind and 
consciousness which these philosophers proposed.
My review of these ideas is both more deliberate and 
more detailed than that offered by either Kearns or Taylor, 
for my intent is to describe a particular epistemological 
tradition. My purpose is two-fold: to establish a pattern
for later discussions of the link between models of mind and 
consciousness and the disciplinary traditions that support 
them; and to provide a context against which changes in 
representations of consciousness in psychological and
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literary discourse may be assessed.
The Scottish Psychology of Mind and Consciousness
In the "Preface" to his Essays on the intellectual 
Powers of Man. Thomas Reid states that the purpose of his 
inquiry is to discover the "nature and force" of mental 
faculties in order that man might learn to apply them ever 
more successfully to the development of all science. Reid 
believed, as did his followers, that a natural science of the 
mind, properly carried out, would provide a foundation of all 
knowledge; indeed, he asserted (quoting Hume) that natural 
philosophy "is the centre and capitol of the sciences, which 
being once masters of, we may easily extend our conquests 
everywhere."4 Once the properties of the mind were 
understood, the laws governing the formation of ideas well 
defined, the sources of error and false beliefs clearly 
articulated, natural philosophy would be in a position to 
adjudicate the knowledge claims of the natural sciences 
(astronomy, chemistry).
To understand the human mind and its operations was to 
lay a foundation for the future of all science. This was not 
a new idea in the early nineteenth century; indeed, this 
clear epistemological objective had been assumed by most 
Western philosophers since Descartes first formulated his 
method of doubt in the sixteenth century.5 while this belief 
ensured philosophy's crucial role among the natural sciences, 
it also was compellingly clear that little progress had been 
made: the questions of philosophers about the mind and its
properties had achieved no certain solution. What was 
needed, Reid believed, was a method which, when applied to
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the analysis of mental phenomena, would yield general laws 
about the mind of the same kind that attended Newtonian 
mechanics.6
Like their eighteenth-century counterparts (Locke, Hume, 
Berkeley), the Scottish philosophers believed that the 
success of the natural sciences was owed to the systematic 
application of careful observation and experimentation.1 As 
mental phenomena differed from physical phenomena only in 
respect to their locus of operation, there was little doubt 
that proper attention to method and analysis would yield a 
similar outcome for natural philosophy.3 "It was natural," 
concludes Isaiah Berlin, author of The Age of Enlightenment. 
"and indeed almost inevitable, that those who had been 
liberated by the new sciences should seek to apply their 
methods and principles to a subject which was clearly in even 
more desperate need of order than the facts of the external 
world."5
The way to a science of the mind was through observation 
and experimentation. Accordingly, Reid's explicit 
epistemological objective was buttressed by a traditional 
methodological directive: "The chief and proper source of
[knowledge of the mind and its faculties]," he states, "is 
accurate reflection upon the operations of our own minds.... 
the same kind of operation with that by which we form 
distinct notions of external objects." As Reid defines it, 
reflection is to knowledge of the mind as observation is to 
knowledge of external events. It is, he asserts, "a kind of 
[reasoned] intuition [which] gives a like conviction with 
regard to internal objects, as the faculty of seeing gives
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with regard to objects of sight."10
Properly used, reflection (the introspective method) 
would lead to the discovery of general laws of mental 
phenomena. Specifically, Reid was concerned with both the 
conditions under which certain powers of the mind were 
expressed (the power of perception, the power of reason, for 
example), and the conditions which led to their optimal 
development. According to Reid, introspective data were not 
alone sufficient for drawing general conclusions about the 
workings of the mind (after all, on the basis of 
introspective data alone, David Hume drew the conclusion that 
humankind was incapable of 'true' knowledge of the world).
The philosopher who would develop a sound model of the mind 
and consciousness must, according to Reid, validate his 
conclusions against observations of a more general character, 
taking into account a wide range of human actions. One might 
study, for example, the behavior of parents toward their 
children in order to determine habitual modes of thought and 
conduct. Or, one might study human errors or prejudices, 
because such fallacious reasoning would provide evidence of 
the way in which the human mind may be led to false 
conclusions and incorrect interpretations.11 This reference 
to sources of information other than introspection would 
serve as a check, Reid believed, on the tendency to regard 
introspective evidence as absolute; and it would serve, at 
least in principle, the role served by crucial experiments in 
the natural sciences.12 For the purpose of this study, it is 
against these specific epistemological and methodological 
objectives that the Scottish model of mind and consciousness




The Scottish philosophers (Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, 
Thomas Upham, and others) specifically rejected the 
conclusions of John Locke and David Hume, even though their 
models of mind and consciousness were constructed upon a 
similar foundation, a foundation supported by the Newtonian 
model of science. In applying the Newtonian model of the 
physical world to the properties of the mind, for example, 
Locke envisioned the human mind as an entity (having 
extension and limits) that contained a number of uniform 
particles ("ideas") which, in their simplest form, could not 
be reduced. According to Locke, these simple ideas 
(corresponding to sensations and emanating from the external 
world) either remained isolated and discrete or, in accord 
with associative laws of similarity and contiguity, were 
compounded into complex ideas, similar to the way in which 
objects in the external world were compounded out of atoms 
and molecules. Throughout the process, the mind, envisioned 
as a mere receptacle, remained passive: the compounding of 
simple ideas into complex ideas occurred automatically, 
irrespective of desire or the will, according to laws that 
could be precisely articulated.13 This model of the mind is 
a salient example of what Kearns intends by a "mind-as- 
entity" world-view.
Locke's thoroughgoing associationism drew forth strong 
reactions (from Immanuel Kant and the Scottish philosophers), 
for it implied that nothing could be known for certain, not
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the existence of physical objects, nor the existence of God, 
nor even our own identity: All that could be known were the
simple or complex "ideas" the mind contained. Indeed, was it 
possible that the only sound conclusion philosophers could 
draw after centuries of debate was that certain knowledge was 
unattainable? This inevitable conclusion was unthinkable for 
Thomas Reid, and his solution to the problem, though 
seemingly simple in retrospect, marked a turning point in 
philosophical inquiry, leading to a rejection of questions of 
mere epistemological form and toward a preference for 
questions of psychological import.
The essence of Reid's metaphysical position was that the 
human mind is not passive, but active. Knowledge is no mere 
compilation of sensory impressions, but a unified whole 
corresponding one-to-one with events and objects in the 
external world. The mind contains not a mere constellation 
of simple and complex "ideas," as Locke would have it, but a 
complex hierarchy of powers and capacities, both natural and 
acquired. Reid's task, as he saw it, was to delineate these 
powers and operations, their characteristics, the conditions 
under which they operated, and the manner in which they could 
be improved. In this regard, Reid's task differed from 
Locke's at the outset: his intent was to provide an analysis
and classification of mental powers and their development, 
not to provide an analysis of the origin of knowledge.
Figure 1 is a representation of Reid's model of the mind 
consisting of two parallel series, one labeled 
"Understanding" and the other labeled "The Will." Each 
series consists of a hierarchy of natural "powers" or
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Series I represents powers of the Understanding; Series II represents powers of the Will. 
(Adapted from Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man [1813-1815] [Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, M.I.T. Press, 1969], p. 70ff.; and Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers 
of Man [1815] [Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1969], pp. 76-89).
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"faculties" (represented as numbered squares). In Series I 
(the Understanding), the powers are arranged in the order 
corresponding to successive steps in the acquisition of 
knowledge; those in Series II are arranged according to 
degree of effort. The long horizontal line in the middle of 
the page represents the entire "train of thought," capturing 
the succession of thoughts emanating from the separate powers 
over time.14
The model Reid proposes is a process model; my purpose 
in presenting it in this way is to underscore the similarity 
between Reid's model of the mind and twentieth-century 
information-processing approaches to the mind, though Reid 
opts for different categories--"powers"--rather than 
processing levels.15 Like these later models, however, Reid 
intends us to understand that the separate powers of the mind 
operate both successively and in tandem: the powers of the
Understanding are influenced by those of the Will; perception 
is a prerequisite to reason and judgment.16 This interactive 
aspect gives Reid's system the following structure: The
powers of mind can be classified as predominantly Active 
(involving primarily the Will) or Passive (involving 
primarily the Understanding) and as Natural (innate) or 
Acquired (that is, developed over time and dependent on 
training or education). Within this structure, there are 
four possible divisions of mental operations: Natural
Passive powers are faculties (the power to reason, to judge, 
or to perceive--represented as powers of the Understanding in 
Figure 1); Natural Active powers are capacities (such as the 
capacity to attend or the capacity to deliberate--represented
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in Figure 1 as powers of the Will); Acquired Passive powers 
Reid calls "dispositions" (moral taste or a love of beauty); 
and Acquired Active powers are habits (ethical reasoning or 
moral judgment) .17
As a first-order power of the Understanding, perception 
is grounded in physiological mechanisms, granted to humankind 
according to God's will. According to Reid, sense organs 
receive impressions from objects in the external world; these 
impressions are then transmitted from the organ to the 
nervous system, and from there to the brain, though "we 
cannot give a reason why [or how] it is so." Perception, 
according to Reid, is direct and unmediated: "(B)y fixed laws 
of nature...[perception] corresponds exactly to the nature 
and conditions of objects in the world....Without this exact 
correspondence," he continues,"the information we receive by 
our senses would not only be imperfect, as it undoubtedly is, 
but would be fallacious, which we have no reason to think it 
is."18 Perception is limited and circumscribed, by God's 
will, by the nature of the sense organs themselves (we see 
very little, if at all, in absolute darkness); even so, what 
we do perceive directly corresponds exactly to what exists-- 
and it is God's will that this be so.
The natural powers of the Will are similarly grounded in 
physiological mechanisms, though Reid is not prepared to 
submit an analysis of their origin, except to say that they 
are granted by God.19 Acquired powers, in contrast, are only 
potential, not fixed; their emergence depends on external 
conditions, education, moral training, as well as love of God 
and humankind and the desire to make the most of one's life.20
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Thus, the development of a love of beauty or the capacity to 
reason ethically depends on both innate propensities and a 
prescribed educational and religious program.
In this respect, Reid's view of the mind was very 
different from Locke's conception of a passive mind, as he 
intended it to be. Reid saw his work as a necessary response 
to Locke's passive sensationalism and Hume's skepticism, both 
of which, in denying that the mind contained innate powers 
and capacities, did not provide an explanation for observable 
differences among people in either abilities or conduct. By 
assuming that knowledge accrued independently of the will, 
Locke (and Hume) seemed to deny what was very clear to Reid, 
namely that the elite (the philosopher, the academic, the 
theologian) was of a different character than the "vulgar and 
insensitive," who must be led to right conduct.21 Moreover, 
though Locke's model had much to say about the origin of 
ideas, it had little to say about conduct. Reid's model, in 
contrast, founded on the assumption of the interaction of the 
various powers of the Will and the Understanding, had much to 
say about the development of the "higher powers" of reason 
and moral good, though, admittedly, much less about the 
origin of ideas.22 It is for these reasons that I have 
stated that Reid's model is less concerned with 
epistemological form and more concerned with psychological 
issues. And it is for these reasons that the Scottish 
approach, originating in Reid, served as a more useful model 
of mind and consciousness for early psychologists than 
Locke's model alone.
The model proposed by Reid is reductive in that it
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assumes that classification of the mind into distinct powers 
(or faculties) and analysis of those powers in terms of 
discrete characteristics and the conditions under which they 
operated would yield general laws of human mental function. 
The Scottish philosophers believed, however, that once these 
laws were known, once the modes of operation were understood 
(including those instances of false perception, illogical 
reasoning, and immoral judgment) , philosophy would then be in 
a position to assume its role as the arbiter of scientific 
claims. As Dugald Stewart, a student of Reid, states the 
matter:
The more knowledge of this kind we acquire, the 
better can we accommodate our plans to the established 
order of things, and avail ourselves of natural Powers 
and Agents for accomplishing our purposes,23
Though Reid and his followers were convinced that a 
thorough knowledge of human mental function would provide a 
firm foundation for the sciences, they also believed that 
their analyses would have profound religious and ethical 
implications. Certain powers, for example, ethical reasoning 
and moral judgment, reverence for beauty and God, were powers 
that could be acquired through proper training and exercise.24 
Indeed, this particular idea is so often repeated throughout 
Reid's essays that it must be understood as a central tenet.25 
In the final analysis, reason and conduct are so intertwined 
in Reid's model that the proper development of the former 
leads inevitably to "right" conduct and "the honour, dignity 
and worth of a man."26
In many respects, Reid's concept of moral development is 
more important than his epistemological agenda. Ultimately,
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he appeals both to human intellect and human will; and it is
the human will that distinguishes humankind from animals,
civilized man (the philosopher) from savages (the "vulgar and
inattentive"), and adults from children.27 Reid's moral
agenda is intertwined with the belief that God-given powers
require constant effort and continued assessment in order to
ensure the development of ethical reasoning and moral
judgment. Indeed, this developmental thesis is implicit in
all of Reid's work, as is evident in the following quote:
The power of reflection upon the operations of their own 
minds does not appear at all in children. Men must come 
to some ripeness of understanding before they are 
capable of it....Like all our other powers, it is 
greatly improved by exercise; and until a man has got 
the habit of [it], he can never have clear and distinct 
notions of them, nor form any steady judgment concerning 
them....To acquire this habit, is a work of time and 
labour, even in those who begin it early, and whose 
natural talents are tolerably fitted for it; but the 
difficulty will be daily diminishing, and the advantage 
of it is great.28
The ability to reflect is such a power acquired, and though 
humankind may be endowed with the capacity to form such a 
habit, its development depends on both "natural talent" and 
concerted effort, that is, the human will (see Figure 1).
My purpose in emphasizing this aspect of Reid's thought 
is two-fold: Reid was one of the first, in all likelihood,
to insist on a distinction between innate powers of the mind 
(perceiving, reasoning, judging) and innate capacities of the 
mind (such as the capacity to reflect or the capacity to 
appreciate beauty) and to incorporate into his model the idea 
that one might develop both by an effort of the Will. The 
idea that the Will and the Understanding might interact, that 
their interaction was part of a developmental sequence, was
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the primary- difference between the mental models proposed by- 
Reid and those proposed by Locke, for example, and Hume.29 in 
summary, Reid's explicit concern with the properties of the 
Will enabled him to a) account for individual differences 
among peoples (the vulgar versus the the elite, children 
versus adults); b) suggest means by which God-given powers 
might be improved; and c) account for error and false 
beliefs, none of which Locke was able to account for 
successfully. Moreover, it accorded with the idea, common to 
nineteenth-century Americans, that knowledge of God and 
purity of soul were a product of individual effort (good 
works) , not merely given by divine fiat.30 One reason, then, 
for the enduring influence of the Scottish tradition in 
America is precisely that their ideas gave such profound 
support to individual effort.
My second purpose in emphasizing this aspect of Reid's 
thought is that this idea--the idea that persons differed in 
their ability to reflect upon their own thoughts (as well 
upon the events which occasioned them) and, by extension, to 
act upon their reflections--was assumed by each of the 
writers whose works I will examine in Chapter 4. To greater 
or lesser degree, each of these novelists described 
characters whose lives were directly affected by their 
ability to take in information about their world, to reflect 
on that information, and to act on their conclusions.
Consciousness and Reflection
As we will see in the succeeding chapters, the 
distinctions Reid makes between "consciousness" and 
"reflection" are upheld by both late nineteenth-century
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psychologists and novelists. In the Essays. Reid defined 
"consciousness" as a power of the Understanding, and 
"reflection," as an innate capacity which depends for its 
development on the activity of the Will (see Figure 1). Reid 
believed the distinction was important because reflection was 
regarded as the primary tool of the mental philosopher, and 
the capacity for reflection (acquired over time) was regarded 
as the primary feature that distinguished those who aspired 
to true knowledge of the world and those who merely existed 
within it.
In the words of Thomas Reid, "consciousness is an 
operation of the understanding of its own kind, and cannot 
[therefore] be logically defined;"31 that is, reduced to 
elements such as "ideas" or "impressions," as Locke would 
have it. Though consciousness included pains and pleasures, 
hopes and fears, desires and doubts, "in a word, all the 
passions, and all the actions and operations of our own 
minds, while they are present,"32 its activities were confined 
to the present instant. That is, consciousness might "know" 
of these operations, and know them with certainty, but only 
as they occurred; consciousness was without memory, within 
this context, however, "consciousness" assumed the character 
of a perceptual act, an ever-present observer of the mind's 
operations, "the evidence, the only evidence," Reid insists, 
"which we have or can have of [the] existence [of the 
operations of our minds]."33 Like Reid, American pre- 
experimental psychologists and realist novelists would 
recognize in consciousness this same orientation to the 
present; unlike Reid, the novelists would regard the
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sensations of consciousness as primary.
In contrast, reflection, says Reid, is "like to the 
difference between a superficial view of an object...and that 
attentive examination which we give to an object when we are 
wholly employed in surveying it."34 Reflection, as we have 
seen, is the philosopher's tool. Accordingly, while 
consciousness is restricted to present phenomena, reflection 
is the power to examine with careful attention both the 
present and immediate past experience, while simple 
consciousness is constrained by immediate experience and 
transitory sensations, reflection, because it is founded on a 
combination of the powers of memory, reason, and judgment, is 
effectively timeless: past, present, and future coalesce. It 
is through the acquired ability to reflect, according to 
Reid, that we come to have knowledge of our minds and through 
which we come to understand our desires; it is, of course, 
reflection that provides the philosopher's data. As we will 
see, in the hands of the novelists, "reflection" becomes the 
source of self-knowledge.
Reid distinguishes consciousness and reflection on other 
grounds as well: Consciousness is described as involuntary,
operating independently of judgment and reason, and 
unfocused; reflection is described as voluntary, operating 
within the constraints of judgment and reason, and focused.35 
Reflection, not consciousness, is the source of invention, 
the poet's creative act. Dugald Stewart argues this point in 
some detail in a passage that resonates with metaphorical 
imagery:
Of the powers which the mind possesses over the train of
its thoughts, the most obvious is its power of singling
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out any one of them at pleasure, of detaining it, and of 
making it a particular object of attention. By doing 
so, we not only stop the succession that would otherwise 
take place, but in consequence of our bringing to view 
the less obvious relations among our ideas, we 
frequently divert the current of our thoughts into a new 
channel.36
It is "reflection" that enables the poet and scientist to 
halt the progression of images, to focus on one thought to 
the exclusion of others, to discover relationships among 
images and ideas, and thereby to create a novel image, embark 
on yet untraveled terrain.
The difference between consciousness and reflection that 
Reid sought to establish may seem contrived, because within a 
mind-as-entity perspective, because such distinctions were 
considered the hallmark of careful analysis. Nonetheless, 
the method, patterned after the method used in the natural 
sciences, was inevitably classificatory, analytical, and 
reductive: Distinctions, like that established between
"consciousness" and "reflection," were regarded by those who 
advanced them as indications of progress in knowledge about 
the human mind and human mental function.
Yet, reductive analysis of this kind generated its own 
set of conceptual difficulties. One difficulty that was not 
to be satisfactorily resolved even into the twentieth century 
was that of accounting for the human sense of self. The 
models devised by Locke and Reid within a mind-as-entity 
perspective assumed relatively stable classificatory 
distinctions; in Reid's model, for example, memory is but one 
component of the Understanding (see Figure 1}. In contrast, 
the self-concept, introspectively known, endured through time 
and across situations. How, for example, might the
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philosopher account for the fact that each individual knows
with certainty that each thought is his or her own thought,
distinguished from all others' thoughts? Though the question
seems odd from a twentieth-century perspective, in a
classificatory system (such as Reid's) which ought to be made
to account for all aspects of mental function, the problem of
an enduring self was not easily resolved. Where, in such a
system, would an enduring self be located? In such a model
it would have been as logically defensible to locate the
self-concept in Reason or the Will or Memory as in any other
delineated power.
In order to maintain consistency, Reid located the self
(or self-concept) in consciousness. The implications of this
idea are interesting: Though reflection might serve the
creative pursuit, though the Will in its various forms
preceded every conscious act, though Memory might serve as
the locus of former selves and past events, only
consciousness, innately given and oriented to the immediate
moment was capable of providing the essential and pervasive
sense of a self. Reid writes:
[Though] (t)he thoughts and feelings of which we are 
conscious are continually changing, and the thought of 
this moment is not the thought of the last, still, there 
remains, under this ebb and flow of thought, a constant 
sense of certainty that the self that existed in a 
single moment of perception is the same self that 
existed yesterday or would exist tomorrow.37
The very core of consciousness, in Reid's model, is the 
abiding sense of self.
Reid's solution to the question of a sense of self was 
not a sweeping reappraisal of previous theories of 
consciousness, but it is significant, if only because he
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firmly established a "self" within immediate, on-going 
experience and, in doing so, took the first step in the 
development of a psychology of experience. In a very real 
sense, the psychological characterization of experience as 
self-owned and promulgated was at one remove from the neutral 
(and neutralizing) epistemological programs of Locke and 
Hume. In this regard, Reid appears as a transition figure, 
leading the way into a psychology that paid heed to 
individual experience. As we will see in the next chapter, 
however, Reid's solution to the problem of the location of 
the self or self-concept was not adopted without revision by 
the next generation of psychologist/philosophers (1865-1885), 
although each of them recognized the necessity of accounting 
for the known-self in their own classification systems. 
Realist authors, however, unencumbered by classification 
systems and reductive analysis, assumed the known-self as an 
integral and defining characteristic of consciousness.
As we will see, psychologists of the later period (1886- 
1910), less inclined to classification, supported a self- 
owned consciousness, even, as with James Baldwin, predicating 
the development of the individual on the ability to 
distinguish between self and not-self. In the search for 
general laws of human nature, the "new psychology" of this 
later period was attenuated not by the development of 
classification systems, but by the use of aggregate data and 
the development of psychological "norms" of adjustment.38 A 
brief passage from William James's Principles of Psvchotocrv 
will reveal the influence of this idea on late nineteenth- 
century psychology:
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Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each Thought, 
dies away and is replaced by another. The other, among 
the things it knows, knows its own predecessor, and 
finding it 'warm, ' in the way we have described, greets 
it, saying: 'Thou art mine, and part of the same self 
with me.' Each later Thought, knowing and including 
thus the Thoughts which went before, is the final 
receptacle--and appropriating them is the final owner-- 
of all that they contain and own.39
By the mid-nineteenth century, consciousness was 
conceived in three different senses: It was conceived as the
source of our knowledge of the discrete operations of our 
mental powers by which general principles of mental function 
could be determined. In this context, consciousness was both 
immediate and simple, capable of recording present experience 
and elementary sensations; and reflective, capable of turning 
back upon itself and recording thoughts on that experience 
and recognition of those sensations as sensations in accord 
with other sensations and past experience. As simple 
consciousness, it remained an independent act of mind; as 
reflective consciousness, it was under control of the 
separate powers of the will--attention, deliberation, and 
resolution— and included the powers of judgment and 
reasoning. Simultaneously, consciousness also served as the 
sense we have that all our thoughts emanate from a single 
self, that they are our thoughts. In this sense, 
consciousness provided the continuity that was necessary for 
a system otherwise divided in theory.
Finally, both consciousness and reflection were 
conceived as the source of all our knowledge of the external 
world of physical objects and events and the internal world 
of mental processes, of the passions, and of the body's
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physiological responses to internal and external stimulation. 
Where epistemological and moral issues dominated the mode of 
representation, consciousness was a necessary, but 
problematic, dimension of mental functioning: necessary,
because it provided the means for an analysis of 
epistemological and moral issues (within the constraints of a 
mind-as-entity perspective); and problematic, because 
consciousness itself could not be "brought into" reductive 
analysis. As we will see, mid-nineteenth century psychologies 
of mind and consciousness offered no clear solutions.
The Scottish Influence 
The distinction Reid established between immediate 
consciousness and reflective consciousness occurs repeatedly 
in the psychological literature throughout the nineteenth 
century. It occurs, for example, in the epistemological 
models of mind and consciousness set down by American pre- 
experimental psychologists and it occurs in the models of 
consciousness offered by William James and later experimental 
psychologists like James Mark Baldwin and George Trumbull 
Ladd.10 Invariably, consciousness is described as consisting 
of a succession of thoughts, sensations (pleasure and pain), 
fears and hopes, memories, and the like, always "of the 
present," that is, occurring in the here and now.
Reflection, when the distinction is made, has duration: the
process extends over time, involves attention, deliberation, 
and (often) resolution. It is willed and focused, and, as 
Reid describes it, it is the source of knowledge and 
invention.11 As we will see in Chapter 4, the distinction 
between consciousness and reflection serves as a useful
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characterization of modes of consciousness in nineteenth- 
century realist literature.
In contrast to Locke's over-valuation of experience,
the Scottish appeal to innate principles effectively forged a
compromise between a nativist theory of mind which supported
humankind's dependence on God and an empirical theory of mind
which allowed for the gradual shaping of mind through
education and experience.42 Certainly, the Scottish view
appealed to the American democratic ideal that individual
effort counted for much more than innate endowments in regard
to the pursuit of a moral life. In G. Stanley Hall's words,
The Scotch philosophy represented by Reid, Stewart,
Brown and Hamilton, opened a far safer way. The "common 
sense," which was its watchword, contained an immediate 
conviction of right and wrong, of the reality of the 
external world, freedom, etc., about which there was no 
need or warrant for debate or doubt, while its 
discussion of association, desire, will, and feeling, 
was lucidity itself, and fitted our practical country 
and had a wider vogue here than in Scotland itself. In 
this form, psychology was very widely introduced in 
American colleges.43
Like their twentieth-century counterparts, the Scottish 
philosophers were acutely aware that a valid and useful 
"science" of the mind depended on objectivity, unbiased 
observation, and a more careful analysis than even the 
natural sciences employed. And they were just as self­
consciously aware that the language of their science--indeed 
the very subject matter--was even more than normally prone to 
distortions and misinterpretations.44 The self-conscious 
"scientism" exhibited in their work may be considered by 
contemporary psychologists to be somewhat misplaced, but it 
is there, nonetheless. Their goal was clear: Careful
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observation of the operations of the mind through conscious 
reflection would yield simple and general laws of mental 
function; and from those laws, through the process of 
reasoning, one might discern the effect of any given 
combination of them/5 As we have seen, this 
scientific/analytical approach justified both their mental 
science and the assumption with which they began: namely
that our knowledge of mental events and our knowledge of 
real-world events were the same in kind.
Later psychologists would follow the spirit, though not 
the letter, of the program Reid set forth. As we will see, 
they were no less concerned than he was to ensure that a 
science of the mind should be protected against speculative 
self-interest. One way to do that, of course, was to adopt 
the conventions of classification/analysis to mental science 
just as Reid did. This strategy provided assurance that the 
author's work would be accepted within the tradition. In a 
sense, mental science in America up until the late 1880s 
followed a program of "normal science," a term originated by 
Thomas Kuhn that refers to the practice within a discipline 
of refining an accepted paradigm/6 As we will see, in the 
third quarter of the nineteenth century, American 
psychologists were engaged in the practice of normal science 
in just this sense, elaborating Reid's model of the human 
mind and consciousness.
Indeed, far too little recognition has been given to the 
Scottish influence in traditional history-of-psychology 
texts. Graham Richards, for example, notes that 
Associationist accounts of the mind (e.g., Locke, Hume, Mill)
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are accorded 84.3% coverage in contemporary history-of- 
psychology texts, while the Scottish Enlightenment position 
(Reid, Stewart, Hamilton) is accorded a mere 15.7% coverage.47 
According to Richards, this unequal representation is the 
result of a concerted effort among latter-day historians to 
justify psychology's "scientific" heritage: the
Associationist account is, in its particulars, more in accord 
with the "'positivist', reductionist, 'materialist' 
['empiricist'] tradition" that psychologists have self­
consciously claimed as their own.48 The persistent neglect 
of Scottish ideas, according to Richards, serves the 
essential purpose of maintaining the belief that psychology-- 
as a science--has its origins in a train of philosophical 
ideas that, in spirit, support its goal of "prediction and 
control."49 Though I have presented only a brief overview of 
Scottish ideas (primarily Reid's), it should be evident that 
their work is attended by a particular sensitivity to the 
idea that a science of the mind should be approached no less 
objectively than a science of the physical world. Though 
their success in that endeavor may be questioned, their acute 
awareness of the problem was at least as influential as 
Associationist accounts in setting the stage for the eager 
acceptance of the experimental tradition by American 
psychologists seeking justification for their work.
Though reduction of the mind to powers seems no less a 
reduction than to (Lockean) ideas, the categorization Reid 
proposed was more than relabeling: it represented a dramatic
shift in emphasis no less important than that which displaced 
humankind from the center of the universe. The reason is
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clear: Locke's model of a passive mind could not
satisfactorily explain why individuals of similar experience 
so often disagreed; it could not explain differences in 
development (especially moral development), or, even, 
differences in behavior over time. In this account, I have 
attempted to show that the Scottish thinkers accorded greater 
emphasis to motivational issues than Locke (for one) had 
granted, even if that emphasis rested on a theological 
foundation. From a presentist point of view, we might find 
in Scottish thought the origin of a number of ideas that have 
contributed to the development of psychology as a science. 
Richards, for example, proposes several: the development of
a psychology of education (which can be traced to the 
Scottish idea that certain "habits" can be acquired),- the 
development of a psychology of individual differences (which 
can be traced to the Scottish idea that talent and effort 
both determine behavioral outcomes, foreshadowing Gall's 
phrenology and providing a context for evolutionary thought); 
and proto-psychiatry (which can be traced to the idea that 
"excesses of the imagination," unattended by reason, would 
lead to improper behavior, poor health, and madness).50 I 
would add a fourth, namely Reid's idea that there is a 
necessary correspondence between physiological processes and 
mental powers. All these ideas would be taken up by the 
"new" psychologists of the late nineteenth century.
Summary and Prospectus 
My purpose in this chapter was to provide a context in 
which to assess changes in the concept of consciousness 
throughout the nineteenth century. For this reason, it is
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important to establish a clear sense of the concept as it was 
understood by the leading philosophy of the time. In various 
places throughout his work, Reid refers to consciousness as 
an "internal sense," similar in all respects to the act of 
seeing. The dominant metaphor of consciousness is that of a 
perceptual act, "reflection" no less so: Both are to the
mind what the senses are to the external world.51 Later 
theories of consciousness (e.g., Asa Mahan, William James, 
Herbert Spencer), though retaining in principle Reid's 
distinction between consciousness and reflection, do not 
adopt his metaphor. Indeed, by 187 0, most
psychologist/philosophers did not even consider consciousness 
to be a "power" of the mind at all.
The solution of later thinkers to the 'problem' of 
consciousness had already been articulated by Reid in a 
chapter entitled "The Train of Thought." As Reid defined it, 
the train of thought was not consciousness, but that which we 
may be conscious of. Distinct from consciousness, the train 
of thought was caused not by external stimulation but 
originated entirely within the "constant intestine motion" of 
the mind itself. It may be called, Reid asserted, 
imagination, though he is cautious about the implications of 
that label which implied a lack of moral constraint.52
According to Reid, the train of thought consisted of 
either ideas "that flow spontaneously, like water from a 
fountain, without any exertion of a governing principle to 
arrange them;" or it may be "regulated and directed by active 
effort of the mind, with some view and intention."53 The 
similarity between these descriptions and Reid's account of
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consciousness and reflection are too powerful to ignore: The
train of thought may be, that is, either like "consciousness" 
(immediate, involuntary, and unfocused) or like "reflection" 
(voluntary, focused, and involving reason and judgment). 
Figure 1, an adaptation of Reid's model of the mind based 
upon his work, depicts the "train of thought" as continuous 
with the operation of the various faculties, of which 
consciousness is one.
The distinctions Reid makes between consciousness, 
reflection, and the train of thought, however consistently he 
holds to them, are not compelling. I point this out, not to 
point out weaknesses in Reid's system, but to establish a 
possible connection between later models of mind and 
consciousness and the model Reid describes. By the mid 
nineteenth century, many philosopher/psychologists would 
build on Reid's "train of thought;" would, in fact, take this 
idea as the defining characteristic of consciousness. In 
later psychologies (see William James), Reid's "train of 
thought" comes to serve as an apt metaphor for the experience 
of consciousness itself.
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CHAPTER 3
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY, 1845-1885
American psychology in the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century was founded on the ideas laid down by 
Thomas Reid. Specifically, the psychologists whose work we 
will examine in this chapter upheld Reid's belief in a mind 
that consisted of separate powers or faculties which gave a 
true and accurate picture of the world. With some minor 
changes, they adopted the divisions of mind Reid had 
proposed; and they assumed, like Reid, that the separate 
powers of the mind, the Will and the Understanding, 
interacted in specific and determinable ways.
Despite this implicit acknowledgement of Reid's 
influence, however, American psychologists of 1845-1885 were 
much less interested in the moral issues that had so 
preoccupied Reid and his followers than they were concerned 
with devising models of human mental function that accorded 
with the latest research into human physiology, particularly 
the functions of the brain and nervous system. Accordingly, 
there is an incipient materialism in the work of this period 
that is not present to the same degree in earlier work. 
Moreover, as we will see, all of these models incorporated a 
developmental perspective, to a greater degree of specificity 
than Reid had done. These ideas were influenced, in part, by 
the evolutionary theories of Herbert Spencer, whose ideas had 
come to acceptance in both American popular culture and in
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the academic halls.1
Although the influence of Scottish thought continued 
until well into the 1880s, many of the models of mind and 
consciousness developed in this period reflect the uneasy 
opposition of two other lines of thought: The first
perspective, derived from British empiricism, we encountered 
before in the brief discussion of John Locke's theory of 
mind. Locke's position received support from David Hume and 
J. S. Mill and remained a potent force in British theories of 
mind throughout the nineteenth century, though less so in 
America until the rise of Behaviorism in the twentieth 
century.
The second perspective was derived from German idealism, 
a philosophy of mind that emphasized the transcendent and 
intuitive nature of human thought. The primary source for 
German philosophy in America was Immanuel Kant, who, like 
Thomas Reid, was unwilling to accept the conclusions which 
Hume had drawn from Locke's metaphysical position. Kant 
believed that the human mind was endowed with certain innate 
capacities to organize experience: in particular, Kant
asserted that the mind was innately capable of organizing 
experience in space and time, determining cause and effect, 
and, through memory and reflection, of acquiring such notions 
as the concept of beauty or good.2
Many of Kant's ideas were also proposed by Reid. For 
example, like Reid, Kant also divided the mind into distinct 
faculties or powers, though he accorded the imaginative 
faculty much greater respect than Reid was inclined to do. 
Unlike Reid and his followers, however, Kant believed that
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our knowledge of the world was limited to that which could be 
gained through sense experience, that is, to phenomena. The 
world of noumena. that is, of objects-in-themselves, was 
beyond sense-experience and thus beyond our ability to know 
with certainty, though the imaginative faculty, operating in 
accord with reason, was capable, in principle, of acquiring 
higher-order knowledge of this sort.3
These ideas were enthusiastically taken up by the 
American Transcendentalists (Emerson, Thoreau) who advocated 
reason and intuition over earthly experience as a means to 
certain knowledge.4 As a literary movement, however, American 
Transcendentalism seemed to have little influence on mid­
nineteenth century American psychology, though that influence 
can be seen toward the end of the nineteenth century in the 
work of William James (both William and his brother, Henry, 
grew up in an atmosphere of close contact with Emerson, 
Thoreau, and the others, who were part of their father's 
circle).
Nonetheless, German idealism did infiltrate American 
psychology, however briefly, in the work of two early 
American psychologists, Asa Mahan and Laurens Hickok. There 
is no indication in available records to suggest that these 
men garnered their ideas from the Transcendental movement 
alone; rather, it appears that their debt is to a burgeoning 
interest in German philosophical ideas that occurred in the 
mid-nineteenth century among American philosophers. At least 
one source traces the emergence of this interest to the 
publication of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's 1833 American 
edition of Aids to Reflection, though there is evidence that
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the work of both Kant and Hegel was offered in American
colleges and universities in the early nineteenth century.5 In
the tradition of Kant and Hegel, these particular American
theorists gave greater powers to consciousness than Reid, for
example, had allowed.6 As we will see, consciousness from
this perspective is couched in "energy" metaphors: it assumes
the quality of an "internal light" or an "inner power."
Laurens Hickok (1798-1888)
In Hickok's work, we see a salient example of
consciousness cast as an internal light, though expressed in
an explicitly psychological text, Hickok's Rational
Psychology, published in 1848. Because the text accorded
with the basic tenets of Christian theology, it was widely
used in American colleges and universities prior to the Civil
War to introduce advanced students to the scientific study of
the mind. Like Reid, Hickok offers an extended discussion of
the faculties of sensing, perceiving, judging, intuiting and
their relations. Unlike Reid, Hickok suggests that these
activities are made known to us by the luminate quality of
consciousness:
The whole process of the construction [of the pure 
object of experience], all stand out in the mind's own 
light, and such illumination will be available to reveal 
what has been done, and to show the product. The pure 
object is put within this light, and thus the mind 
possesses it in its own illumination, and this is the 
same as to say that the object stands in consciousness. 
Not as an act, but as a light; not as a maker - for that 
is the province of the intellectual agency - but rather 
as a revealer: after such analogies shall we doubtless
best conceive of consciousness, and which may thus be 
termed the "light of all our seeing."7
Hickok's concept of "consciousness" as that which 
illuminates and reveals mental processes represents a
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significant departure from Reid's conception of consciousness 
as a perceptual act. Consciousness, in Hickok's system, was 
envisioned as a substance-less 'power', invisible and 
formless, capable of "receiving all things" without altering 
its characteristics. By definition, however, it could shed 
no light on its own operations:
It is that inward illumination in which all that is 
therein constructed may appear, while itself is a light 
too pure and transparent to admit that it should be 
seen.8
It remained an undefinable operation which possessed 
different characteristics at different times--now of reason, 
now of intuition, now of understanding, now of willing, yet 
possessing no two simultaneously. In Hickok's system, 
consciousness appeared as that medium, changeless and 
formless, in the light of which separate faculties-- 
reasoning, perceiving, intuiting and willing--played out 
their distinct roles. The image expressed by Hickok is 
wholly in accord with his view that an empirical psychology 
of mind must be buttressed by appeal to "transcended 
experience."9 Though this view of consciousness is expressed 
in the work of the American Transcendentalists, it was 
discarded by those who promulgated the new American literary 
tradition of the mid-nineteenth century, American realism.
Asa Mahan (1799-1889)
Asa Mahan's major textbook, A System of Intellectual 
Philosophy, was published first in 1845, reissued in 1847, 
and issued again as an enlarged edition in 1854.10 What is 
different about this text is that Mahan is clearly not 
concerned with constructing a conception of either mind or
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consciousness that meets the requirements of his theological 
principles.11
Taking his cue from Reid, Mahan insists on a distinction 
between two different kinds of consciousnesses: The first
consciousness, occurring earliest in time, is self- 
consciousness- -defined as "the being aware of ourselves, as 
of the rne, in opposition to the not me:" this consciousness 
was also called "simple consciousness." The second 
consciousness, emerging in late childhood or early adulthood, 
is referred to as "philosophical" consciousness--a process 
similar in many respects to Reid's concept of "reflection."12 
Although Mahan believed both forms of consciousness were 
contingent upon Reason--the organ of all "universal and 
necessary truths" (the elevation of Reason to the source of 
all truth ensures that Mahan is working within the idealist 
tradition), it is through simple consciousness, Mahan 
believed, that humans, through the gradual recognition of the 
self as separate from all else, come to develop their 
intellectual capacities.13 Like Reid, Mahan believes the 
"philosophic consciousness" is directed by the will, and 
capable of yielding certain knowledge about the activities of 
our minds.14
From these basic principles, Mahan constructed a model 
of consciousness that is explicitly concerned with 
explicating the series of mental events from which we derive 
our knowledge of the world. Knowledge begins, according to 
Mahan, with the perception of a material object. Simple 
perception is attended by simple consciousness, a mere 
recognition of object as distinct from self. From this
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perception, reflective consciousness extracts certain ideas 
about the object, such as that it has shape and form, exists 
in space and time, etc. Over time, reflection extracts from 
the perception of physical objects the concept of abstract 
notions of "contingency," for example the idea that the 
existence of an object implies the existence of physical 
space or that an event must have a cause. Similarly, 
reflection extracts from the repeated perceptions of 
physical objects and events the abstract concept of 
"necessity," the idea that physical space is a necessary 
condition for the existence of a physical object or the idea 
that a cause is a necessary condition for an event to occur. 
Over time, these ideas, originally given by simple 
consciousness and subjected to the process of reflection, 
are analyzed, arranged, and generalized by the intelligence, 
and presented as certainties to the Mind, the overseer of all 
mental operations.15
Figure 2 represents the process Mahan has outlined. Of 
the first stage of consciousness, there is only the 
perception of an external object or event; of the second 
stage, of reflective consciousness, there is both abstraction 
and synthesis (according to the laws of association) and 
consequent classification and generalization. This last 
stage submits to the Intelligence the phenomena "so arranged" 
which yields them, in turn, to the mind.
Summary
The models of mind and consciousness described by Hickok 
and Mahan are not characteristic of mid-nineteenth century 
models more generally. However, like Reid, they relied on a




Stage 4 Mind Reason






Stage l Simple Consciousness perception*
* where Intelligence is considered a special function of Mind 
and consciousness (both simple and reflective) is considered 
a special function of the Intelligence.
Figure 2.
Representation of Asa Mahan's concept of mental function. 
(Adapted from Asa Mahan, A System of Intellectual Philosophy, 
1st ed. [New York: A. S. Barnes, 1854], pp. 47, 50-52. 55- 
56.)
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faculty psychology, segmenting the mind into separate and 
distinct powers of reasoning, judging and the like; and like 
Reid, they distinguished between immediate (simple) and 
reflective consciousness. The elevation of the faculty of 
reason (synthesis and abstraction) reveals Kant's influence.
Likely because of the Kantian influence, both Hickok and 
Mahan gave to consciousness specific powers that Reid did 
not. For Hickok, consciousness was that internal light that 
illuminated the operations of the mind and took on their 
specific and discrete characteristics. This "reflective" 
capacity is interesting: The metaphor suggests that
consciousness was not a power of the mind (as an "internal 
sense" was such a power), but held a somewhat tangential 
position, merely serving to mirror the activities of the 
mind. This idea was taken up by Mark Hopkins and James 
McCosh, psychologists whose work represents the prevailing 
ideas of the period in psychology just after the Civil War.
It is not a particularly compelling view (as we will see, 
later American psychologists believed consciousness alone to 
be the "proper" subject-matter of psychology) and it 
certainly was not the view held by the literary realists of 
the third quarter of the nineteenth century.
Mahan, in contrast, proposes a "consciousness" of a 
wider scope, one that is active, capable of development, 
capable, at later stages, of abstraction and synthesis, 
classification and generalization. Mahan's consciousness 
consists of levels: simple/reflective, immediate/extended in 
time. It is a combination of Reid's consciousness/reflection 
distinction without the limitations imposed by equating both
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with a perceptual act. As we will see, this model of
consciousness is very much in accord with the models adopted
by the literary realists discussed in the next chapter.
These models, as other nineteenth-century psychological
models of mind we will examine that reduced mind to a
constellation of separate powers, the dominant metaphor, was
that described by Michael Kearns as the "mind-as-entity"
world-view, even though, like Reid, these men envisioned the
mind as composed of powers, not merely ideas, simple or
complex. As Kearns states:
The image suggests that the interior of the mind is no 
longer the simple space presented by Hume and Hartley 
but a textured place with localized features within 
which a percipient principle [i.e., consciousness] can 
experience certain impressions unavailable from the 
external world....[The Scottish philosophers] place more 
value on the mind's activity [but that principle is 
phrased] in metaphorical language that still allows the 
mind the qualities of extension and impressionability. 
{The mind] is localized, hence extended, although here 
it is living, active, and willful, rather than passive.16
Thus, it is the "reduction" of the mind to "localized 
features" that is the primary characteristic of a mind-as- 
entity world-view, not (necessarily) the assumption of 
passivity, according to Kearns.
Still, there is something incongruous about a label that 
includes Locke and Hume and Reid (and, by extension, Hickok 
and Mahan) without some qualifying remarks. The differences 
between an active mind, consisting of discrete powers 
modified by the Will, and a passive mind, consisting of 
discrete ideas, combined according to associative law, are 
major, and much too important to be trivialized under a 
single all-encompassing label. Reid's model, in contrast to
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Locke's model, for all its possible faults, allowed for the 
possibility that the mind might develop over time; allowed 
for the possibility that individual differences, in talent 
and propensity to put forth effort, would lead to different 
modes of conduct; and suggested a source for error and false 
beliefs.
A Psychology of Mind and Body
Hickok and Mahan published their ideas just before the 
outbreak of the American Civil War. By 1870, however, the 
epistemological/philosophical cast of American models of mind 
and consciousness had faded into the background and there 
occurred a shift in emphasis from a study of the human mind 
as an aspect of the soul to a study of the mind as an aspect 
of the brain and nervous system. There were several reasons 
for this shift. Traditional accounts regularly and 
accurately cite the influence on American thought of the work 
of psycho-physicists Gustav Fechner and Hermann Helmholtz in 
Germany and physician/philosophers Thomas Laycock and W. B. 
Carpenter in England.17 The work of these men was founded on 
the belief that psychological phenomena (that is, of the 
mind) were closely related to physiological phenomena, that 
is, of the brain. We have seen this idea, of course, in 
Reid's theory of the process of perception. By the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century, however, there seemed a 
compelling need to clarify this connection and to incorporate 
the latest findings into models of the mind.
A second factor that supported attempts to clarify the 
mind/body connection emerged as a direct result of the Civil 
War. Physicians and neurologists of the late nineteenth
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century had become aware that many of the soldiers who 
survived the war were suffering from a variety of ailments 
(such as battle fatigue and shell shock) for which no clear 
organic cause could be found, however serious and readily 
apparent their physical symptoms.18 Neurologists and 
physicians of the time looked for a "psychological" 
explanation for these illnesses. A similar explanation was 
advanced for "neurasthenia," an illness characterized by 
vague symptoms such as insomnia, headache, fatigue, and 
depression which kept many people from completing even 
routine tasks. The cause of neurasthenia was often laid to 
the conditions of the fast-paced world of American urban 
life--stress, overwork, competition--though the physical 
symptoms were debilitatingly real.19 Most physicians had come 
to believe there was a connection between the mind and the 
body which precipitated such symptoms, even though the 
organic basis was not well understood.
Given this emphasis on mind/body relations, it is to be 
expected that the models of mind and consciousness that 
dominated American thought from 1865 to 1885 would attempt to 
bring into account some aspect of the connection. It is 
interesting that they did so even while retaining in spirit 
many of the ideas that Reid had established over fifty years 
earlier. As we will see in the work of Mark Hopkins and 
James McCosh, the idea that the mind consisted of separate 
semi-autonomous powers proved too powerful to reject.
Mark Hopkins (1802-1887)
Mark Hopkins, president of Williams College (1836-1872), 
published his Outline Study of Man. The Body and Mind in One
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System in 1878 as a record of his lectures. It was reissued 
in 1886, and again in 1891 (revised), just one year after 
William James published his Principles of Psychology. In 
this work, Hopkins offers a Kantian-like higher-order system 
of classification of the faculties of the Intellect according 
to their specific epistemological function. Thus, the 
Intellect is described as possessed of four distinct 
regulatory functions: a presentative faculty or power
through which we have knowledge of our minds and the physical 
world; a regulative faculty through which we have knowledge 
of a priori ideas and truths; a representative faculty that 
operates through the association of ideas and the 
imagination; and an elaborative faculty that yields knowledge 
through comparison and abstraction.20 The following is a 
reproduction of Hopkins's diagram of the regulative and 
presentative powers:
THE REGULATIVE FACULTY THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY
(a priori knowledge) (immediate knowledge)
N p 11 { willing
e r {Resemblance |I The inner sense { feeling
c o {Number |1 { thought
e d {Personal Identity 1 1
s u {Space |1
s c {Time |I Sense perception { percepts
a t {Being |1 { obj ects21
r s 11
y
In the diagram, the section to the right side of the
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elongated double line represents the knowledge man receives 
from the external world through sense perception, and from 
the observation through the "inner sense" of the operations 
of his own mind. The section to the left side of the double 
line represents a priori knowledge, elsewhere in Hopkins's 
text referred to as intuition or the Reason.
Within this bipartite division, Hopkins defines 
consciousness as "the knowledge by the mind of itself as the 
permanent and indivisible part of its own operations," a 
definition which does not seem very different from any that 
we have encountered before. Yet Hopkins continues in a 
different vein: "This implies, he continues, "a knowledge of
the operations, but leaves that knowledge to be given by its 
own specific faculty while consciousness holds the whole as 
unitv by a constant reference of the different acts and 
states of mind £p the indivisible self pr ego."22 It is not 
the role of consciousness, argues Hopkins, to transmit 
knowledge of the mind's operations--that function is taken up 
by the specific faculty which carries out those operations. 
Thus, we know of willing through the willing faculty; 
judgment through the judging faculty, etc. The role of 
consciousness, as Hopkins defines it, is to provide the 
necessary unity to the system by ordering these different 
"acts and states" to a "permanent and indivisible self or 
ego."
Consciousness, as Hopkins describes it, is not under 
control of the will; it is automatic; it admits of no 
diversity. Consciousness is the glue that holds the system 
together and it does so, Hopkins suggests, because
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"consciousness is not [itself] knowledge, it is that which
accompanies knowledge."23 It is the indisputable self-
referent of every mental act, and, accordingly, cannot be
regarded as a valid and trustworthy record of those
operations.24 The analogy Hopkins adopts reflects his
physician's training:
Consciousness belongs to another sphere. Its office is 
to bind all the operations of the Mind into unity. It 
does for the mind just what the cellular system does for 
the body....the cellular membrane is found in connection 
with every part of the body. It enfolds, for instance, 
each fibre of the muscles. It is never by itself. It 
always accompanies something else, is for the sake of 
something else; and it gives unity to the body. And 
consciousness does the same thing for the mind. It is, 
as it were, its cellular membrane, combining everything 
connected with it into unity; never found by itself, but 
always present in connection with every other mental 
operation.25
Unlike Reid, Hopkins does not regard consciousness as a 
separate power on a par with other powers of the 
Understanding, nor does he credit consciousness with any 
power at all, but for its capacity to bring together as one 
the separate operations of the mind. Like every other 
philosopher whose work I have reviewed, however, Hopkins is 
intent upon the idea that consciousness is the sole origin of 
the concept of the self.
James McCosh (1811-1894)
Though James McCosh published his major works in 
psychology after 1885, his work is more closely allied with 
the Scottish tradition than representative of the new age of 
experimental psychology of the later period.26 In fact, by 
the time his books were published, McCosh had been teaching 
psychology as intellectual philosophy in Scotland, Ireland,
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and. the United States for nearly thirty years. Because McCosh
is, as A. A. Roback suggests, the last representative of this
long tradition in American psychology, his inclusion in this
section is justified.27
McCosh's psychology consists of the same division of
faculties which we encountered in Hopkins (whom McCosh did
meet briefly on his American tour of 1866)2S: His two major
texts represent the cognitive (mental) and motive
(appetitive) powers separately; the powers of the mind are
successively discussed as presentative ("cognitive"),
representative ("reproductive") and comparative powers.
Though McCosh includes recent physiological information, he
insists that while
(i)t is proper to add that light may be thrown on the 
operations of the mind by the physiology of the brain 
and nerves ....(and that] light may be thrown on the 
action of the conscious soul by careful study of the 
parts of the body most intimately connected with the 
action of the mind— .[still] (o)bservation in 
psychology is to be conducted mainly by self- 
consciousness .25
And it is to self-consciousness that McCosh appeals 
throughout.
McCosh defines self-consciousness as the power by which
"we know self in its present state as acting and being acted
on."30 McCosh describes this self-consciousness as follows:
(w)hen I perceive a material object, when I recollect an 
occurrence, when I draw an inference, when I am 
sorrowing, or rejoicing, when I am wishing or willing, I 
am conscious that I do so. In short, consciousness 
seems inseparable from the exercise of all our faculties 
and to accompany every operation of the mind.31
Self-consciousness for McCosh has the same character as did 
consciousness for Hopkins--with one notable difference:
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McCosh dispels Hopkins's claim that consciousness provides 
the necessary unity to the system through its constant 
reference to a permanent and indivisible ego. It was clear 
to McCosh (as it was clear to Reid and his followers) that 
self-consciousness is solely oriented to the present. In 
self-consciousness, we know only of a self as having being; 
it is only by comparing a memory of a past self with our 
consciousness of a present self that we can speak of a sense 
of personal identity (this idea, of course, is expressed by 
Reid) .32 Quoting a poem by Wordsworth, McCosh suggests that 
self-consciousness is like a "shadow" which cannot be parted 
from the substance, "a gleam of [one's] own image crossing 
the eye's discoveries."33 Because Hopkins gave to 
consciousness the explicit function of unifying the mental 
system, it was, essentially, timeless.
Unlike self-consciousness (which "merely' accompanied 
mental operations) "intuition," as McCosh defined it, was a 
distinct faculty, the source of all our ideas of relations-- 
of time, of cause and effect, of resemblance. Because McCosh 
wanted to distinguish his concept of "intuition" from the 
sense in which it was used by the Transcendentalists, he 
insisted that even intuitions must be constrained by the 
properties of real-world things and events. In McCosh's 
formulation, intuitions are not formed apart from objects [as 
Kant and others suggested] but are in fact discoveries of 
something in objects, or relating to them.34 Though the use 
of the word "intuition" seems to suggest a higher-order form 
of knowledge, in fact, McCosh's "intuitions" are no different 
than Mahan's "generalization and abstraction" processes or
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even, one suspects, very much different from Reid's 
reflective consciousness.
Though McCosh believed that experience alone might 
account for the notions of abstract relations of time and 
space, and the like, he was certain that experience alone 
could not provide the full import of these concepts and could
never yield to our convictions of the universal manner of
their occurrence.35 McCosh's "intuitional realism," however, 
is not an indelible a priori law of the mind, but a distinct 
capacity of the mind that depends on experience for its
execution. What intuition grasps is the reality of the
relations among events and objects in the world. Those 
relations, when brought within the intuitive faculty, are 
held to as general laws, not of the mind, but of the reality 
of things of both internal and external worlds.
Despite McCosh's arguments for an intuitive faculty, he 
insists, however, that the science of psychology is properly 
founded on the self-conscious observation of "states or 
affections" of the mind even though that self-consciousness 
is little more than a shadow which attends mental operations 
with the sense that it is the I who perceives (or thinks). 
McCosh's consciousness is clearly neither an intuitive 
consciousness nor a perceptual consciousness. We might, for 
the sake of convenience, refer to McCosh's concept of 
consciousness as the "shadow" theory of consciousness, as it 
has neither power nor endurance nor form nor task.
Conclusion
Three conclusions might be drawn from the models of 
consciousness reviewed in this chapter. First. From Locke
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and Reid through Hopkins and McCosh, there is general 
agreement that consciousness is the source of our knowledge 
of both external and internal events as well as the source of 
our knowledge of God and God's power. Even though 
consciousness was conceived in this way, the means by which 
it served this function were never made explicit; it was 
accepted as a "first principle" that consciousness is a 
reliable source of information. Second. There is general 
agreement that consciousness consisted of two aspects: 
immediate and simple (consciousness conceived as 
"awareness"), and reflective and complex (consciousness 
conceived as a capacity of the mind). This division implies 
the notion of levels of consciousness, though none of the 
philosopher/psychologists we have reviewed in this period 
referred to consciousness in this sense or explicitly 
asserted that their models implied a hierarchy of conscious 
experiences. This idea was to await the recognition of 
mental pathology as altered conscious states, a perspective 
that would gain ground in the third quarter of the nineteenth 
century.
Third. There was general agreement that consciousness 
serves as the embodiment of the self or the self-concept. 
Certainly, where the mind was conceived as an entity 
divisible into specific operations, some aspect of mental 
function must be given over to the sense of felt continuity, 
the notion that all our thoughts are attended by the sense 
that they are our thoughts. Consciousness served this 
function, though there is no necessary reason why 
consciousness, any more than reason or memory, should serve
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this function. (Indeed, Kant believed that the self-concept 
was learned, not innate.)
That few of the nineteenth-century 
psychologist/philosophers whose models we have examined 
explicitly addressed these issues is, in all likelihood, the 
result of their preference for epistemological issues over 
psychological ones, even in an age when there appeared to be 
increasing interest in the relation between mental function 
and physiological symptoms. What is missing from these 
models is a clear attempt to address psychopathological 
symptoms, symptoms which Reid and his followers frequently 
explained as a lack of will or an excess of imagination. 
Madness, insanity, neurosis, none of these could be 
satisfactorily explained within a model principally oriented 
to conscious processes. If psychology was to be a science, 
however, it must come to terms with both the fallibility of 
mind and the existence of altered conscious states; it must 
adopt a peculiarly psychological point of view that 
encompassed all aspects of man's experience. This was to be 
the legacy of William James and the psychologists of the late 
nineteenth century, whose ideas we will encounter in the 
fifth chapter.
As we have seen, America's philosopher/psychologists 
adopted the methods and assumptions of the Scottish 
philosophers, the same methods that defined most nineteenth- 
century science: the belief that the proper goal of any
science was to submit a classification and hierarchical 
ordering of its subject matter; and the assumption (always 
implicit) that such classification constituted a sufficient
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explanation of the subject.36 These ideas dominated the work 
of Mark Hopkins, and James McCosh who, following in the 
tradition of Scottish faculty psychology, believed they were 
setting mental philosophy upon the certain and respectable 
path of science. In contrast, the novelists of this same 
period adopted a different approach. More concerned with the 
subjective experience, less concerned with epistemological 
issues, the writers whose works are the topic of the next 
chapter replaced "mind" with "consciousness" as the primary 
subject of investigation, acknowledging it as the "ultimate 
and legitimate authority." Consequently, from the literary 
perspective, the central issues of consciousness--that it 
consists of both immediate and reflective (intuitive) 
aspects, that it embodies the self-concept, that it is the 
source of all knowledge--become the central themes of 
literary representation.
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CHAPTER 4
THE "LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY": CONSCIOUSNESS EMPOWERED
My intention in this chapter is to describe models of 
consciousness portrayed in selected works of realist writers 
Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, William Dean Howells, and Henry 
■James, I do not mean to suggest that these authors 
necessarily held to the ideas implied by these passages nor 
that they set out with a particular model in hand, so to 
speak, and concertedly attempted to "fit" the cha.ra.cter to 
the model. Decidedly, realist authors were little concerned 
with epistemological questions and were not intent upon 
constructing philosophical systems. As I hope to make clear - 
they saw their work as an attempt to recreate, in narrative, 
the experience of ord.ina.ry men and women in quite ord.ina.ry 
circumstances; the experience, that is, of living in the 
rapidly changing society of late nineteenth*century America 1 
I am. suggesting, however, that, because these passages a.re 
intended to reflect the experience of ordinary people, they 
may be considered reliable indicators of the wav in which 
consciousness would, he described, by neonle who had no 
t h e o l o g j cal or nhiInsophica1 interest in the m a t t e r . no 
epistemological agenda, to pursue.
It will become evident in this chapter that the authors 
of realist fiction I have selected pursue a very different 
course from that of the philosopher/psychologists of the 
preceding chapters= They have no desire to classify or to 
explain. They are little interested, in speculating about, the
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origin of knowledge or correcting the flaws of previous 
models of mind or consciousness. Indeed, consciousness is 
not an entity to be explained, but, from the literary point 
of view, an on-going series of successive mental and 
emotional states with which the reader is invited to embrace 
and to experience as one's own. This implicit (and 
occasionally explicit) objective of realist fiction virtually 
obviates against the possibility that realist authors would 
recognize anything of value in the psychological literature. 
As we have seen, the psychological literature offers up a 
consciousness seemingly stripped of emotive significance. It 
is just that profound difference in intent that makes 
comparisons between the two disciplines a problematic 
enterprise.
As Michael Kearns has emphasized, the conception of 
mind-as-sentient-being was promulgated by novelists long 
before it was adopted by psychologists.2 The reason for this 
should be clear if we remember that nineteenth-century 
science was conceived as an analytical and reductive 
enterprise (see Chapter 3, pp. 78-79 and footnote 35). In 
order to justify a science of mind and consciousness as 
science, nineteenth-century philosophers and psychologists 
adopted the same approach, reducing mind to component 
"faculties" (consciousness, reason, intuition, and the will) 
and speculating upon possible interactions. Logically, 
reductive analysis assumes the existence of a circumscribed 
entity, for only entities can be segmented in this way.
It will become clear in this chapter that, because 
psychologists and novelists of this period (1865-1885) were
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pursuing different agendas, they adopted quite different 
perspectives on the nature of consciousness. This outcome, 
far from devaluing a comparative enterprise, provides grounds 
for the concluding discussion concerning the constraints 
imposed by discipline-specific agendas and methodological 
commitments on the integrity of the object of interest.
What follows in this chapter is a series of passages 
drawn from the works of noted American realists that serve as 
salient examples of the mind-as-sentient-being world-view. 
Because the literary realists of the mid-nineteenth century 
were less than explicit about their theories of 
consciousness, however, the strategy in this chapter will 
rely to a greater degree than before on interpretation of 
selected passages. The interpretive strategy that I have 
adopted in this chapter will include reference to the 
author's explicit statements about his or her work (where 
available), and the extent to which the passage accords with 
the conventions and intentions of literary realism. Because 
literary realists were concerned with expressions of 
consciousness as experienced, I have assumed that the 
"meaning" of a selected passage serves as a reliable 
indicator of a particular, quasi-implicit "theory" of 
consciousness.
The Tenets of Literary Realism 
Olaf Hansen has suggested that the agenda of literary 
realism may be characterized as one "oriented [both] towards 
transcendence and towards practicality." And it is certainly 
characteristic of this literature that there exists within it 
a fundamental tension between what Hansen has termed "the old
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dilemma of having to choose between absolute subjectivity on 
the one hand [characteristic of the Romantic novel] and 
absolute objectivity [characteristic of the sciences] on the 
other."3 Nineteenth-century realist novelists solved this 
dilemma by assuming that, since their work adhered as closely 
as possible to the experience of the common man (or woman) 
engaged in ordinary activities, it could not help but reflect 
(or come to reflect) general laws of human nature.
Justification for this appeal to a science of human 
nature was supported by several sources: It was supported by
the work of the Scottish philosophers who believed their 
analyses and classifications of the faculties and powers of 
the mind represented general laws of human mental phenomena 
(see Chapter 2); it was supported by a tradition long 
associated with Calvinist theology that assumed man's life 
and struggles could be explained as part of a Divine plan, 
that is, a higher order of laws;4 and it was supported by the 
optimistic "evolutionism" of men like Herbert Spencer and 
Hippolyte Taine who, seeing "progress in every comer," 
promulgated the idea that development (whether natural, 
human, or cultural) advanced in orderly stages.5 Within this 
context of ideas, realist authors saw their work as one with 
the spirit of the times--an age in which subjective 
experience was considered but one small part of a universe of 
ordered phenomena.
As readers of realist fiction, we are asked to identify 
with a moral dilemma fought within a central consciousness, 
an arena in which sensory experience, conscious reflection, 
Puritan morality, and practical necessity must have their
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say: a "theatre," according to William James, "of
possibilities."6 Yet, though Herbert Spencer (and, to a 
lesser extent, Hippolyte Taine; see Appendix) might have 
supplied such a context, there is little evidence of their 
influence in this early period. The moral dilemma, the 
conflicted consciousness, was not new to realist fiction: it 
emerged out of a long tradition of theological questioning. 
What was different about realist fiction, in contrast to the 
fiction of the preceding Romantic period, were the kinds of 
questions that were asked. Realist authors brought to their 
task an overriding concern for the relation between the 
individual man or woman and the rules and standards accorded 
the society in which they lived.7
That realist writers did have a moral agenda, however, 
cannot be questioned, and their work should be seen in that 
context. They were very much aware of the changes that had 
taken place since the end of the American Civil War: the
transition from an agricultural economy to an industrial one; 
the growth of cities; westward expansion; the growth of a 
large band of "urban poor" and of a middle class. They were 
no less aware of the more subtle changes: the passing of the
"genteel tradition;" the decline of a religious ethic; 
changes in women's roles (though not, necessarily, in 
expectations). Recognizing these changes, they tended to 
view the individual as continually striving against a society 
perpetually in flux. The crucial point is that these authors 
believed that the striving itself was important and that 
success depended on an individual's ability to make sense of 
his or her experience. Their stories are stories of men and
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women who succeed (when they succeed) because of the 
knowledge they have acquired from their experience. As 
readers, we are permitted to witness this process, this 
striving, through the internalization of action within a 
central consciousness.
As we will see, it was the dynamic process of emerging 
self-awareness and the interactions between an experiencing 
self and society that captured the imaginations of literary 
realists. Accordingly, the mimetic representation of 
subjective experience countermanded the use of classificatory 
techniques and reductive analysis. Instead, these authors 
were concerned with the use of literary techniques that 
permitted the recreation of such complex mental processes as 
emerging self-awareness, the growth of understanding, and the 
resolution of moral conflict. The mind-as-sentient-being 
metaphor is an apt expression for what these authors intended 
to convey in their work
Elizabeth Stuart Phelns (1841-1911)
Elizabeth Stuart Phelps was the daughter of a popular 
mid-century novelist and a professor of philosophy who taught 
at Andover Academy in Massachusetts. Her mother's death in 
childbirth when Elizabeth was eight years old had a profound 
effect on her work, particular in her selection of topics and 
her wide-ranging social consciousness. In her autobiography, 
published in 1896, she writes of her mother's death and her 
knowledge of her mother's life with deep regret:
At the time of her death she was at the first 
blossom of her very positive and widely promising 
success as a writer of the simple home stories which 
took such a hold upon the popular heart....Her last book 
and her last baby came together, and killed her. She 
lived one of those rich and piteous lives such as only
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
gifted women know; torn by the civil war of the dual 
nature which can be given to women only....1 have 
sometimes felt as if even the generation that knows her 
not would feel a certain degree of interest in the tact 
and power by which this unusual woman achieved the 
difficult reconciliation between genius and domestic 
life.8
This theme of the gifted woman, sensitive, articulate, 
capable, coming to terms with the demands and expectations of 
nineteenth-century domesticity occurs repeatedly in Phelps's 
work.
From the frequent references to Scottish principles, to
Spinoza, Fichte, to the works of Kant and Hegel, there is no
reason to suspect that Phelps was not well acquainted with
their ideas. Indeed, she writes, almost as a satirical
aside, of the practical uselessness of "psychological
study...which...unquestionably finds a proper place in the
lecture room, where all well-classified feelings go."9 It is
evident from this quote that Phelps intends to describe a
consciousness of quite a different sort than that of the
classificatory systems of contemporary
philosopher/psychologists. It is not for her to reduce
consciousness to a mere adjunct to mind, to a "perceptual
act" whose task is to reveal mental operations. Instead,
Phelps describes a consciousness of sentient states, of
feeling-toned sensations. A particularly telling passage
captures many of these ideas:
A being of radiant physique; the heiress of ancestral 
health_a creature forever more of nerve than of muscle, 
and therefore trained to the energy of the muscle and 
the repose of the nerve; physically educated by mothers 
of her own fibre and by physicians of her own sex,--such 
a woman alone is fitted to acquire the drilled brain, 
the calmed imagination, and sustained aim, which 
constitute intellectual command.
A creature capable of this command, in whom emotion
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intensifies reflection, and passion strengthens purpose, 
and self-poise is substituted for self-extravagance,- - 
such a creature only is competent to the terrible task 
of adjusting the sacred individuality of her life to her 
supreme capacity of love and the supreme burden and 
perils which it imposes upon her.10
In this passage, Phelps exalts the intellect over passion, 
self-command over "self-extravagance," and makes of the 
capacity to reflect the cornerstone of mental health. But it 
is the capacity to reflect in accord with emotional 
commitment and the "capacity of love" that reveals most 
clearly Phelps's intent to transcend the sterility of 
academic analysis. Unlike Reid and the early American 
psychologists we examined in the last chapter, the language 
Phelps uses has an emotive quality: She commends the one "in
whom emotion intensifies reflection, and passion strengthens 
purpose" where Reid and the others regarded both emotion and 
passion as anathemic.
Quite ignoring the epistemological cast of American 
academic philosophy, Phelps describes a consciousness too 
acutely (though occasionally belatedly) aware of its own 
frailties and false perceptions, a consciousness which 
selects, constructs, and reflects back upon itself in never- 
ending series. In many of her stories, especially those 
whose central characters are women, Phelps portrays this 
development through a consciousness so sensitively attuned to 
itself and its various textures that it appears as though the 
external reality--the objective events which form the fabric 
of consciousness--are of less import than the reflective 
experience.
The following selection is drawn from Phelps's 1879
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printing of The Story of Avis. In this example, Phelps 
equates consciousness with the imagination, and submits that 
this imaginative quality is a stronger master than Reason:
Now and then a feature, an attitude, an accent, gets a 
mathematical hold of our imaginations, as far removed 
from the aesthetic or magnetic way, yet more imperious 
than either; like the pattern of the wall-paper in the 
room which has known some tragedy or ecstasy of our 
lives. We sit enchained by a trick of speech in the man 
we hate, or the cut of the brow in the creature we 
despise, the shadow under the lip of the stranger we 
neither expect nor care to meet again, or the glance of 
the friend in whose broken faith eternity could not 
tempt us to confide. These things happen as the comets 
march and countermarch, by laws deeper than, though 
apparently subservient to, caprice.11
The passage depicts a consciousness at the mercy of a series 
of seemingly trivial events. What is it that directs 
attention to an isolated feature, a "trick of speech," a 
passing glance? These small events, Phelps would assert, 
command our attention and take hold of consciousness more 
"imperviously" than aesthetic or intellectual study. How 
could such trivialities take hold so firmly? This is exactly 
the sort of question which Reid and his followers relegated 
(with a sense of approbation) to the realm of imagination.
It is precisely that "excess" of meaning given to the 
seemingly inconsequential that is beyond the classificatory 
procedures adopted by all the psychologists were have 
reviewed, a state of affairs with which Phelps is clearly 
aware.
In The Story of Avis Phelps relates the experience of a 
sensitive, articulate woman, an artist of recognized talent, 
who must come to terms with the realities of nineteenth-
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century domesticity and the (inevitable, to Phelps) 
abandonment of her career. In this story, as in most of her 
work, Phelps's awareness of the social constraints imposed on 
women is prominently displayed: She portrays the struggle of
women of talent in a society that has clear and fixed 
expectations of women's roles. In Phelps's work, however, 
the struggle takes place entirely within the consciousness of 
the central character, a woman who is acutely sensitive to 
the nuances of her own psychic state. Indeed, this is one of 
the distinguishing characteristics of the realist tradition, 
as we have seen. The following examples are drawn from this 
work.
Following Philip's proposal of marriage, Avis returns to 
her studio after a long absence. This passage reveals her 
awareness that, by accepting his offer, she may have 
compromised her artistic future. Standing in the center of 
her art studio, Avis considers her position and the nature of 
the compromise she is called upon to make. Note the use of 
analogy: the studio walls are "like the friend who never
forgets" a former resolve; the presence of an "invisible 
tribunal" standing in judgment. These metaphors convey the 
moral dilemma, that Avis must resolve:
(2)
A stillness and strangeness deeper than a bruised 
muscle could strike, came upon her when she closed the 
door of the long-deserted place, and, striking a fire in 
her little grate, sat down to warm her hands. The 
autumn sun stepped in, and stood cool and calm against 
the wall, like the friend who never forgets, or suffers 
as to forget, the resolve or the aspiration which we 
once expressed....Avis looked about her with a 
singularly self-defensive feeling, as if she were 
summoned by some invisible tribunal to answer for an 
impalpable offense. She had something of the recoil 
which a man has in turning to his books or his business
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after a night's dissipation....
"What have I done?" she cried. "Oh! what have I 
done?"11
The quoted monologue (relatively rare in realist 
fiction) which concludes this passage is not unexpected. By 
the time of her outburst, we, as readers, already know that 
Avis is feeling guilt and loss and regret. These feelings 
are conveyed metaphorically: She is met with 'the cool
autumn sun' whose 'calm presence' reminds her of her former 
self; her guilt is established by an 'invisible tribunal' 
against which she has no worthy defense. That she suffers a 
'radical confusion' encountering her work (in the manner of a 
man whose 'night of dissipation' leaves him unprepared for 
the business of his day) suggests--perhaps more strongly than 
if conveyed directly--her knowledge of what she may lose in 
marriage.
The use of metaphor allows the reader access to the 
inner turmoil more directly, more intimately, than if the 
feelings had been expressed in a more forthright manner (as 
if to say, "I am afraid..."). The moral dilemma is 
internalized, represented as a series of conflicting feelings 
and impressions, as of a simple consciousness (the present 
"I") overpowered. More important, however, than the fact 
that consciousness is represented by a succession of feeling- 
states, is that it is accompanied, finally, by reasoned 
recognition of their import: it is, in the end, to reflective 
consciousness (and the deliberating will) that Phelps 
appeals. As literary historians have noted: "Phelps's
appeal to the reader is to the rational mind as well as to 
the feeling heart,"13 a statement that unintentionally
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reflects the idea that consciousness is both immediate and 
reflective.
The following passage, also from The Story of Avis, 
employs a similar technique. Again, note the use of metaphor 
to convey the inner conflict: her former passion has become
a "diseased life" whose loss cannot be mourned; her husband's 
image has become indistinguishable from the background of 
trivialities of her life; and the dilemma posed is one of 
learning to live without the passion that had once allowed 
her to rationalize the inevitable abandonment of her career. 
The italicized passages tell the inner story:
(3)
A certain terror fell upon her at finding in her 
own heart no sting sharper than that of a sad scorn.
She had rather hoped she might find herself a little 
j ealous.... She hung over her love for her husband as we 
hang over a precious, diseased life, of which we have 
not the courage to despair... .Better fire than frost 
Better £ha seething- than the freezing death[
With a sickening dismay she perceived that Phillip--he 
too--began to seem to her like a figure seen in the 
vallev of an incoherent dream. She felt as if she had 
suddenly stepped into a world of pygmies, and had a 
lilliputian code to learn before she could take up the 
duties of citizenship therein.14
In this passage, the metaphors call up images of disease and 
death and lonely isolation. There is more than a hint of 
objective distancing (of "dismay" and "sad scorn"), as Avis, 
always sensitive to her own feelings, becomes aware of the 
loss of her passion. In this passage, Avis (and the reader) 
are caught up in a confusing swirl of despair and loss.
In Phelps's work, the use of metaphor gives voice 
to the inner turmoil. For the psychologists of the same 
period, the use of metaphor appeared to authenticate their 
claims to scientific objectivity. The reader will recall,
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for example, that Reid equated consciousness with a 
"perceptual act," an internal sense. This metaphor was taken 
up by his followers, Stewart and McCosh (though McCosh 
referred to this sense as "intuition"). Throughout the 1865- 
1885 period, psychologists adopted a series of other 
metaphors to "explain" the operation of consciousness (the 
reader will recall Hopkins's identification of consciousness 
with the "cellular membrane," and Hickok's reference to 
consciousness as the "light of reason"), none of these men 
appeared to consider that consciousness might be equated with 
a series of feeling states expressed in terms of sensory 
elements. In Phelps's work, we see this intent most clearly; 
and the opposition to the work of the analytical philosophers 
is striking.
Another example from the same work shows Phelps's 
ability to portray a consciousness filled with visual images, 
each conveying a sense of lost innocence, regret, and 
(perhaps) guilt. In this passage, Philip is portrayed as 
overwhelmed by his knowledge that his callous behavior toward 
his wife might well have destroyed the only aspect of his 
life that was truly pure. As before, Phelps relies on a 
series of rapid, visual images to convey the unreflected 
conscious state. The reader will note the contrast Phelps 
suggests between "sensations," as conveyed by the visual 
imagery, and "reflections," which Philip would avoid. In 
this passage, Philip would will the images away, though his 
will is powerless:
(4)
It was Philip who was wakeful that night. Visions which
he would just then have gone blind to forget,
electrotyped themselves upon the half-lit room. Long
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odorous country twilights, the scent of honeysuckle 
about a farmhouse-door, the pressure of confiding 
fingers on his arm, the uplifting of a young face, the 
touch of trustful life, pursued him rather with the 
force of sensations than reflections. With these came 
other ghosts, incoherent fancies, aimless fevers, 
nameless dreams.15
Despite the many dissimilarities between Phelps's work and
Reid's, it is significant that, in this passage, Phelps uses
the word "reflections" in contrast to "sensations" in the
same sense, and for the same purpose, with which Reid
contrasted the terms: that is, to indicate the difference
between a train of thought consisting of transitory images
and a train of thought consisting of focused ideas. As we
have seen, Phelps uses imagery to convey a number of
different consciousness states. In passage 2 (p. 93), the
technique was used to convey a sense of the moral dilemma
that Avis must resolve upon her marriage; in passage 3 (p.
95), the technique is used to convey loss and bitterness,
Avis's recognition that the passion that had sustained her
commitment to marriage had dissolved and all that remained
was obligation. In passage 4 (above), she uses the technique
to convey an unreflective consciousness, a series of
pictorial images that are unusually concrete, quite as though
Philip is mentally reviewing a scrapbook filled with
mementos. This, of course, is what Phelps intends. Despite
these differences, there is clear indication that
consciousness as Phelps conceives it is very different from
the sterile entity depicted by the academics.
A final passage provides even stronger support for this 
conclusion. In the following selection from The Storv of 
Avis. Phelps employs a series of metaphoric images to convey
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an "altered" conscious state, characteristic of those under 
the influence of alcohol.:
The first thing which she saw was a huge earthen vase, 
standing by itself against the wall, raised a few inches 
from the floor, thus, and thus only, indicating to her 
eyes that it was not what we are used to call a 
reality....Through a maze of lotus-leaves, Isis went 
seeking Osiris, the figures moving faintly before her 
eyes till they had adjusted themselves with what seemed 
a voluntary motion to their attitudes upon the clay.
The figures were black, expressed by gray lights. The 
leaves were of an opaque green, without veining or 
shadow. A raised design of silver and steel surrounded 
the neck, lips, and pedestal of the jar. If it had been 
light enough, she could have taken her pencil, and 
accurately copied this design, which was very intricate, 
and which pleased her....
This appearance, which lasted but for a few 
moments, was the signal for a kaleidoscope of beautiful 
and soulless form to stir before her, slowly and subtly, 
like the outer circle of a whirlpool into which she was 
to be drawn. Pottery, porcelain, furniture, drapery, 
sculpture, then flowers, fruits,--a medley of still- 
life, --swept through strange and half-revealed, but 
wholly resplendent interiors, which glided on 
indifferently, like languages that said, "What hast thou 
to do with this?" Now and then, out of the splendid 
maze, a distinct effect seemed to pause, and poise 
itself, and woo her through the dark. An open hand, 
raised, and turned at the wrist like a flower on its 
stem, held water-lillies, drooping and dripping. A 
sunbeam, upon an empty chair in a student's alcove, 
focused upon a child's shoe and a woman's ribbon. A 
skull ground a rose between its teeth. Bees, upon a 
patch of burning July sky, wooed a clover. In a pool in 
a cliff, a star-fish defined the colors of a tangle of 
weeds and shells. In a thicket of wildbriar a single 
rose-leaf had fallen upon a gray stone, across which, 
and over the miniature clearing in the mimic forest, the 
tattered and fringed light lay.16
In this passage, a succession of visual images dominates the 
conscious state, diminishing the expression of reason and 
self-awareness. This sort of experience is beyond the range 
of issues with which the psychologists of this time were 
prepared to explain. Altered conscious states were not to
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concern academics until near the turn of the century.
As a whole, these passages convey a "theory" of 
consciousness in sharp contrast to the models developed by 
eighteenth and early nineteenth-century
philosopher/psychologists. Given her ideals, it is likely 
that Phelps's motive was as much personal as it was social: 
to give voice to her belief that the secondary status 
accorded nineteenth-century American women was grounded in a 
false sense of what constituted rationality and a false 
identification of rationality with the male mind. In 
response to the perceived "ultra-rationality" of academic 
philosophy, it is also likely that Phelps intended to convey 
the idea that consciousness was not necessarily synonymous 
with rational thought, but included aspects of pure sensation 
and emotive significance. For Phelps, the use of metaphoric 
images conveys the impression of a multi-textured feeling- 
toned consciousness that is quite at odds with the 
classificatory approach adopted by the psychologists, and 
only hinted at by her contemporaries, William Dean Howells 
and Henry James. A consciousness of this sort is not again 
apparent until the work of william James begins to appear in 
the 1870's.
William Dean Howells (1837-1920) 
william Dean Howells was a mid westerner, b o m  and 
raised in a small Ohio town. Like many of the literary 
realists, Howells had little formal education. He began his 
literary career as a journalist for the Ohio State Journal 
and continued his journalistic career as chief editor of the 
Atlantic Monthly (1871-1881) and as a regular contributor to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
Harper's Monthly (1886-1920), where he published his most 
famous and polemic articles advancing the 'cause' of realism 
in American fiction. As editor of the Atlantic. Howells was 
singularly responsible for providing a forum for other 
realists of the period, notably Henry James and Mark Twain, 
and for encouraging younger writers whose work spawned the 
naturalist tradition in America, men like Jack London and 
Frank Norris.17
Unlike Phelps, Howells was less concerned with the 
individual response and more concerned with the individual- 
as-representative-of-a-type, though not, of course, an ideal. 
The tendency to portray his characters in stereotypical 
colors is present in all his works from the earliest Their 
Wedding Journey published in 187 2 to his last, Through the 
Eve of a Needle, published in 1907, all "conventional Howells 
fare," according to one biographer.13 Though his early works 
are largely descriptive of social life (down to the smallest 
observed details and interactions), his later works came to 
include a desire to change the social reality; in the words 
of present-day analysts, "to describe experience in order to 
disturb man's acceptance of experience."15 Howells's 
overriding social agenda led him to conceive of consciousness 
as purely an inner response on a par with--or in no way more 
complex than--the outward behavior. Howells's characters are 
not of the 'type' to reflect deeply or wonderingly, to brood 
or to analyze; his characters are men and women of more 
action than thought; more purpose than possibility. 
Accordingly, Howells approached consciousness much as a 
scientist might describe the behavior of a biological
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specimen--as though it were all of one piece, with no complex 
turnings or twistings; as though all that could be known 
could be observed by an impartial observer.
Far more than most realists of the period, Howells was 
the literary man who believed that scientific method holds 
the key to progress and to truth.20 Like Hippolyte Taine, 
whose work he knew well, Howells partially accepted a 
deterministic interpretation of literature and the literary 
process.21 The author's task, he believed, was merely to set 
the conditions under which the action would take place and 
then watch the novel unfold according to the internal 
consistency of the material. "It is a well ascertained fact 
concerning the imagination," wrote Howells, "that it can work 
only the stuff of experience. It can absolutely create 
nothing, it can only compose."22
It was Howells's method to set up the plot, map out the 
central characters, and allow the action to take place, 
maintaining all the while an objective distance from the 
inner workings of the character's mental state. As Dorritt 
Cohn explains it, it is as though the narrator of the story 
"holds the unwavering stance of a wise and rational 
psychologist," whose purpose it is to use the character's 
plight to set forth his (or her) own generalizations about 
human behavior and society.23 Because the author assumes an 
objective posture, he appears in the novel as an omniscient 
narrator who knows more than his characters; often, the 
reader comes to identify with the narrator's objective 
stance. The extent to which the narrator's presence 
dominates the story is indicative of the extent to which the
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character's consciousness comes to play a significant role in 
the development of the story line. As Dorritt Cohn has 
asserted: "The more conspicuous and idiosyncratic the 
narrator, the less apt he is to reveal the depth of his 
characters' psyches or, for that matter, to create psyches 
that have depth to reveal,"2i a statement which is aptly 
applied to Howells's work.
The following examples of this technique are drawn from 
William Dean Howells, The Rise of Silas Lapham. written in 
1885:
(6)
He could see the young people down on the rocks, 
and his heart swelled in his breast. He had always said 
that he did not care what a man's family was, but the 
presence of young Corey as an applicant to him for 
employment...was one of the sweetest favors that he had 
yet tasted in his success. He knew who the Corey's were 
very well, and, in his simple brutal way, he had long 
hated their name as a symbol of splendor which...he 
could not hope to realize in his own.
Nothing had moved his thick imagination like this 
day's events since the girl who taught him spelling and 
grammar., .had said she would have him for her husband.25
This passage is a salient example of an observer's 
careful reporting of what might well be occurring in the mind 
of a well-known but not necessarily well-liked acquaintance. 
We are given to understand Lapham's "brutal way" and "thick 
imagination" so as to preclude our ability to identify with a 
character who, incidentally, clearly knows less about his own 
mind than we are given to know of it. Silas Lapham is a man 
unencumbered by complexities or acute sensitivities--he is, 
after all an American businessman, a representative of late 
nineteenth-century American industrialization. Accordingly, 
he is less likely than the too-sensitive characters portrayed
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in Phelps's works to reflect profoundly or with evident 
benefit upon either internal or external events. His is a 
consciousness that must be "interpreted," even as a patient's 
meandering thoughts might, on occasion, need be explained to 
him. Lapham is aware only of his sense of pleased 
satisfaction ("his heart swelled in his breast"); the 
connection between this feeling and an earlier one are not 
made by him but by the invisible narrator. The presence of a 
third-person narrator must have appealed to Howells because 
it represented (or seemed to represent) the most 'scientific' 
way of negotiating a compromise between the "dilemma" of 
subjectivity and objectivity.
In another passage from the same text, however, Howells 
ventures closer to the conscious state of his character.
There are no authorial intrusions of the "thick imagination" 
type; Howells offers no judgment on his character's actions. 
Nonetheless, Howells maintains his characteristic 
objectivity: Lapham's psychic state is observable in
behavioral language:
(7)
He could not keep about his work steadily, and with his 
nerves shaken from want of sleep, and the shock of this 
sudden and unexpected question, he left his office 
early, and went over to look at the house and try to 
bring himself to some conclusion there. The long 
procession of lamps on the beautiful street was flaring 
in the clear red of the sunset towards which it marched, 
and Lapham, with a lump in his throat, stopped in front 
of his house and looked at their multitude. They were 
not merely a part of the landscape; they were a part of 
his pride and glory, his success, his triumphant life's 
work which was fading into failure in his helpless 
hands. He ground his teeth to keep down that lump, but 
the moisture in his eyes blurred the lamps....There was 
no such facade as that on the whole street, to his 
thinking.26
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Even though Howells permits us, as readers, a more intimate 
connection with his character, we do not encounter in this 
passage a man who pauses long enough to consider the meaning 
of his plight, a man, that is, capable of reflection as Reid 
used the term. The moral dilemma remains unresolved, if only 
because the character is inherently (it would seem) incapable 
of resolving it. For such people, Reid would predict, 
nothing would be gained by the experience, as Lapham gains 
little. At the end of the novel, when Lapham's financial 
ruin is near-complete, Howells, as omniscient narrator, 
returns:
(8)
He was more broken than he knew by his failure; it did 
not kill, as it often does, but it weakened the spring 
once so strong and elastic. He lapsed more and more 
into acquiescence with his changed condition, and that 
bragging note of his was rarely sounded. He worked 
faithfully enough in his enterprise, but sometimes he 
failed to seize the occasions that in his younger days 
he would have turned to golden account.27
In this passage, Howells's use of the third-person narrative 
works well with' a character whose ability to articulate his 
own conscious states is limited; essentially, it has allowed 
him to create a character whose psychological depth is of 
less importance than the author's intended social statement.28
Where Phelps realized her social agenda within the 
confines of a too-sensitive consciousness, Howells realizes 
his in the social arena. Nonetheless, Howells retains the 
technique, common to literary realism, of implying that the 
most important "action" of the narrative is that which takes 
place within the belabored consciousness of his central 
character. The difference between Howells's Silas Lapham
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character and Phelps's Avis is that Avis is able to profit 
from her experience and Lapham is not. Phelps's character 
succeeds, at least, in rising above her situation; she 
appears to resolve her difficulties; she comes to acceptance. 
Silas Lapham does not profit from his experience; he does not 
reflect; he is not self-aware. Silas Lapham fails because he 
is incapable of of reflecting on the nature of his failure, 
and, consequently, he lapses over time "more and more into 
acquiescence."
Is it possible to construct a "theory" of consciousness 
from these brief passages? In many ways, Howells's concept 
of consciousness parallels that of the academic 
psychologists. His is a consciousness of single dimensions, 
the literary equivalent of a unified entity responding 
passively to external events. Unlike consciousness as 
portrayed by Phelps, Howells does not suggest that 
consciousness is anything other than a point of contact 
between the external and internal worlds. Although Lapham is 
prepared to respond to events, his responses do not emerge 
out of increased self-awareness; they are the products of 
long-held habits, uniformed by changes in circumstance.
Where external action dominates the narrative, consciousness 
recedes; and we have seen Howells's emphasis on behavioral 
descriptions (see passages 6, p. 101; 7, p. 103; and 8, p. 
104) in lieu of visual sensory images. Nonetheless, there is 
an implicit moral contained within Howells's narrative: The
failure to develop the capacity to reflect is a failure with 
profound moral implications. Both Lapham's success and his 
failure are a consequence of his single-mindedness;
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complexity, intuitions, self-revelations, as experienced and 
accounted for, are not the character of Silas Lapham. Nor 
was it Howells's intention to portray such characters. As we 
have seen even in these brief passages, Howells's social 
agenda was realized in the creation of characters whose 
uncertain fate may be laid to their inability to profit from 
their experience. By extension, we may conclude that 
Howells's portrayal of a consciousness of simple dimensions 
was intended to advance his belief that the fulfilled life 
was inextricably linked to self-knowledge, acquired through 
full awareness of the felt experience. As we will see, this 
theme is the central theme of the last realist whose work we 
will examine in this chapter.
Henry James (1843-1916)
Henry James, Jr., was b o m  in New York, the second 
oldest son of a man given to grand thoughts and religious and 
social zeal and a woman of gentle birth and quiet manners.29 
He was considered by his family more stable and more 
trustworthy than his older brother, William James, sometime 
psychologist, philosopher, scientist, though William's 
charming manner often overshadowed Henry's quieter nature. 
There was, indeed, a subtle, though persistent, rivalry 
between the two, somewhat aggressively pursued by William 
(whose critical comments on his brother's work suggest, at 
times, a reluctance to recognize his brother's ability) to 
which Henry, however, always responded mildly. In 187 6, 
after trying literary life both in New York and Paris, James 
settled in London, where he would be based for most of the 
rest of his life.
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Throughout his life and work, James was preoccupied with 
the theme of the betrayal of the young and innocent. Judith 
Woolf credits this preoccupation to the effects of the Civil 
War (many of James's childhood friends were killed in that 
war) and to the death of a much-loved younger cousin from 
tuberculosis.30 A psychoanalytic interpretation would 
suggest that, perhaps, James himself felt "betrayed" by 
parents who seemingly assented to William's every whim, at 
some cost to the other members of the family.31 Whatever the 
reason, this theme is present throughout many of his novels 
and short stories: A child, often female, is left at the
mercy of parental whims and insensitivities. In order to 
survive (to succeed) she must learn to interpret her world 
correctly, to understand others' motives, to make sense of 
rejection (if that is what it is), and to realize her real 
potential. The stories are related through the child's 
succession of impressions, thoughts, and reflections, through 
a sensitively aware, ever expanding consciousness. This same 
technique is used in his "adult" novels as well (e.g., 
Roderick Hudson, The Princess Casamassima), and toward the 
same end: the portrayal of a consciousness that expands
through aware self-experience. The crucial ingredient, at 
least for James, is the creation of characters who are (in 
his own words), "intense perceivers all, of their respective 
predicaments. "32
Reviewing James's essay "Is There a Life After Death?" 
Courtney Johnson suggests that James himself was such a 
perceiver, a man intensely aware of changes in his own 
internal world.33 In the essay, James describes what he
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considers the important aspects of consciousness, how it 
functions and how it changes over time. Again, the crucial 
ingredient is the capacity for self awareness, the ability to 
reflect on one's experience. According to James, 
consciousness evolves, not, as Spencer would have it, from a 
state of "incoherent heterogeneity to coherent homogeneity," 
but, rather, from simple apperception of the world and ideas 
to active participation in the world via an on-going, 
interactive internal dialogue. The result, James proclaims, 
is that consciousness expands, it becomes infinitely more 
interesting, more complex, a multi-textured topographical 
relief. He writes:
(F)or...consciousness at least contained the world, and 
could handle and criticize it, could play with it and 
deride it; it had that superiority: which meant, all
the while, such successful living that the abode itself 
grew more and more interesting to me, and with this 
beautiful sign of its character that the more one asked 
of it the more and the more it appeared to give.3*
The distinction which James intends to convey is between 
what Courtney Johnson has called "ordinary" consciousness, 
arising out of sense experience, and an "extraordinary" 
consciousness, based on sense experience, but drawing upon 
and emerging out of "something other than that."35 It is 
Johnson's position that James's distinction between the two 
kinds of consciousnesses is a "paradox," which cannot be 
resolved within the context of Kant's assertion that "'all 
our knowledge is grounded in experience' . "36 But we have seen 
similar ideas expressed before in, for example, the 
distinction Thomas Reid makes between consciousness as a 
power of the Understanding ("the only evidence which we have 
or can have of...the operations of our minds") and the
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capacity of "reflection" ("a kind of intuition" acquired over 
time).37 We have also seen this idea in Mahan's distinction 
between "simple consciousness" and "reflective consciousness" 
in James McCosh's "intuitional realism" (see Chapter 3) and 
it appears as a central tenet of American Transcendentalism, 
expressed as the belief that reason and a sort of intuition 
combine to make the transcendent experience possible (see 
Appendix).
The distinction James is making in this essay and which
underlies his approach to fiction, is embedded in a long
historical tradition. (One might also argue that the
distinction is implicit in Kant's discussion of the
difference between phenomena and noumena.) In this essay,
James is suggesting that a self-aware consciousness
continually strives to make sense of experience by engaging
in a dialogue informed by past dialogues, sensory experience,
creative "insights," religious ideals, personal desire, in
sum, a never-ending, constantly expanding series of thoughts
and impressions. The image is one of consciousness spiraling
outward, though James conveys an image of a calmer sort:
Experience is never limited, and it is never complete; 
it is an immense sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web 
of the finest silken threads suspended in the chamber of 
consciousness, and catching every air-bomed particle in 
its tissue. It is the very atmosphere of the mind; and 
when the mind is imaginative--much more when it happens 
to be that of a man of genius--it takes to itself the 
faintest hints of life, it converts the very pulses of 
the air into revelations.38
James's view of consciousness as the source of 
understanding and creative insight is carried out in his 
creation of characters who have the potential to transcend
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their experience. Less concerned than Howells to maintain a
scientist's objective stance; less concerned than either
Phelps or Howells to promote his own social agenda, Henry
James's use of this narrative technique is intended to
portray a consciousness actively engaged in observing and
reflecting on the world. Several selections which follow are
from James's self-acknowledged first novel, Roderick Hudson.
written in 1875. This novel, like many of James's later
novels, embodies a deliberate effort on James's part to view
an entire fictive action from within the mind of a central
participating observer. In the 1907 preface to this work,
James writes:
The centre of interest throughout "Roderick" is in 
Rowland Mallet's consciousness, and the drama is the 
very drama of that consciousness--which I had of course 
to make sufficiently acute in order to enable it, like a 
set and lighted scene, to hold the play. By making it 
acute, meanwhile, one made its own movement--or rather, 
strictly, its movement in the particular connexion-- 
interesting; this movement really being quite the stuff 
of one's thesis.35
In this context, the narrative technique serves as a vehicle 
for the depiction of a sensitive consciousness engaged in 
continual reflection, appraisal and reappraisal of his 
experience. And, because it permits a character to engage in 
a kind of retrospective analysis, it makes possible the 
portrayal of an evolving consciousness within a specified 
context and without the necessity of inferring the inner 
process from outward behavior.
Roderick Hudson is the story of a young and relatively 
rich man (Rowland) who has taken responsibility for the 
support of a similarly young but very temperamental artist
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(Roderick) whose artistic genius he admires. The difficulty-
presented is that Rowland is singularly attracted to
Roderick's fiance; and Roderick is not a faithful lover. The
internal dialogue is presented thus:
[Rowland] had wondered over the whole matter first and 
last in a great many different ways--he had looked at it 
in all possible lights. There was something that mocked 
any sense of due sequences in the fact of [Roderick's] 
having fallen in love with her. She was not, as Rowland 
conceived her, the "type" that, other things being what 
they were, would most have touched him, and the mystery 
of attraction and desire, always so baffling if seen 
only from without, quite defied analysis here.40
Unlike Howells, James (as narrator) knows little more than 
his character about "the mystery of attraction and desire;" 
neither the observer "from without" (James) nor the "observer 
within" seem to have access to a possible resolution of the 
feelings of a man for a woman who is not free. As the 
passage continues, however, James moves further and further 
away from the figural consciousness : He tells us that
Rowland "would have been at a loss to say" why Mary's type 
failed to appeal to Roderick, had he really confronted the 
question. He notes that "our virtuous hero did scanty 
justice" to the idea that Roderick could hardly be held 
responsible for Rowland's "irregular" attraction. He makes 
sure we, as readers, see the "subtle sophistry" of Rowland's 
mental argument. By the time we arrive at the concluding 
assertion (to the effect that "any other girl would have 
answered"), we feel screened off from the character's mind.
The movement in the narrative from near-identity with 
the figural consciousness to a distinct separation from it, 
suggests that that consciousness has undergone a significant
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transformation. It is less open to us; less, in all 
likelihood, open to itself: the Rowland who openly admitted 
his bewilderment in the first passage, has concluded, by the 
last passage, that what he wished not to be true, was not 
true--that Roderick certainly could not love her, she was not 
his "type." Unlike Howells, James moves toward the figural 
consciousness, nearly identifies with it, and moves away from 
it (in the form of judgment and objectivity) all to suggest a 
flow of conscious action, a consciousness in process. The 
"moving away," which results in our disengagement with the 
character's mind, is symbolic: the technique suggests that
the character has "closed off" his mind to himself and is no 
longer willing (or capable) of uninhibited reflection. The 
process is halted, suggesting, perhaps, that Spencer's 
"coherent homogeneity" is not the end James would crave.
A primary theme running through many of James's novels 
and short stories is that of mental growth, the notion of 
innocence lost to experience, the gradual coming-to-awareness 
of a young mind. We have seen evidence of this theme before 
in Phelps's portrayal of Avis's confrontation with the loss 
of her career and the loss of her passion. Similarly, it is 
in James's novels in which a central consciousness comes to 
possess, over time, a truer sense of "reality" than it 
originally possessed (something which Howells's characters 
manage to avoid). Accordingly, the Jamesian consciousness is 
best described as an on-going stream of sensations, 
reflections, and retrospections; an eternal "discussion" of 
faint and vivid thought-series (halos and fringes). As James 
himself writes in the Preface to the 1907 edition of Roderick
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Hudson:
[Relations] are of the very essence of the novelist's 
process, and it is by their aid, fundamentally, that his 
idea takes form and lives; but they impose on him, 
through the principle of continuity that rides them, a 
proportionate anxiety. They are the very condition of 
interest, which languishes without them; the painter's 
subject consisting ever, obviously, of the related 
state, to each other, of certain figures and things. To 
exhibit these relations, once they have all been 
recognised, is to "treat" his idea, which involves 
neglecting none of those that directly minister to 
interest....
Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and 
the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to 
draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which 
they shall happily appear to do so.41
The following selections are from James's What Maisie 
Knew.42 The story portrays a young child who is often a pawn 
in a game of wits and revenge between her divorced parents 
and their respective spouses. At this point in time, Maisie 
has begun to understand the conditions under which her 
presence {or absence) may please (or not) the adults of her 
life:
She was conscious enough that her face indeed could 
n't please him if it showed any sign - just as she hoped 
it did n't - of her sharp impression of what he now 
really wanted to do. Was n't he trying to turn the 
tables on her, embarrass her somehow into admitting that 
what would really suit her little book would be, after 
doing so much for good manners, to leave her wholly at 
liberty to arrange for herself? She began to be nervous 
again: it rolled over her that this was their parting,
their parting for ever, and that he had brought her 
there for so many caresses only because it was important 
such an occasion should look better for him than any 
other. For her to spoil it by a note of discord would 
certainly give him ground for complaint; and the child 
was momentarily bewildered between her alternatives of 
agreeing with him about her wanting to get rid of him 
and displeasing him by pretending to stick to him. So 
she found for the moment no solution but to murmur very 
helplessly: "Oh papa - oh papa!"43
The presence of the inner question ("Was n't he trying to
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turn the tables on her...?") is characteristic of reflective
consciousness portrayed, and the language is that of a child,
so different (as we have seen) from James's own. What is
given to us to know of this child's mind is coincident with
her knowledge of it; there is no other interpretive presence.
The conscious moment portrayed is indeed a "discussion" of
alternative actions which are suggested on the basis of her
past experience. It is, in william James's words, "a theatre
of possibilities."
The following selection from the same novel shows us a
consciousness that has evolved: the child has become more
confident and more aware:
As she was condemned to know more and more, how could it 
logically stop before she should know Most? It came to 
her in fact as they sat there on the sands that she was 
distinctly on the road to know Everything. She had not 
had governesses for nothing: what in the world had she
ever done but learn and learn and learn? She looked at 
the pink sky with a placid foreboding that she soon 
should have learnt All. They lingered in the flushed 
air till at last it turned to grey and she seemed fairly 
to receive new information from every brush of the 
breeze.14
In this passage, the conscious state is constrained to 
the present mental instant and to the character's own 
experience; accordingly, it is subject to the limitations and 
distortions of the character's own knowledge, sensitivity, 
reason, and judgment. When employed throughout a novel, in 
different stages of development, the technique is useful for 
portraying a consciousness which evolves over time, which 
appraises, remembers, reflects on and about; a consciousness 
which makes connections (more or less valid), which flows and 
teems with "questions, exclamations, repetitions,
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overstatements, colloquialisms."15 Depending on the narrative 
context, however, we, as readers, may judge that evolving 
awareness as more or less truthful, more or less correct, to 
the extent that the author supplies us with information 
beyond the character's knowledge or to the extent that our 
own experience allows us to fill in the gaps.
Discussion: Part I
In the period between 1865 and 1885, neither American 
literature nor American psychology had achieved the status of 
professionalization or respectability that would come at the 
turn of the century. Writing within a tradition of naive 
realism and under an aura of suspicion with which the 
Scottish philosophers and their followers regarded the 
(imaginative) novel, American realists were simultaneously 
working out and defending the techniques which would come to 
define the realist novel. One characteristic of American 
realism was its emphasis on the "ordinary, the commonplace, 
and the common man," the representative "type," as Silas 
Lapham was a representative type, as most of Howells's 
characters were representative types. Since neither Poe's 
madness nor Emerson's other-worldliness were experiences 
common to ordinary men and women, rejecting the romantic 
consciousness led American realists to a confrontation with 
consciousness as it was experienced to the experiencing 
subject, a consciousness bound up with, inexorably tied to, 
the events of everyday life.
The solutions offered by the literary realists to the 
"problem of consciousness" were as varied as those offered by 
the psychologists, reflecting their particular agenda as much
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as any one author's singular experience and introspective 
sophistication. To the observant and somewhat superficial 
William Dean Howells who equated "truth" with emotional 
distance and "objectivity" with the journalistic eye, 
consciousness was purely a behavioral phenomenon, to be 
described as a scientist might describe a chemical reaction. 
To the compassionate, sensitive, and often-sentimental 
Phelps, consciousness was described as a series of emotion­
laden images and reflective monologues. To the introspective 
and analytical James, consciousness was described as a series 
of ever-expanding revelations, the path to certain knowledge, 
the threshold of personal transcendence.
As I indicated at the beginning of this chapter, there 
are no obvious connections between the concepts of 
consciousness described by the philosopher/psychologists and 
the concepts of consciousness employed by literary realists 
of this period, 1865-1885. Indeed, the passages I have 
selected provide additional evidence in support of both 
Kearns's and Taylor's conclusion that the shift toward a 
mind-as-sentient-being perspective occurred in literary 
discourse before it became common currency in psychological 
discourse. Of the novelists whose work we have examined, 
most were acquainted with the philosophical models I have 
described, but there is no indication in either published or 
unpublished sources that suggests they intentionally drew on 
those ideas; indeed, there are several indications that 
suggest they deliberately rejected them.
There may be personal reasons for this seemingly 
deliberate rejection of the academic enterprise. Howells,
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for one, was a journalist whose training did not include a 
background in philosophy or psychology, though he was likely 
aware of William James's early work through his association 
with Henry James. As we have seen, both Phelps and Henry 
James did indeed reject the academic models and purposefully 
set out to portray a consciousness of sensory complexity with 
the capacity for self-aware exploration, expansion, and 
transcendence. Their models of sentient consciousness were a 
result of their deliberate intent to portray experience as it 
was experienced; to invite the reader to share in that 
experience. By internalizing the action of the narrative 
within a central consciousness, these authors promulgated 
what has become known as "psychological realism" (defined as 
the realistic portrayal of experience) that opposed the more 
conservative (and, perhaps, sterile) philosophical realism of 
their academic contemporaries. (This emphasis on 
psychological realism was no less a concerted opposition to 
the idealism of the early nineteenth-century 
Transcendentalists.)
Taking consciousness as their central theme led literary 
realists to a direct confrontation with the nature of 
consciousness itself. And, although each of the realists 
whose work we reviewed adopted a somewhat different 
perspective on that issue, their solutions to the "problem of 
consciousness" largely ignored the emphasis on rationality 
and mental segmentations that characterized the psychological 
enterprise. In contrast to the language of science, the 
accepted language of the novel of consciousness is replete 
with self-reference and metaphoric embellishments. That
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American pre-experimental psychologists (including Reid) so 
readily adopted the language of science is testimony to their 
desire to accord "psychological topics" the same status as 
the objects of inquiry in the natural sciences. This, of 
course, was not a literary concern.
Whether assumed objectivity in some way alters the 
topics under consideration, whether "consciousness" (or the 
"self," or "emotions"), as experienced, can be wholly 
captured in objective discourse, is a matter of some debate. 
Graham Richards, for example, asserts that the 
"objectification" of psychological terms so central to the 
goals of prediction and control (the goal of all science) is 
fundamentally at odds with the goals of "critical self- 
ref lection," and self-understanding that have long been 
recognized in the humanities (history, literature, clinical 
psychology) If this is so, then recognition of these
opposing aims would lead us to expect profound differences 
between, for example, "consciousness" as characterized within 
an empirical/epistemological system (Locke, Reid, Mahan) and 
"consciousness" as characterized in the metaphorical language 
of the nineteenth century novel. As we have seen, there are 
profound differences between the psychological and literary 
models of consciousness of this period (1800-1885).
By the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century, the 
Scottish influence had begun to wane, eclipsed by the 
evolutionary ideas of Charles Darwin. By then, psychology 
had acquired disciplinary status, aided by the return of 
American students who had trained in German laboratories. By 
then, American literature had acquired, if not disciplinary
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status of the same sort, at least respectability. In the
next section, Part II of this study, I will examine models of 
consciousness in psychology and literature of this later 
period, 1886-1910. As we will see, the psychologists of this 
later period adopted many of the ideas expressed by the 
literary realists we have just examined. And, somewhat 
surprisingly, the novelists of this later period addressed 
many of the issues that came to the attention of these later 
American psychologists.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS, 1886-1910
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century and 
well into the third quarter, Scottish Commonsense philosophy 
dominated American thought--particularly in matters relating 
to concepts of the mind and consciousness. As we have seen, 
the models proposed by America's pre-experimental 
psychologists Laurens Hickok, Asa Mahan, Mark Hopkins, and 
James McCosh, adopted many of Reid's ideas, particularly his 
analysis of the mind in terms of separate powers or 
faculties, and his idea that the Will and the Understanding 
were important interactive processes in determining the 
direction and flow of thought. What changed in those years 
between, say, 1813 (the publication of Reid's Essays) and 
1886 (the beginning of the "new psychology"), was less a 
matter of structural change in the models themselves and more 
a matter of reorganization of the particulars.
For example, following Reid (and the Scottish school 
more generally), consciousness was no longer regarded as a 
separate power of the mind but, rather, as an irreducible 
succession of feeling states, containing all the acts of 
which the mind was capable (perceiving, judging, reasoning) 
as well as memories, sensations, and all the properties 
formerly associated with the Will. Indeed, long before the 
late nineteenth century, consciousness had come to be 
identified with Reid's "train of thought" (see Figure 1); as
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we have seen, this is the view adopted by Hickok and Mahan,
Spencer and Taine (see Figures 2 and 4), and it is certainly
the view adopted by the realist writers we examined in the
last chapter. The difference between the novelists' models
of consciousness and those of the psychologists of 1865-1885
was less a matter of substance than of emphasis: the
psychologists we examined held to the view that consciousness
was merely an adjunct to the operations of the mind; the
novelists regarded consciousness as primary.
By the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century/
however, even philosophically-minded, experimentally-oriented
psychologists had come to regard consciousness as the proper
subject-matter of a science of psychology. For example,
George Trumbull Ladd, in the "Introduction" to his seminal
text, Elements of Physiological Psychology, writes:
(l)t will serve our purpose best to 'define' this 
science simply by ascribing to it a certain more or less 
definite sphere of phenomena. Thus we shall consider 
psychology as that science which has for its primary 
subject of investigation all the phenomena of human 
consciousness, or of the sentient life of man.1
Similarly, James Mark Baldwin in volume 1 of his Handbook of 
Psychology defines Psychology as the "science of the 
phenomena of consciousness." cautioning that we must be 
"careful to include consciousness where-ever and in whatever 
stages it be found."2 William James, perhaps less willing to 
commit himself, states simply that "Psychology is the Science 
of Mental Life," though it is clear that he understands 
mental life as occurring within consciousness.3
The reasons for this shift in emphasis from "mind" to 
"consciousness" are nov/here stated precisely in these early
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works. Granting a certain interpretive license from the 
perspective of nearly one-hundred years, however, we can 
recognize several theoretical advantages that resulted from 
the shift. First. Even a brief survey of their work 
indicates that psychologists of this later period were no 
less interested in the intellectual processes--perception, 
reason, judgment, and other discrete contents of mind--than 
were psychologist/philosophers of the early period.4 However, 
they were at least as concerned with the emotions and the 
will (the sentient life of humankind), and, following Reid, 
with the interactions between intellectual and motivational 
processes and their consequences in behavior. From a purely 
definitional perspective, the mind had long been associated 
with rational acts (the mind could think, reason, and judge) 
but rarely with acts of feeling or passion. Only 
consciousness, long since identified with the "stream of 
thought," encompassed both intellectual and motivational 
processes, rational and irrational attitudes, sensations as 
well as ideas. If we consider the terms "mind" and 
"consciousness" as serving a purely theoretical function (as 
"mind" served the epistemological objective), then 
"consciousness" was a more flexible construct with which to 
identify the wide array of topics that, by the late 
nineteenth century, had come under the umbrella of 
psychology.
Second. Purely as a construct, consciousness also had 
the appeal of neutrality. At one remove from "mind," 
consciousness was also at one remove from the mind/body 
debate which, in the wake of new discoveries about the brain,
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had become such a central issue.5 The relation of mind to 
brain was assumed by all; the question was whether or not the 
relation should be understood as one-to-one or many-to-one; 
whether, that is, whether each mind-act could be reduced to a 
particular activity within the brain or whether the 
activities of mind required another level of analysis. The 
question, phrased in terms of the relation between the powers 
of the mind and the brain, had profound religious and moral 
implications, calling into question the freedom of the will, 
personal responsibility, and God. In contrast, 
consciousness, long considered a shadowy accompaniment to 
mind, seemed to have an equally ambiguous relationship to the 
brain. Most thinkers of the time, however, were willing to 
admit that certain aspects of consciousness (for example, 
sensations and affect) had concomitant somatic parallels: 
the conscious experience of fear corresponded to increased 
heart rate; grief was expressed as tears.6 The relationship 
of consciousness to somatic processes did not seem to carry 
with it the same profound metaphysical implications that were 
part of the mind/brain debate. My point is that 
consciousness, because it was the more enveloping construct, 
was more amenable to the objectives of a scientific 
psychology that sought to encompass both the physical and 
mental aspects of the human condition.
James Baldwin's defense of this issue is not unique. 
After presenting a series of reasons why mental states and 
physical states cannot be considered "one and the same," he 
concludes:
The absolute separation of psychology from physiology,
however, in point of matter does not imply their
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independence of each other in point of fact. They are 
united in fact by a bond which finds analogy only in 
that which unites the science of the inorganic, 
chemistry, with that of life, biology. Life introduces 
a new series of phenomena into nature, but the 
morphological changes it produces are accomplished 
immediately through the processes of inorganic or 
chemical change. So psychology, while introducing a new 
order of phenomena, proceeds immediately upon the data 
of physiological change.7
All of which suggests that consciousness--as a psychological 
construct--served the new psychology well precisely because 
it did not carry with it the limitations and conceptual 
baggage with which the concept of "mind" had long been 
associated: consciousness was "life" ("a theatre of
possibilities") in a way that "mind" was not.8
One issue arising in the late nineteenth century, 
however, that Reid did not address in any substantive way was 
the issue of psychopathology. Abnormal mental states, 
according to Reid, were expected consequences of a too-active 
imagination coupled with a lack of willful effort, a tendency 
to allow passion to rule conduct rather than reason.3 Such 
tendencies, Reid believed, were more characteristic of the 
"vulgar and inattentive" social class than of the elite. By 
the late nineteenth century, however, a number of highly- 
positioned people began to complain of symptoms for which no 
organic cause cause could be found.10 Their symptoms-- 
insomnia, headache, fatigue, dyspepsia, depression, 
persistent anxiety--were sufficiently debilitating to force 
them to withdraw from normal activities, a cause for concern. 
Clearly, these men and women, "pillars" of society, could 
hardly be charged with willful negligence or shameful 
malingering; their position in society obviated such claims.
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The most popular diagnosis was "neurasthenia" {coined by- 
neurologist George Beard in 186911) a term that was meant to 
cover a wide variety of such symptoms; the label made it 
official (as labels do), a legitimate medical condition, but 
one of psychological import. Psychologists, as scientists of 
the mind, were obliged to recognize this fact, to incorporate 
into their models of mind and consciousness some explanation 
for mental dysfunction.12
That consciousness served this role more adequately than 
the concept of mind is one assumption I intend to illustrate 
in this chapter. By way of example, consider the meaning of 
the phrase "She's lost her mind." Most lay people would 
agree, I think, that the phrase accounts for an apparent 
break with reality, a disorder of logic, with delusions, 
hallucinations, and paranoia. This identification of mind 
with "powers" of reason, judgment, and rational thought was 
no less powerful in the nineteenth century than it remains 
today. The symptoms of neurasthenics, however, evinced no 
break with reality; their symptoms were disorders more of 
affect than of logic. In retrospect, it seems as though 
"consciousness," so long as it was conceived as a succession 
of affect-laden sensations and ideas (the "stream of 
thought"), served a necessary theory-constitutive function: 
it was the means by which nineteenth-century psychologists 
would endeavor to bring into account symptoms and behavior 
that were clearly maladaptive.
Even so, these later psychologists were drawing on ideas 
that had long been part of American thinking about the mind 
and consciousness, ideas drawn largely from the work of the
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Scottish philosophers, changing merely the particulars (in 
line with new discoveries concerning the brain and in 
response to new demands on the discipline), while holding on 
to the basic structure. As we will see, the psychologists 
whose work forms the basis of this chapter--William James, 
George Trumbull Ladd, and James Mark Baldwin13-- shared many 
of Reid's concerns: a) a concern to establish psychology as 
a science with clearly defined subject-matter and objective 
methods (including experimentation), and careful analysis of 
the conditions as well as the consequences of mental acts; b) 
an interest in the process of mental development (by the late 
nineteenth century, "development" was conceived within the 
context of evolutionism); and c) a concern to incorporate 
into psychological analysis all the latest advances in the 
knowledge of human physiological functioning.
In its late nineteenth-century usage, consciousness was 
implicitly understood as a process akin to awareness and 
receptivity. It was conceived as the end-point of experience 
and the source of action. As we have seen, Henry James and 
the other realist writers we have examined conceived 
consciousness in this way. By the late nineteenth century, 
psychologists, too, would come to this view. That they did 
so even while retaining many of the ideas first proposed by 
Reid is testimony to what Graham Richards has called the 
"essential phenomenological and humanistic character" of 
psychological ideas.15
In this chapter, I examine models of consciousness 
developed by George Trumbull Ladd, William James, and James 
Mark Baldwin. The usual account of faculties and of
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consciousness is present in their work; however, each of 
these men made important contributions to particular topics 
within the new psychology: Ladd in physiological psychology;
James in psychopathology; and Baldwin in developmental 
psychology. Accordingly, while I will devote some space to 
a general discussion of their models, I intend to emphasize 
these important aspects of their work. Because George 
Trumbull Ladd's important text, Elements of Physiological 
Psychology, was heralded as the harbinger of the "new 
psychology" by no less than G. Stanley Hall in 1887, I will 
begin this overview with a discussion of Ladd's work.
George Trumbull Ladd (1842-1921)15 
George Trumbull Ladd began his career as a psychologist 
in a program of self-study of the works of Locke, Reid, the 
British empiricists, the German experimentalists, and all of 
the Americans, including Mahan, Porter, Hickok and others. 
Though his intent was to learn all he could about the "new" 
mental science, his motives were less a reflection of his 
intellectual interests and curiosity than of his concern lest 
the application of scientific principles to the study of 
human nature should run counter to or trivialize classical 
religious ideals. As Eugene Mills states the issue, "A 
confirmed dualist, Ladd believed that, whatever might be 
revealed by the methods of science, there was still a 
psychological reality immune to scientific method which could 
be known only by immediate experience."16 Like his 
contemporaries, william James and James Mark Baldwin, Ladd 
believed that the mental life of humankind could not be 
reduced to "localized features" or brain mechanisms, but
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retained always the character and quality of a "something
more." Ladd insisted that
the development of Mind can only be regarded as the 
progressive manifestation in consciousness of the life 
of a real being which, although taking its start and 
direction from the action of the physical elements of 
the body, proceeds to unfold powers that are sui generis 
according to laws of its own.17
Psychology could be a science, Ladd would assert, but it 
would be a science unlike other sciences and its laws would 
be laws of a different order.
It is strange indeed that a man who was devoted to 
classical study, a man who was a philosopher first and a 
scientist (if at all) only second, should claim the distinct 
honor of presenting the first American textbook oriented 
almost wholly to the physiological basis of mental life.
Yet, the publication in 1886 of Ladd's text is widely 
recognized as the pivotal event signifying the end of 
philosophical psychology and the beginning of scientific 
psychology in America. G. Stanley Hall's comment is typical: 
"It is at last possible," he writes in November of 1887, "to 
read a plain statement of the facts of a good part of the 
field of experimental psychology in English."18 According to 
Mills, however, Ladd's purpose in publishing the text did not 
emerge out of a desire to "set psychology on the proper path 
of science," but was the result of a long, sustained, and 
concentrated attempt to make sense of this new field. As a 
scholar, Ladd was attracted to tasks of this sort, according 
to Mills, with the result being a careful and systematic 
summary of the main issues in the field. For this reason, 
the book established Ladd's reputation as one of the leading
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scientists in the field of psychology.15 
Qn Consciousness
"It will be the task of the book itself," Ladd writes in 
the Preface to the Elements. "to set forth the assured or 
alleged results of Physiological Psychology; and this will be 
done at every step with such degree of assurance as belongs 
to the evidence."20 This is not, however, Ladd's only 
objective. An examination of the Table of Contents reveals a 
second, perhaps primary, concern: Although the first
section, entitled "The Nervous Mechanism," contains seven 
chapters reporting the latest advances in knowledge of the 
central nervous system, sensory mechanisms, and embryonic 
development, the last two sections (entitled "Correlations of 
the Nervous Mechanism and the Mind" and "The Nature of Mind," 
respectively) contain fifteen chapters discussing 
localization of function, visual, auditory, and tactile 
processes, and the physical basis of the higher powers of the 
mind, ending with a philosophical account of the mind/body 
relation and a concerted refutation of the materialistic 
thesis. It is this last section that forms the foundation 
for much of what follows.21
Psychology, according to Ladd, is the science of the 
phenomena of consciousness. By "phenomena" Ladd means 
precisely that consciousness consists of a series of events: 
the yellow of the the watch, the red of the rose, the feeling 
of cold, or of heat, or of pain, acts of imagination, and 
pure thought which, according to Ladd, all occur within 
consciousness.22 More than these events, however, 
consciousness also consists of "synthetic" acts, events in
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themselves, such as discriminating, combining, and localizing 
of sensations. "Our entire conscious existence," writes 
Ladd, "...is a continually shifting succession of individual 
mental activities, no one of which is exactly like any other 
or is to be considered as a mere repetition of any other."23 
Given the complexity and interrelationship of the phenomena 
of study, therefore, it would seem that a science of 
psychology would tackle an impossible task, "(f) or what is 
infinite in variety and always changing its kind cannot be 
described;" and that which cannot be described, cannot be 
science.”
But a science of psychology can be attempted, however, 
with some assurance, because the phenomena of consciousness 
can be classified on the basis of our immediate awareness of 
the "likenesses and unlikenesses" of the different states of 
consciousness which we all experience. (This, of course, is 
Reid's "reflection".) Such classifications, Ladd believes, 
are necessary to the science because they "tell us much that 
scientific inquiry desires to know about the origin or 
correlations of...mental phenomena." They can tell us, for 
example,
what special part of the external organ of sense, or 
what area of the brain, is more directly concerned in 
producing the psychical state which precedes or causes 
the mental phenomena....[and] they may demonstrate what 
kind of physical stimuli result, respectively, in 
exciting such and such states of consciousness.25
These classifications are necessary, Ladd asserts, because 
they "set the way" for experimental and physiological 
elaboration.
Ladd begins, as we have seen, with the same set of
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assumptions with which Reid and others have begun. Like 
them, he agrees that all the "faculties" of consciousness may­
be assumed under three heads: "phenomena of knowing,
phenomena of feeling, and phenomena called acts of will."26 
Such classification is permitted, however, only on the 
assumption that there exists a "real being" called "mind"
(the proper subiect of the phenomena of consciousness) which 
is distinguished in every respect from the "real beings" 
understood as the physical molecules of the brain system. 
There is no one-to-one correspondence between psychical 
states and physical states, Ladd asserts, because the mental 
and the physical are different categories of analysis: "(t)he 
principles which regulate the formation of classes among the 
conscious states of the mind are very different from those 
which regulate...the physical basis of these states."27
This is not to suggest, however, that no relation exists 
or that conscious phenomena and brain states are absolute and 
independent operations. Ladd's solution to the difficulty is 
to envision a system in which the brain acts as the "medium" 
through which the will "acts" toward its ends, through which 
sensations and perceptions are "presented" to the mind; the 
brain acting as a kind of transmission center sending and 
receiving messages.23 As to the connection between mind and 
brain, Ladd insists any literal answer would lead at once to 
absurdity. The answer "best consistent with the facts," 
according to Ladd, is the same connection we always find 
between two "any so-called 'real beings':"
The molecules of the brain (so far, at least, as psycho­
physical science knows anything of them) are composed of 
elements of material reality, called atoms; these atoms 
act by way of motion, according to their constitution
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and relations to each other and to their environment.
The mind, on the other hand, is a real unit-being of 
another order than that of the atoms. Its acts are the 
various modes or states of consciousness. This being 
called mind is causally related to the beings called 
atoms; the relation is mutual. The mind behaves as it 
does because of the constitution and behavior of the 
molecules of the brain. The molecules of the brain 
behave as they do because of the nature and activities 
of the mind....The action of each accounts for the 
action of the other. But the action of neither is to be 
explained as solely due to the action of the other; 
neither mind nor brain can be regarded as the subject 
for the phenomena ordinarily ascribed to the other.23
As Ladd suggests, this view is unmistakably dualistic; 
specifically, it is interactionist. The phenomena of 
consciousness operate according to laws distinct from the 
laws that govern the operation of the brain, yet mind and 
brain interact, each one serving on occasion as the cause of 
action in the other. The fact that each is not conceived as 
the sole influence, one on the other, leaves open the door 
for free will, individuality, and the pursuit of higher 
goals.
There is little in Ladd's conception of consciousness 
that we have not encountered before; only the distinction 
between immediate consciousness and reflective consciousness 
is missing. The introspective method is heralded as "the 
only way we have "of ascertaining what are the phenomenon 
that require explanation," but it is never equated with 
"reflection" in the sense in which Reid intended, nor is 
"reflection" understood as a capacity which must be developed 
over time. Though the classification of mind into various 
"faculties" receives Ladd's support, these faculties are not 
to be understood as entities "having an existence of 
themselves;" or as capable of being compounded in any way.
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"They are not divisions of the mind," writes Ladd,
nor are they powers of the mind, if by this word be 
meant some permanent recognizable reality, stored up in 
a spiritual subject, or attached to it or inherent in 
it, after the analogy of the relation of physical forces 
to their subjects, the atoms. The faculties of the mind 
are the modes of the behavior, in consciousness, of the 
mind.30
One can not imagine a more decisive refutation of the faculty 
psychology of Reid and Stewart. Yet the “faculties" are 
retained, if only because they provide the focus for 
psychological research. Moreover, it is clear that Ladd, 
like Reid, would retain a measure of free-will, even in the 
face of new discoveries of functional correlates within the 
cortex.
There is one aspect of Ladd's account that is worth 
mentioning because we will encounter a form of it in the next 
chapter in the work of Henry Adams. In his discussion of the 
relation between mind and brain, Ladd develops the following 
thesis:31 Events occurring within the brain are, at base,
physical events. All physical events, even those within the
human brain, are modes of action, specifically, "alterations 
in the relations of the material atoms or masses to each
other in space." Consciousness, also, is motion, though not
of elements in space; consciousness is motion in time, a 
constantly shifting organization of mental experience. The 
concept of motion is central, however, to both fields of 
action and it is that concept that Henry Adams employs (more 
or less successfully) to describe the historical development 
of human knowledge.
The publication, of Ladd's physiological text was a 
pivotal event in the history of psychology, indicating the
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abandonment of a purely speculative psychology and the 
development of psychology as a scientific discipline. It is 
in that context that I presented his views. William James, 
in contrast, presents a view of consciousness more in the 
tradition of Reid than of Ladd, not rejecting, but certainly
-deemphasi-z-isg-,— its—phy&iological^-a&geefes^— As—ws—w-i-l-l^ see^ ----
consciousness, for James, has active, selecting properties. 
Perhaps James's most under-rated contribution to psychology, 
however, was his realization that a theory of consciousness 
was incomplete that did not also account for abnormal mental 
states. Because many of James's ideas are reflected in the 
literature of the time, I will give some account of these 
ideas.
William James (1842-1910)
William James is the recognized father of American 
psychology, a man whose contributions to the field are as 
varied and unclassifiable as they are insightful. During the 
last half of the nineteenth century, his was the voice of 
compromise and reason and, though he developed no 
comprehensive program, the breadth of his knowledge and his 
incomparable style have carried the weight of his ideas 
through nearly one hundred years of psychological debate.
James began his work in psychology in the shadow of 
Scottish common-sense realism and the American Transcendental 
movement (see Appendix). From the Scottish school, James 
derived the ideas of a consciousness of immediate experience 
(of fleeting sensations and transitory impressions) and a 
reflective consciousness of reasoning, willing, remembering, 
and judging. From the Scottish school James also derived the
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conviction that our ideas and our feelings and passions were 
as real as the objects of the external world, though, as we 
will see, he allowed that neither subjective nor objective 
experience may be exactly what they seem. From the 
Transcendentalists, James derived the idea that consciousness 
might serve a higher purpose than the mere ordering and 
classification of sense impressions. It was from their work 
and from their presence in his life that James would come to 
insist on the "something more" of conscious life to which 
every man aspired.
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of James's thought is 
that it was well-grounded in every ideological current of his 
time. Like Ladd, he knew intimately the work of Locke and 
the British empiricists (many of his ideas reflect his 
opposition to their reductionistic sensationalism); he knew 
intimately the work of Kant and the various strains of German 
idealism which followed (he rejected their Soul and retained 
their spirituality); he applauded experimentalism (but 
despaired of German psychophysics); he was well acquainted 
with the work on hysteria of Pierre Janet and Jean-Martin 
Charcot in France, of George Beard in America, and of Henry 
Maudsley in England (though a physician, he did not practice 
formally); and he was perhaps the sole American supporter of 
psychical research in both America and England, frequently 
citing the work of the English psychic researcher, Frederick 
Myers.
According to James, the science of psychology was 
defined by the following set of criteria: a) psychology is
the study of mental life (the word itself calls to mind a
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teeming universe of ideas and emotions); "the knowledge of
particular men about the particular things that surround
them;"32 b) properly, psychology ought to concern itself with
the full range of man's experience, considered as a unified
whole, including the emotions as well as the intellect; and
c) that there are not and should not be absolute criteria
for defining the truth or falsity of ideas or actions except
according to their utility. As we will see in the following
discussion of James's ideas, these convictions inform every
aspect of his thought.
On Consciousness
In the work of John Locke, in the psychologies of Asa
Mahan, Mark Hopkins and James McCosh, one encounters a
consciousness peculiarly passive--a consciousness whose task
was merely to observe and record the operations of the mind.
Even Ladd, concerned as he was with the relation between
conscious states and brain mechanisms, proposed a singularly
unresponsive consciousness. No ephemeral shadowy
consciousness such as these could serve James's uniquely
psychological point of view, for consciousness as James made
use of it was a dynamic process endowed with the capacity to
order experience in particular ways, to select, to choose. to
compare, to judge, to create, to disregard; it was the Self
in active response to both inner and outer worlds. It was
sentient, emotional, analytical, synthetic. And it was
unquestionably free, as the following quote reveals:
(T)he mind is at every stage a theatre of possibilities. 
Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with 
each other, the selection of some, and the suppression 
of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of 
attention. The highest and most elaborated mental 
products are filtered from the data chosen by the
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faculty next beneath, out of the mass offered by the 
faculty below that, which mass in turn was sifted from a 
still larger amount of yet simpler material and so on. 
The mind, in short, works on the data it receives very 
much as a sculptor works on his block of stone. In a 
sense the statue stood there from eternity. But there 
were a thousand different ones beside it, and the 
sculptor alone is to thank for having extricated this 
one from the rest. Just so the world of each of us, 
howsoever different our several views of it may be, all 
lay embedded in the primordial chaos of sensations, 
which gave the mere matter to the thought of all of us 
indifferently. We may, if we like, by our reasonings 
unwind things back to that black and jointless 
continuity of space and moving clouds of swarming atoms 
which science calls the only real world. But all the 
while the world we feel and live in will be that which 
our ancestors and we, by slowly cumulative strokes of 
choice, have extricated out of this, like sculptors, by 
simply rejecting certain portions of the given stuff. 
Other sculptors, other statues from the same stone!
Other minds, other worlds from the same monotonous and 
inexpressive chaos! My world is but one in a million 
alike embedded, alike real to those who may abstract 
them. How different must be the worlds in the 
consciousnesses of ant, cuttle-fish, or crab!33
In his unique style, James has portrayed a consciousness 
that, by attending to some things more than others, actively 
selects from the "arena of possibilities" which the mind 
conveys. He suggests that this selection is made possible in 
concert with the various "faculties" of the mind which 
perform the functions of "filtering" the mass of data 
available to it. At all levels of this sensory process, 
consciousness plays the role of choosing which to recognize 
and which to disregard. It is given in each man's 
experience, says James, to make those choices in response to 
his own self-interest and all that he has experienced before. 
In this way, each of us "carves out" our singular lives. 
James's model of consciousness is, in part, one of a process 
of adaptive selection.34 The premise is Darwin's; the
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application is uniquely James.
What consciousness selects, however, is only a small 
part of what consciousness actually is. "Traditional" 
psychology (i.e., faculty psychology), according to James, 
because it has focused on primary processes of the mind, has 
neglected the marginal, hazy, barely perceptible "fringe" of 
consciousness.35 we think, we plan, we judge, but surrounding 
that thinking, planning, judging, is an affective web of 
relations that informs the direction of thought. "What is 
that shadowy scheme," James asks, "of the 'form' of an opera, 
play, or book, which remains in our mind and on which we pass 
judgment when the actual thing is done? What is our notion 
of a scientific or philosophical system?"36 Any idea or 
event upon which our thought is focused, shades imperceptibly 
into these margins of consciousness from which we come to 
know the form of a thing, its prototypical "gestalt," just as 
we come to know the thing in itself.37
James describes a consciousness of two aspects: the
first is that which commands our attention; the second is the 
relational fringe. James's terms are the more compelling: 
he describes them as "resting places" and "places of flight," 
respectively. The resting places are filled with sensations 
or images which can be held before the mind for extended 
periods. These resting places, according to James, have been 
for too long the sole interest of psychology; they are, he 
asserts, the source of the ideas of sensationalists (Locke) 
or faculty psychologists (Reid) who describe a consciousness 
of discrete events. The places of flight are rapid and 
transitory; they are "filled with thoughts of relations,
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either static or dynamic: "We ought to say," writes James,
that these relations are feelings, "a feeling of and, a 
feeling of if, a feeling of but." The places of flight 
within the conscious stream are resistant to analysis, 
according to James; "examination annihilates them; words 
cannot capture them."38
Figure 3 is a adapted diagram of James's consciousness. 
In the diagram, time is represented along the horizontal 
axis, while the height of the curve represents the intensity 
of the feeling-state. The letters a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 
represent successive conscious states. All states are 
present, James notes, in the intensities shown by the curve; 
the letter "d" representing the most intense state. The 
small "o's" and "pluses" representing the relational fringe. 
One might conceive of each letter as a resting place 
represented by a specific image or sensation or thought; the 
pluses and "o's" are the relational fringe (the connecting 
links), the series of associated ideas and images which are 
concurrently called to mind.39
Consciousness, as James described it, bears striking 
similarity to the "theories" of consciousness conveyed by 
literary realists Elizabeth Stuart Phelps and Henry James, 
suggesting that William James is less interested in 
epistemological issues than in describing a consciousness of 
felt experience. There is little of the "simple" and 
"reflective" consciousnesses described by Reid and his 
followers in this account, though, like his brother Henry, 
James believed that, under certain conditions, reflection 
would yield dividends in terms of higher-order knowledge and
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Figure 3.
William James's "Stream of Consciousness" (adapted from 
William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 
(1890) (New York: Dover, 1950), p. 243).
b d fa c e g
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the emergence of secondary conscious states.
Secondary Consciousness
During the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century, 
there occurred a resurgence of interest in altered conscious 
states. Following the work of Pierre Janet and Jean-Martin 
Charcot in France, hypnosis had gained a new respectability 
in the treatment of mental disease.40 In America and in 
England, spiritualism, mediumship, and demoniacal possession, 
co-existed with the new psychology, evidence of a particular 
kind of the popular interest in matters of the mind.41 
Finally, there were a growing number of cases with symptoms 
like depression, lethargy, withdrawal, and hysteria for which 
no organic cause could be found.42 Surely, thought James, the 
science of psychology was as responsible to these conditions 
as it had long been to "normal" function. Unlike many of his 
contemporaries, James was convinced that a science of 
psychology was incomplete that did not also attempt to 
account for these "exceptional" states of human mental life, 
for they were, after all, psychic states, albeit states with 
pronounced mystical implications.43
It is, accordingly, no accident that the diagram 
representing James's concept of consciousness approaches 
infinity at either end of the time-line, for James believed 
that there had to exist some aspect of psychic life "beyond 
the margin" of relations that directed normal conscious 
life.44 In James's model, therefore, consciousness did not 
end at the margins; it expanded outward (as though in space) 
and beyond the known and the present.45 This second 
consciousness was referred to by James alternately as the
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subconscious or the subliminal, and it serves as the core of 
his belief that altered mental states were nothing more (nor 
less) than the intrusion of subliminal contents into ordinary 
consciousness.16
Many of James's ideas on this theme were drawn from the 
work of Frederick W. H. Myers of England, a man whose 
interest in psychical phenomena carried him to the forefront 
of the field of psychical research. According to Myers the 
subliminal is "the enveloping mother-consciousness" from 
which our normal consciousnesses evolve. From its 
intercourse with the spiritual world the subliminal 
consciousness draws energy and makes contact with ideas and 
impressions that can not be acquired through the usual 
channels.17 There is, as well, a less ethereal aspect to the 
concept of a secondary consciousness: Wot only can the
subliminal make contact with other minds (and presumably 
other worlds48 ) but it also serves as a holding place for all 
manner of archaic and rudimentary memories of automatic 
processes (such as walking), all impressions passing through 
consciousness to which we do not attend, and "buried 
feelings" which are kept out of conscious awareness.15
The two forms of consciousness--the normal and the 
subliminal--flow like parallel streams within the psyche, 
merging occasionally (as in instances of great insight): the
subliminal remaining out of contact with the external world; 
the normal waking consciousness pursuing its worldly task.
In theory, all cases of mental disease, whether of hysteria 
or the popular 'neurasthenia', or cases of altered conscious 
states--of mediumship, spiritualism, hypnotic trance, or
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sleep--represented an unexpected eruption of the subliminal,
"like a wave that rises to the surface, swamps the other
waves, overflows the banks, [and] deflects for a while the
course of the current.50 Under these conditions, the entire
broad field of normal consciousness would contract to a
single idea, upon which "the whole of knowledge is brought to
bear."51 Instead of the controlled associative stream of
waking consciousness, the single idea with its random
association of feeling-toned ideas and sensory images would
dominate thought and behavior. All that which did not in
some manner accrue to the single idea (either by chance or
affective association) would not, indeed could not, be
recognized by the beleaguered subject.52 This explanation,
according to James, fit the facts as well as any other, and
better than most:
(O)ne cannot help admiring the great originality with 
which Myers wove such an extraordinarily detached and 
discontinuous series of phenomena together. Unconscious 
cerebration, dreams, hypnotism, hysteria, inspirations 
of genius, the willing game, planchette, crystal-gazing, 
hallucinatory voices, apparitions of the dying, medium- 
tranees, demoniacal possession, clairvoyance, thought- 
transference- -even ghosts and other facts more doubtful- 
-these things form a chaos at first sight most 
discouraging....Yet Myers has actually made a system of 
them, stringing them continuously upon a perfectly 
legitimate objective hypothesis, verified in some cases 
and extended to others by analogy.53
Certainly among the prominent psychologists of the late 
nineteenth-century, William James was unique in his readiness 
to accept the notion of a subliminal that had the powers and 
capacities that Myers gave to it. It is interesting that 
before Freud's ideas became well known, few American 
psychologists were willing to recognize an "unconscious" of
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the sort Freud proposed, though they were ready to accede 
that certain activities of the mind might become unconscious 
in the sense that they had become "automatic."54 Perhaps the 
concept of a subliminal consciousness set the stage for a 
general acceptance of Freud's ideas.
In the following section, we will examine consciousness 
from a developmental perspective. By the late nineteenth 
century, the core themes of evolutionary theory had become 
part of every developmental theory proposed, and the theory 
proposed by James Mark Baldwin proved no exception, in 
contrast to Thomas Reid, whose ideas of mental development 
were confined to the attainment of reason and judgment and 
moral responsibility,55 Baldwin was concerned with 
maturational issues and the differences between healthy and 
diseased minds, children and adult, animal and human; this is 
"genetic" psychology, as Baldwin explains in the following 
quote:
The new and important question about the mind which 
is...recognised is this: How did it grow? What light 
upon its activity and nature can we get from a positive 
knowledge of its early stages and processes of 
growth?...How is the growth of the child related to that 
of animals?--how, through heredity and social 
influences, to the growth of the race and of the family 
and society in which he is brought up? All this can be 
comprehended only in the light of the doctrine of 
evolution, which has rejuvenated the sciences of life; 
and we are now beginning to see a rejuvenation of the 
sciences of the mind from the same point of view.56
James Mark Baldwin (186J-1934)
James Mark Baldwin is considered one of the founding 
fathers of American psychology: Along with James McKeen
Cattell, he founded the Psycho1ogica1 Review in 1894, the 
Psychological Index (forerunner to Psychological Abstracts)
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and Psychological Monographs. In 1904 he founded the 
Psychological Bulletin. His Handbook of Psychology (1889 and 
1891) was a small review of major theories in psychology of 
the period; his Mental Development in the Child and the Race 
(1895) was a landmark text in the application of evolutionary 
theory to the development of the mind.
Throughout the nineteenth century (and including, to 
some extent, the theories of Ladd and James), consciousness 
was defined largely by its content. Consciousness 
"contained" ideas, thoughts, sensations, memories; forms or 
levels of consciousness were distinguished by the kind of 
operations performed or the kinds of ideas to which one might 
attend: revelations and insights were products of the
subliminal; plans, purposes, actions proposed, were products 
of normal consciousness. The apparent difficulty of talking 
about the mind and consciousness without also speaking in 
terms of discrete units was no easier in the late nineteenth 
century than it had been a century earlier.
Baldwin, however, confronts this problem squarely; that 
he does so in the context of a long-held tradition in 
psychological thought is testimony to the flexibility of 
psychological concepts. The core of Baldwin's developmental 
theory rests on the distinction between two stages of 
consciousness we have encountered before: the distinction
between simple and reflective consciousness.
The reader will recall that the distinction between 
simple and reflective consciousness proposed by Reid was 
founded on this one crucial difference: simple consciousness
was immediate, involuntary, and unfocused; reflective
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consciousness included both present and past events, was 
voluntary, and focused. Baldwin makes a somewhat different 
claim: simple consciousness is present when the conscious
subject makes no distinction between herself and other 
thinking subjects; reflective consciousness is present when 
such a distinction is made. (The reader will remember that 
Asa Mahan defined simple consciousness as the ability to 
distinguish between the me and not me: while reflective 
consciousness consisted of the ability to synthesize higher- 
order ideas.) According to Baldwin, however, development 
from simple to reflective consciousness occurs at that point 
when the experiencing subject "embraces simply the 
circumscribed area of [her] own experience considered in 
reference to [herself] . "57
This is an oversimplification of Baldwin's ideas, though 
the general point of his theory is not thereby lost. The 
question of interest to Baldwin is, At what point does the 
child acquire the capacity to embrace her experience as her 
experience and what are the conditions under which she does 
so?58 The answer, according to Baldwin, is that the "me/not- 
me" distinction occurs as soon as the child becomes sensitive 
to particular forms of sensation, especially as she is able 
to distinguish between sensations of touch and the muscular 
sense. This process gives the child a sense of the form of 
her own body, as well as the location and relative function 
of its various parts. From this bodily sense, the child 
develops an awareness of things external and a sense of the 
bodily movements that are necessary to make contact with 
them. "This fact of control of the body," writes Baldwin,
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"seems to be the first beginning of the exercise of the 
will. It involves a subjective reference more distinct 
and peculiar to itself than any of the purely affective 
sensations, and leads to the notion of the I and so to 
self-consciousness. "59
Consciousness, according to Baldwin, precedes hand-in-hand
with physical development; is, in fact, dependent on
maturational processes for its emergence as reflective
consciousness. In reflection, the notion of a self has
distinct form:
In reflection...the self is discovered through the act 
of attentive inspection, as having and exercising the 
characteristics of mind....The...ego...is defined and 
enriched by added marks, such as efficiency, identity, 
and permanence....Through reflection, therefore, the 
idea of self is attained and assumes its important place 
in the mental world....It brings coherence into the 
circuit of consciousness, by giving it a centre of 
reference and a circumference of limitation to the 
individual.60
The words are familiar: "Reflection," "self," "identity,"
"coherence," are all words we have encountered before in 
early theories of consciousness. Locke's consciousness was 
the embodiment of the self, as was Reid's. The reader will 
remember that Asa Mahan's theory of consciousness was the 
first to embrace a developmental pattern of the sort that 
Baldwin describes in these paragraphs (see Chapter 3}.6l 
"Reflection," for Locke and Reid, however, was the source of 
all higher knowledge, not merely confined to knowledge of the 
self. Finally, the use of term "coherence" is consistent 
with all the models of mind and consciousness we have 
examined: Like Baldwin, each model gave to consciousness the
singular role of providing unity to the psychic system. In 
one way or another, the concept of a psychological "self" has 
endured.
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This very brief summary of Baldwin's theory of the 
development of consciousness does not do justice to the 
importance of his work. Nonetheless, a few interesting 
points may be made. Baldwin's theory of conscious 
development is, at base, a theory of personality because it 
is explicitly concerned with the development of a sense of 
self-identity. Early theories (epistemological systems), as 
we have seen, conceived identity as coexistent with 
consciousness itself. The fact that these early theories 
were wholly and entirely concerned with the adult mind is 
true enough, but neglects the more compelling issue: By the
end of the nineteenth century, evolutionary theory had taken 
hold of American psychology and laid the path it was to 
follow for the next one hundred years. There is no more 
convincing evidence of the influence of evolutionism than 
Baldwin's theory of the development of consciousness.62
Conclusion
By the late nineteenth century, consciousness had 
usurped mind as the focus of interest of psychologists. 
Indeed, this is precisely what Kearns means to suggest in his 
use of the phrase "mind-as-sentient stream" to characterize 
this period. Though possible reasons for this shift were 
given at the beginning of this chapter, a brief summary is in 
order. Admittedly, these ideas are conjectures, and post hoc 
ones at that. However, I have yet to find a source that 
details this shift in any substantive way; it seems to have 
occurred without comment. I submit these ideas, therefore, 
only as possibilities.
First. Consciousness was a more flexible and enveloping
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construct than mind.
Psychologists of this later period, were intent upon 
developing theories not (merely) of knowledge but of the 
physiological and psychological nature of humankind. They 
were looking for general laws that would encompass a variety 
of issues with which earlier theorists had only been 
marginally concerned: the relation between mind and body;
the origin of mental disorder; and the differences between 
children and adults, animals and humans. Any theory capable 
of addressing these issues need have as its terms such 
constructs as were connotatively flexible enough to encompass 
both physiological and psychological meaning, both reason and 
affect. In nineteenth-century discourse, "consciousness" was 
such a term.
Second. "Consciousness," as a theoretical construct, also 
had the appeal of neutrality.
Unlike mind, the relationship of consciousness to somatic 
processes did not seem to carry with it the metaphysical 
implications that were part of the mind/brain debate. 
Consequently, consciousness was more amenable to the 
objectives of a scientific psychology that sought to 
encompass both the physical and mental aspects of the human 
condition.
Third. Consciousness provided the foundation for a theory 
that would encompass mental pathology. "Consciousness," so 
long as it was conceived as a succession of affect-laden 
sensations and ideas, served a theory-constitutive function. 
Because mental disorders were understood as disorders of 
affect as well as reason, the concept of consciousness served
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
157
an explanatory function.
One of the consequences of the shift from "mind" to 
"consciousness" was a more finely-tuned, textured, multi­
layered conception of consciousness itself. One might 
envision the whole as a series of parallel adaptive 
processes: normal consciousness, with its affective, sensory, 
and ideational content; a subliminal consciousness, extending 
outward and beyond the sensory instant; and the physiological 
substratum, the molecular movements and neural processes of 
the brain.
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flows round it. With it goes the sense of its relations, 
near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, 
the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. (p. 255)
26 William James, Principles. vol. 1, p. 255.
27 William James, Principles. vol. 1, p. 259. "Relation, 
then, to our topic or interest is constantly felt in the 
fringe, and particularly the relation of harmony and discord, 
of furtherance or hinderance of the topic" (p. 259) . We have 
all had the experience, when working hard at a task, our
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attention focused, of having our flow of thoughts interrupted 
by a sound, an idea, a memory. Sometimes the interruption is 
a welcome addition to the task at hand; it may lead to a 
creative insight, a "breakthrough;" it may, however, stop the 
flow entirely, our attention disengaged.
One further note: There is no question that Henry and
William James held similar views of consciousness: Relations
within consciousness were as important to Henry as they were 
to William. The following quote from Henry James's preface 
to the New York edition of Roderick Hudson is reproduced here 
from Chapter 4, page 106:
[Relations] are if the very essence of the novelist's 
process, and it is by their aid, fundamentally, that his 
idea takes form and lives; but they impose on him, 
through the principle of continuity that rides them, a 
proportionate anxiety. They are the very condition of 
interest, which languishes without them; the painter's 
subject consisting ever, obviously, of the related 
state, to each other, of certain figures and things. To 
exhibit these relations, once they have all been 
recognised, is to "treat" his idea, which involves 
neglecting none of those that directly minister to 
interest....
Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and 
the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to 
draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which 
they shall happily appear to do so. (Henry James, 
"Preface," in Roderick Hudson [New York: Scribner's, 
1907], pp. vi-vii.)
38 William James, Principles. vol. 1, pp. 229-264.
39 William James, Principles. vol. 1, p. 243.
40 Henri F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the 
Unconscious.. The History and Evolution pf Dynamic Psychiatry 
(New York: Basic Books:1970), pp. 89-101, 143-174, 331-417.
41 Jeffrey Mishlove, The Roots of Consciousness. Psychic 
Liberation through History. Science and Experience (New York: 
Random House, 1975), pp. 64-106.
42 F.G. Gosling, Before Freud. p. 10.
43 William James, "The Hidden Self," Scribner's Magazine 
1 (Fall 1890): 361.
44 "We are by this time familiar with the notion," James 
writes, "that a man's consciousness need not be a fully 
integrated thing. From the ordinary focus and margin, from 
the ordinary abstraction, we shade off into phenomena that
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look like consciousness beyond the margin." (William James, 
"Notes for the Lowell Institute Lectures on Exceptional 
Mental States" [1896], reprinted in William James, Manuscript 
Lectures [vol. 19 of The Works of William James1 [Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988], p. 70.
45 William James, Principles. vol. 1, pp. 222-290. We 
have met this same idea in the work of Henry James (Chapter 
4, pp. 102-103); the following quote by the novelist, here 
reprinted, expresses the essence of the Jamesian 
consciousness:
Experience is never limited, and it is never complete; 
it is an immense sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web 
of the finest silken threads suspended in the chamber of 
consciousness, and catching every air-bomed particle in 
its tissue. It is the very atmosphere of the mind; and 
when the mind is imaginative- -much more when it happens 
to be that of a man of genius--it takes to itself the 
faintest hints of life, it converts the very pulses of 
the air into revelations. Experience is never limited, 
and it is never complete; it is an immense sensibility, 
a kind of huge spider-web of the finest silken threads 
suspended in the chamber of consciousness, and catching 
every air-bomed particle in its tissue. It is the very 
atmosphere of the mind; and when the mind is 
imaginative--much more when it happens to be that of a 
man of genius--it takes to itself the faintest hints of 
life, it converts the very pulses of the air into 
revelations. ( Henry James, "The Art of Fiction," 
(1884-1888), reprinted in Henry James. Literary 
Criticism. Essays on Literature. American Writers. and 
English Writers. Leon Edel and Mark Widon, eds. [New 
York: Literary Classics, 1984], p. 52.)
46 Eugene Taylor, william James on Exceptional Mental 
States. The 1896 Lowell Lectures (Amherst, Massachusetts: The 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1894), p. 27.
47 William James, "Review of 'Human Personality and its 
Survival of Bodily Death (by Frederick W. H. Meyers)," 
Proceedings of Lhe Society for Psychical Research will 
(London, 1903). Reprinted in Gardner Murphy and Robert 0. 
Ballou, eds., William James on Psychical Research (New York: 
Viking, 1960), pp. 225-239.
48 William James, "Review of 'Human Personality and its 
Survival of Bodily Death," p. 233.
49 Frederick W. H. Myers, "The Subliminal 
Consciousness," Proceedings of the English Society for 
Psychical Research 7 (1891-1892): 310. A complete list of 
the contents of the subliminal may be drawn from a variety of
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James's published works: buried feelings, momentarily
inactive memories, the passions, impulses, 
likes/dislikes/prejudices, intuitions/hypotheses, 
fancies/superstitions, convictions, all non-rational 
operations, fixed ideas, supra-normal cognitions, and 
religious convictions.
50 Eugene Taylor, William James on Exceptional Mental 
States. p. 27 (adapted from Boris Sidis, The Psychology of 
Suggestion [New York: Appleton, 1898], p. 15.
Eugene Taylor, William James on Exceptional Mental 
States, p. 16. See also William James, "The Hidden Self," 
pp. 363-364.
52 "Hysterics" were particularly susceptible to such 
intrusions. The fault lie in the weakness of their ego:
The attention has not sufficient strength [writes 
James] to take in the normal number of sensations or 
ideas at once. If an ordinary person can feel ten 
things at a time, an hysteric can feel but five, Our 
minds are all of them like vessels full of water, and 
taking in a new drop makes another drop fall out; only 
the hysteric mental vessel is preternaturally small.
The unifying or synthesizing power with which the Ego 
exerts over the manifold facts which are offered to it 
is insufficient to do its full amount of work, and an 
ingrained habit is formed of neglecting or overlooking 
certain determinate portions of the mass. (William 
James, "The Hidden Self," pp. 363-364.)
53 William James, "Frederick Myers's Service to 
Psychology," Proceedings of the Society for Psychical 
Research XVII (May 1901). Reprinted in Gardner Murphy and 
Robert O. Ballou, eds., William James on Psychical. Research 
(New York: Viking, 1960), pp. 219-220. In the twentieth 
century, pervaded as it is by the Freudian idea that all 
behavior is motivated by unconscious impulses, the idea of a 
subliminal consciousness with connections to 'other worlds' 
seems as far-fetched and unlikely as the concept of an 
unconscious seemed to James. Indeed, one wonders which of 
these two explanatory mechanisms is the more parsimonious: 
the idea of an unconscious of seething impulses and 
unconscious desires; or the idea of a subliminal 
consciousness that makes contact with other minds and other 
worlds? In many ways, Myers's (and James's) formulation 
seems to encompass both.
34 William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, 
pp. 164-175.
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55 One of the least considered characteristics of the 
ideas of Carl Jung is that his theory is an amalgamation of 
James's and Freud's ideas.
58 See, for example, James Mark Baldwin, Handbook of 
Psychology, vol 1, pp. 45-58.
37 These themes were noticeably current with the issues 
in the realistic novels we examined in Chapter 4. In the 
works of Phelps and James in particular, the story depended 
on our recognition that people gain through resolution of 
their moral dilemma.
58 James Mark Baldwin, The Story of the Mind (1898) (Ann 
Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1974), pp. 1-5, 53- 
61.
59 James Mark Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, p. 63.
60 James Mark Baldwin, The Storv of the Mind, p. 54-57.
61 James Mark Baldwin, The Storv of the Mind, pp. 66-67.
62 James Mark Baldwin, The Storv of the Mind, pp. 143-
144.
63 Baldwin, however, does not cite Mahan, who seems, by 
this time, to have vanished from the psychological literature 
(neither Ladd nor James make any reference to Mahan at all). 
There are (at least) two possible reasons for this neglect: 
Mahan was, after all, one of the transcendental psychologists 
(like Hickok), who held reason to be the pathway to 
knowledge. In rejecting his thesis, many psychologists may 
have rejected out-of-hand the particulars of his theory. 
Alternatively, as we have seen, many "psychological" ideas 
are absorbed into later theories which are developed in a 
context so different from the original as to render the 
source irrelevant. Certainly, Baldwin's ideas were developed 
within the context of evolutionism (Spencer and Darwin). 
Mahan's ideas (if known) might well have seemed to represent 
a mode of thinking that no longer seemed fitting.
64 See, for example, the discussion in David J. Murray, 
The History of Western Psychology. pp. 267-268; John M. 
O'Donnell, The Origins of Modern Behaviorism. American 
Psychology. 1870-1920 [Mew York: New York University Press, 
1985], p. 167-171.
In 1893, Baldwin prepared a paper for the Columbian 
Exposition at Chicago. In this paper, he refuted "ready-made 
views of consciousness (such as those of Locke, Reid, and
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others). The old "faculties" of consciousness should be 
regarded as "growing" not "ready-made:"
The new functional conception asks how the mind as a 
whole acts, and how this one form of activity adapts 
itself to the different elements of material which it 
finds available....The particular way in which this one 
function shows itself is a matter of adaptation to the 
changing conditions under which the activity is brought 
about. .. .The mind is looked upon as having grown to be 
what it is, both as respects the growth of man from the 
child, and as respects the place of man in the scale of 
conscious existence. (James Mark Baldwin, "Psychology 
Past and Present," Psychological Review. 1, pp. 367-368 
[1894]; reproduced in John M. O'Donnell, The Origins of 
Modern Behaviorism, p. 168.)
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CHAPTER 6
CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER SIEGE: THE NATURALIST RESPONSE, 1886-1910
In a recent book purporting to establish a connection 
between psychology and literature, Judith Ryan sets forth an 
interesting premise: From the fourth quarter of the
nineteenth century until about 1940, she proclaims, American 
and British novelists, responding to the
empiricist/materialist devaluation of a "self," gave form to 
characters whose self-identities appeared unusually 
fragmented and unstable.1 Though her description of the 
naturalist literary genre is undoubtedly correct (as we will 
see in this chapter), her description of the psychology of 
the period rests on a traditional interpretation of 
psychology that is not supported by the facts.
It is not correct, as Ryan would have us believe, that 
the "new" psychology of the late nineteenth century, in its 
quest for scientific respectability, devalued the 
experiencing subject. Rather, the psychologists of the 
period made every attempt to incorporate a self-concept 
within their models of consciousness, even, as Mahan and 
Baldwin proposed, predicating the development of 
consciousness on the capacity to distinguish between a self 
and all that was not-self .2 From a psychological point of 
view, the self was defined through this capacity, not 
devalued by it, though it is probably true, as Ryan asserts, 
that the philosophical problem of self and not self was not
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so easily resolved.3
Nor is it accurate to suggest, as Ryan suggests, that by 
the nineteenth century "(t)he self was no longer firmly 
anchored in the body but in consciousness itself,"1 for, as 
we have seen, the psychologists of this survey, at least, 
held to the view that consciousness and somatic processes 
were linked, though the nature of the connection was 
certainly a matter of debate. Indeed, one might truthfully 
ask, At what point in the history of philosophical thought 
was the self ever conceived as purely (or even mostly) a 
somatic entity?
Nor is it accurate to suggest, as Ryan does, that, by 
the nineteenth century, consciousness "was no longer a 
discrete unit but included everything that was within the 
individual field of perception."5 As we have seen, 
consciousness was no more defined by the perceptual field 
than it was defined by anv single sensory or affective 
strain. Even should one take as the defining conditions of 
the "perceptual field" an unusually broad spectrum of sensory 
input (which it is clear Ryan does not), there is no logical 
connection between "discreteness" as a description of the 
limits or unity of consciousness and the perceptual panorama.
The connection between psychology and literature is by 
no means as direct as Ryan's analysis would suggest. Though 
there were clear echoes of an empiricist strain in the new 
psychology, it was certainly not as pervasive and all- 
encompassing as Ryan would have it. Nor can it be said that 
"empiricism" automatically confines itself to the 
reductionist mode of thought that is generally understood to
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characterize British Associationism.6 We have seen, for 
example, that William James rejected a reductionist approach 
to consciousness, though an empiricist he certainly remained. 
Although Ryan has failed to establish a connection between 
nineteenth-century psychology and modem literature, she is 
correct in recognizing that a new literary genre emerged in 
the period following the realist literature of Phelps, 
Howells, and Henry James; and she is correct in recognizing 
that that literature seemed (at least on the surface) to 
entail a devaluation of the self.
Traditionally, literary naturalism has been defined as 
realism "infused with a pessimistic determinism," a depiction 
of everyday life at the mercy of causal forces which none 
could control, but which man or woman could hope, on occasion 
to defeat (see Chapter 1).7 Donald Pizer, however, suggests 
that literary naturalism, far from being the reductive, 
pessimistic genre it seems to be, actually portrays human 
beings in their most self-affirming, even transcendent 
character:
[Naturalism] suggests that even the least significant 
human being can feel and strive powerfully....Naturalism 
reflects an affirmative ethical conception of life, for 
it asserts the value of all life by endowing the lowest 
character with emotion and defeat and with moral 
ambiguity, no matter how poor or ignoble he may seem. 
[The naturalistic novel] involves us in the experience 
of a life both commonplace and extraordinary, both 
familiar and strange, both simple and complex.6
Pizer would characterize the naturalist literature as a 
struggle for self-affirmation. The naturalist writer comes 
to his work in search of the noble challenge, the 
extraordinary courage, though he knows or she knows that the
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odds are great and the victories few.
These issues define the ethical dilemma posed by 
naturalist writers. Unquestionably, there is an undertow of 
pessimism and defeatism running through these novels: A man
or woman confronts a society that seems to have changed too 
quickly, that has become too loud, too fast and too alien; a 
man or woman is driven or opposed by forces beyond the 
control of either, be they forces of society or forces of 
nature. The self of the distant past (the coherent self 
assumed by Reid, Mahan, Hickok), seems lost indeed to these 
turn-of-the-century writers who confront the changes of late 
nineteenth-century life with something like a wail of 
despair.
A quote from a later Elizabeth Stuart Phelps is
indicative of the general case:
We are taught that the law leans over, far beyond the 
scope of physics; that the human, like the ultimate 
atom, serves the large decree; and that human experience 
itself is a slave to the eternal rhythm. We are 
reminded that grief and joy and hope and anguish 
alternate as much as the budding and the fading of a 
wind-flower. We are asked to observe that misery has 
paroxysms as well as neuralgia; and that mourners smile 
because they have wept, and weep again, since they did 
smile. We are reminded that crime and pestilence 
pulsate in epidemics across the globe. We are called 
upon to record the throbs of the pendulum of history, 
whose swing sweeps from civilization to ruin, from the 
people to the throne, from tyranny to riot, from 
confusion to order, from morality to madness, from 
atheism to bigotry, from despair to faith.9
There is nothing stable or certain about life; the "pendulum 
of history" swings from chaos to order, "despair to faith," 
without end and seemingly without concern for the individuals 
who are caught in its path. In the face of such
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
171
powerlessness, how is it possible for any one human being to 
retain a sense of personal identity? How can a self cohere 
in an unstable world?
The pessimistic/optimistic tensions in American 
naturalism can be traced to two sources: Herbert Spencer's 
evolutionism and Auguste Comte's positivism. In the late 
nineteenth century, Herbert Spencer was the leading 
evolutionist; periodicals of the time were crammed with 
criticisms, interpretations, and defenses of Spencer's 
theories. Though his ideas certainly fueled the literary 
imagination, the reason for Spencer's popularity cannot be 
attributed to the depth of his understanding or the 
profundity of his ideas. What Spencer provided the late 
nineteenth century reading public was an essentially 
optimistic, all-encompassing universal principle of progress 
that satisfactorily accounted for the physical evolution of 
the universe, of organic life, of human knowledge, and social 
organization. The whole of Spencer's "Synthetic Philosophy" 
could be reduced to the movement from "coherent homogeneity 
to incoherent (but integrated) heterogeneity," as mind, 
nature, individuals, and societies adjusted to environmental 
conditions. The ultimate goal was always human perfection; 
the process was inevitable and incontrovertible. The source 
of this change, according to Spencer, remained the 
"Unknowable," the principle behind the principle, variously 
interpreted as God or Force, according to individual 
predilections.10
It is easy to appreciate the appeal of Spencer's ideas 
in the chaotic atmosphere of the late nineteenth century.
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They promised that present conditions would improve, that 
humankind would again rule the universe. The same sort of 
hopeful optimism was expressed in the Comtean idea that 
humankind, armed with the methods of science, would give up 
the Unknowable to the observation, description, prediction, 
and control of nineteenth-century science.11 Though natural 
law doomed humankind to insignificance, the condition was not 
permanent; ultimately, science would bring nature to its 
knees.
Spencer's evolutionism and Comtean positivism 
represented a synthesis of ideological oppositions: 
determinism and free-will, realism and idealism, pessimism 
and optimism, catching the individual self in a cross-fire. 
These are the themes of naturalist literature with which this 
chapter will be concerned. Granted, there are other themes: 
social protest, regionalism, war;12 but even in these works, 
the issue of humankind against natural forces is paramount; 
only the context of confrontation changes.
The difference between realism and naturalism can be 
understood as the difference between the assumption that 
one's place in the world is fixed according to moral law and 
the assumption that moral law no longer holds. Realism 
assumes that self-identity is constant; naturalism assumes 
that life is a process of self-definition. This was not, as 
Ryan suggests, a consequence of an "empiricist" psychology; 
rather it was a consequence of sweeping cultural changes 
(industrialization and the rise of capitalism), advances in 
the physical sciences, a cyclical conception of humankind's 
cultural history, and most important, a consequence of the
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evolutionary theories of Darwin and Spencer. As Ruth Brandon
states it in describing the strong appeal of spiritualism to
the people of the late nineteenth century:
It was not that they wanted to adhere to the 
fundamentalist view that the Bible was the literal 
truth, but the notion of randomness which was so 
essential a part of the theory of natural selection 
seemed to preclude any possibility of there being a God. 
Darwinism meant that there was no grand plan, no 
pattern, no thought behind the universe.13
In effect, God had been lost to humankind, and men and women 
no longer felt a personal connection to their world. It is 
that personal connection that naturalist literature attempts 
to establish.
In this chapter, I will examine the works of three 
naturalist writers, focusing only, however, on single works: 
Henry Adams's The Education of Henrv Adams (written in 1905), 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman's "The Yellow wallpaper" (1891) and 
Theodore Dreiser's Sister Carrie (1907).14 I do not claim 
that these particular works are representative of these 
authors (though they are well known). They are, however, 
salient examples of the themes of naturalism I have discussed 
above, and it is for this reason I have chosen them over 
others.
As we will see, the theme of a search for personal 
identity is an important one in this literature. It is, for 
example, the central issue Henry Adams addresses in his 
Education:
Of all studies, the one he would rather have avoided was 
that of his own mind. He knew no tragedy so heart­
rending as introspection, and the more, because...he was 
not the first. Nearly all the highest intelligence 
known to history had drowned itself in the reflection of 
its own thought, and the bovine survivors had rudely 
told the truth about it, without affecting the
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intelligent.15
Adams refers, in this passage to the introspective methods 
used by psychologists of the time. Indeed, this passage 
fairly thunders as an indictment of that method and its 
results. Of what practical use is philosophical inquiry into 
the faculties of the mind? Neither psychology nor philosophy 
had managed to bridge the gap between the internal world and 
the experience of everyday life. Even so, such an indictment 
would not have occurred had there not existed a loss of a 
grander sort; had there, for example, been a sense of 
societal confirmation of the individual or a sense of 
personal communion with a force greater than oneself.16 By 
the late nineteenth century, the laws of "science" had made 
God superfluous; yet science had not proved capable of 
filling the gap. Indeed, the passage reflects the profound 
disappointment of one who, having believed that a science of 
the mind would re-establish the sovereignty of man, was 
confronted with the possibility that humankind was of no 
particular significance in the world. "Education" for Adams 
was nothing less than the search for meaning within a world 
doomed to the swing of the pendulum. As we will see, this 
same issue is confronted by Gilman and Dreiser's Sister 
Carrie.
Henry Adams (1838-1918)
Henry Adams was b o m  into the Quincy Adamses, grandson 
of the sixth president of the United States and great 
grandson of the second. Of his birth into this famous family 
Adams writes: "Probably no child, b o m  in the year, held 
better cards than he."17 The Adams tradition promised status
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and security, "safeguards" against an unknown world, though 
even in that tradition "as elsewhere a cruel universe 
combined to crush a child."18 His education was that of a 
typical late-nineteenth-century male child of privilege: a 
smattering of mathematics, training in the classics and 
languages, history, religion, the arts, and moral philosophy. 
"At any other moment in history," he writes, "this education, 
including its political and literary bias, would have been 
not only good, but quite the best. Society had always 
welcomed and flattered men so endowed."19 Looking back from 
the vantage of fifty years, however, Adams believed the boy 
of 1854 was no more prepared for the tv/entieth century than 
if he had been educated in the year 1; he had had as yet no 
education at all.20
The question presents itself: What was it that Adams
needed to understand which his classical training could not 
provide? What, indeed, was Adams in search of? John Carlos 
Rowe defines the search in both the Education and Adams's 
Mont -Saint-Michel and Chartres (1913) as a quest for "order, 
origin, and unity,"21 a pursuit generated by the profound 
changes that had occurred in the nineteenth century.22 
According to Rowe, Adams's search for unity and origin was a 
search for a fundamental principle or law that, in accounting 
for the apparent discontinuites in man's cultural 
development, would give meaning to man's existence.23
Adams views the world from the perspective of one who 
observes, rather than participates, who reflects, rather than 
acts.21 Education is thus embodied in a series of 
impressions and reflections--in, that is, experience. Though
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the series as a whole appears fragmented, in the final
analysis, the fragmentation dissolves in the author's attempt
to impose order on these disparate elements. Consciousness,
far from being a mere particle in a sea of supersensual
chaos, is that which establishes each individual's existence.
John Rowe explains:
Cutting and piecing together the history of his 
education, Adams constitutes meaning in the very 
struggle to find a place in a bewildering modern world. 
The constant imperative that one must choose in order to 
be remains amidst the fragmentary narrative of a 
life....Only the function of consciousness itself 
enables man to react successively to a constantly 
changing universe of force.25
If a unifying principle be found, human consciousness (in the
widest possible sense) would surely be confirmed as the
interpreter, indeed the only interpreter, of historical
change.26 It is as interpreter, Adams believes, that man's
life acquires meaning, though meaning of a very different
sort than Reid or early psychologists would acknowledge as
valid. As John Rowe states the matter:
Knowledge becomes a means of survival rather than a 
desire for final definition or identity. The process of 
inquiry itself reveals how meaning and understanding 
depend upon the activity of making problematic choices 
between conflicting evidence. Such choice and selection 
make the game possible and "amusing," turning education 
into a vital experience.27
The role of mind/consciousness for Adams was conceived as 
just that process of choosing, selecting, and interpreting 
that we have seen before in William James's description of 
consciousness: "The mind," James writes, "works on the data
it receives very much as a sculptor works on his block of 
stone," carving out a unique statue, when it might have carved
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out any other.28 The statue, of course, is a singular 
interpretation of the world. By a similar act. according to 
Adams, did humankind ensure its survival; by a series of such 
acts, history is made.
Humankind continually attempts to impose order on the
world, Adams believed,29 to "bring nature to task;" the
historical record is a record of such interpretations, which
nature, obstinately, resists.30 Historically, there is only
the fact of action and reaction, force and resistance, out of
which emerges new complexities of thought.31 How else to
explain variation and change? In that context, the mind
itself becomes a force with which nature must contend.
Nothing forbids one to assume that the man-meteorite 
might grow, as an acorn does, absorbing light, heat, 
electricity--or thought; for, in recent times, such 
transference of energy has become a familiar idea; but 
the simplest figure, at first, is that of a perfect 
comet...which drops from space, in a straight line, at 
the regular acceleration of speed, directly into the 
sun, and after wheeling sharply about it, in heat that 
ought to dissipate any known substance, turns back 
unharmed, in defiance of law, by the path on which it 
came. The mind, by analogy, may figure as such a comet, 
the better because it also defies law.32
The mind defies law because it does not succumb to the forces 
of nature, though it is itself nature. The chronological 
history of the series of confrontations between the human 
mind and natural force suggests to Adams that, comet-like, 
the mind-force has accelerated: "Complexity had extended
itself on immense horizons....The force evolved seemed more 
like explosion than gravitation."33 By 1900, it was clear to 
Adams that the human mind had succeeded in building up untold 
complexities: the science that produced the compass and the
typewriter also produced weapons and war.34 "At the rate of
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progress since 1800," Adams writes, "every American who lived 
into the year 2000 would know how to control unlimited 
power."35
Adams's analysis leads to a single conclusion: Mind is
motion; consciousness is interpretation, adaptation. Both 
mind and consciousness are driven by a desire for unity and 
order. There is no unifying principle, however; there exist 
only the laws defining the interaction of forces. There is 
no order; there is only complexity, multiplicity. Humankind 
is defined by its interpretive acts, its confrontations with 
natural forces, in Adams's analysis, it is defined by little 
else. "Knowledge becomes a means of survival rather than a 
desire for final definition or identity."36 If there is only 
motion and confrontation, there can be no stable centering 
self. The Henry Adams of the Education is little more than a 
"manikin" on which...education is to be draped in order to 
show the fit or misfit of the clothes."37
Adams's conclusion is as much an emotional response to 
the changes wrought by nineteenth-century technology as it 
was a response to the devaluation of humankind which Darwin's 
theory of evolution suggested. He takes his cue from the 
physical and biological sciences--the laws of mechanics and 
evolutionary theory--not from the new psychology.33 Yet, 
there are parallels between Ladd's physiological thesis and 
Adams's dynamic theory of historical change: Each appealed
to laws of mechanics to explain change in state and each 
appealed to evolutionary theory to explain change in time 
(see Chapter 5). The parallels are intriguing in that they 
suggest that the psychology-literature connection was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17 9
mediated by discoveries in the natural sciences. To draw
this conclusion on the basis of one correspondence is to make
an unsupported leap. Such a possibility, however, is
suggested by Stephen Brush in the following quote:
[At times] scientific facts and theories may have a 
direct influence on those who construct philosophical 
systems, write novels, or criticize society. Thus the 
mechanistic materialism of mid-nineteenth century 
physics and biology was reflected by "naturalism" in 
philosophy and literature, and by "positivism" in the 
social sciences.39
Such "borrowing" of concepts seems most often to flow from 
established disciplines in the direction of the less 
established or "softer" disciplines. Certainly, both 
psychology and literature were "soft" disciplines in the late 
nineteenth century. As we saw in Part I, however, the 
connection between the philosophical models of 
mind/consciousness and the literary models developed by 
Phelps, Howells, and James was tenuous at best; indeed, the 
two disciplines employed different languages (a dynamic 
language for novelists; the objective language of "science" 
for philosophy). At least regarding Adams and Ladd, both use 
the language of science, and the connection seems stronger 
for that.
In the next section, the language of science is replaced 
by the language of medicine. In the late nineteenth century 
mental disorder was a medical problem, not a psychological 
one, even though most psychologists of the time had come to 
believe that psychology ought to address disorders of the 
mind as well as normal conscious states. As we will see, 
there are clear parallels between the model of consciousness
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developed by william James and the model that describes the 
gradual deterioration of mental function described by the 
following author.
Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935)
Charlotte Perkins Gilman was well known in her time as 
author and lecturer on what today would be called "feminist" 
issues. She was never a member of established intellectual 
circles, academic or otherwise, however, but made her living 
giving voice to her belief that society as a whole would 
profit from the emancipation of women from the narrow 
confines of domesticity.10 Her published works include Women 
and Economics (1898), in which she discusses the value of 
earned income to self-respect and the good of society as a 
whole from a Darwinian perspective; Human Work (1904), in 
which she describes the discrepancy between "the collective 
social relations that shape our economic life" and the 
"individualistic way we think about the social and economic 
order;" and Herland (1915), a Utopian novel about an 
insulated country inhabited only by women.11 Gilman, 
according to Ann Lane, made "gender the center of her 
analysis," calling attention to women's rights, not to secure 
women's economic independence, but because she believed that 
the good of society countermanded that any one class of 
people should serve another.12 Gilman wanted a much a 
different world for the women of nineteenth-century America.
The core of Gilman's humanism was her belief that the 
power of ideas was the primary tool for changing behavior: To 
change the world, one must first change consciousness; false 
ideas (incorporated in theology, medicine) must be replaced
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with truth. The relation between conscious thoughts and 
action was accepted as incontrovertible, fundamental. We 
modify our behavior, she asserted, to fit our ideas. If we 
see ourselves as wicked or subservient, we will behave so, 
and become so (a Jamesian notion) . Her ideas are couched in 
the language of late-nineteenth-century rationalism, partly 
because of her belief in the relation of ideas and behavior, 
but also because she was convinced that emotionalism (with 
which women were often associated) often led to women's 
subservience.43 These ideas are present in "The Yellow 
Wallpaper," for which Gilman draws on personal experience.
"The Yellow wallpaper" is the story of a young mother's 
descent into madness, caused by a well-meaning but insidious 
husband-doctor who follows S. Weir Mitchell's Rest Cure. In 
the story, John, the husband, takes his ailing wife, who is 
suffering from a nervous disease (neurasthenia), to the 
country for the summer. He insists that she needs perfect 
rest, and prescribes tonics, air, exercise, and absolutely 
forbids her to leave the room or to work at her writing until 
she is completely well again.
He insisted that she remain in a former nursery on the 
top floor of the house, away from the bustle of daily life. 
The room contains a barred window and dirty yellow wallpaper 
of an unusual wavy pattern. She spends most of her time in 
this room alone, "recovering" and, forbidden to work or to 
read, becomes obsessed and increasingly disgusted with that 
yellow wallpaper. Increasingly, as she tries to follow the 
pattern in the wallpaper, the "lame, uncertain curves... 
suddenly commit suicide." Within the wallpaper there appears
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a "strange, provoking, formless sort of figure that seems to 
skulk about," an ambiguous form that threatens, frightens by 
its skulking. As the days pass, the shape gets clearer.
"And it is like a woman stooping down and creeping about 
behind the pattern." At night the pattern in the paper seems 
like the bars on the windows, and the woman in the wallpaper 
becomes plainly visible, creeping around behind the patterned 
bars, looking for a way to escape. Later, as she peels off 
the wallpaper "to let the woman escape" (to escape?), there 
are many creeping women; she is surrounded by them, and 
becomes one of them, crawling around the walls of the room.
Charlotte Gilman's "The Yellow Wallpaper" was published 
in 1891 in the May issue of Mew England Magazine to mixed 
reviews. Though a record of her own experience, the story 
was originally seen as a horror story: One unnamed doctor 
published a letter suggesting that, since it gave no pleasure 
"to any reader," and "must bring the keenest pain" to those 
"whose lives have become a struggle against a heredity of 
mental derangement," it ought not "be allowed to pass without 
severest censure." Another physician, however, sent her a 
note of congratulations, saying that there had yet been "no 
detailed account of incipient insanity."44
There are two diagnoses presented in the narrative. The 
first diagnosis (claimed by the medical profession and the 
husband) was predicated on the assumption that the changes 
that had taken place in late-nineteenth-century life 
(industrialization, urbanization, etc.) had a deleterious 
effect on the human constitution, which was more suited to 
the slow pace and relaxed atmosphere of an earlier time.45
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According to this model, women, because of their frailty, 
were particularly vulnerable. The medical model was based on 
the idea that each person possessed a certain amount of 
nervous energy, which was transmitted to different parts of 
the body. "Neurasthenia" was thus a result of a breakdown in 
the system, of the demand exceeding the supply.46 Once 
diagnosed, treatment consisted of isolation, enforced rest, 
nutritious meals, and the like, all intended to permit the 
restoration of depleted energy and return to normal life 
tasks.47
A second diagnosis is founded on what is best referred
to as the "mental therapeutics model." This model (claimed
by Gilman and the woman in the narrative) was based on the
idea that the subconscious was the source of unpleasant
thoughts and irrational ideas that intruded occasionally into
consciousness, especially under conditions of great stress or
anxiety, overwork or trauma. At such times, the individual's
weakened will was unable to resist the irrational thoughts,
which tended to revolve around a single idea. F. G. Gosling
quotes from a nineteenth-century neurologist:
Probably in all of us impulses, fears, or doubts arise 
suddenly in consciousness as isolated thoughts or 
emotions, and which may be apparently totally 
disconnected with the mental state immediately preceding 
their appearance. For instance, many of us, I presume, 
have been seized with the desire to count the windows or 
doors in passing along a street, or in walking to avoid 
carefully the cracks in a pavement or to touch 
fenceposts.... Certain words or phrases, lines of poetry 
or bars of music, may thrust themselves into 
consciousness at odd times.48
The difference between normal and abnormal was founded on the 
ability to resist committing acts contrary to volition. The
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completely normal man or woman committed no such acts; the 
neurasthenic committed some; the insane committed many more. 
Mental therapy consisted of the rest cure in addition to firm 
assurances that the ideas themselves were not unusual, 
although the patient was encouraged to banish such thoughts 
from consciousness. The physician who took this approach 
attempted to convince the patient that, while the ideas were 
troubling, the physician had full confidence that the patient 
would be able to control them. A strict regimen of diet and 
exercise were also prescribed.19
"Personally, I disagree with their ideas," writes the 
women in the narrative of her husband's treatment plans. 
"Personally I believe that congenial work, with excitement 
and change, would do me good." And further, "I think 
sometimes that if I were only well enough to write a little 
it would relieve the press of ideas and rest me."50 A better 
treatment, given the relation between ideas and behavior 
according to Gilman, would be to erase the false, oppressive 
ideas with "congenial work...and change;" to strengthen the 
will; to turn out "useless and debilitating thoughts." The 
medical model dominates, however (as the husband dominates) 
and the reader is witness to the consequences: To the
obsession with the wallpaper accrues a series of images and 
irrational thoughts, and insanity.
We have seen evidence of this second model in the 
psychological theory of William James (see Chapter 5). In 
James's model, the subliminal consciousness was the 
repository of buried feelings, fixed ideas, traumatic 
experiences, "forgotten" memories, religious convictions--a
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random collection of associated thoughts and sensations.S1 
Under normal conditions there is reciprocity between the 
levels of consciousness; under certain conditions, however, 
an upsurge from the subliminal takes over waking 
consciousness entirely. Consciousness contracts. James 
asserts, to a fixed idea that dominates all thought and 
action.52 To Gilman no less than to James, the relation 
between thought and action was incontrovertible.
Charlotte Gilman was not an introspective woman, 
according to Lane, and her ideas, although reflecting a 
Darwinian perspective, did not include an active interest in 
psychological or philosophical issues.53 It would be 
overstating the case to suggest that Gilman's ideas about the 
relation between conscious thought and behavior were drawn 
from James's ideas. Indeed, the source of the 
thought/behavior relation can be traced to Darwin, to 
Scottish moral principles, and to Calvinist theology.
We have seen that the exchange between psychology and 
literature is mediated by ideas that had become part of late 
nineteenth-century culture: evolutionary theory, physical
science, and medicine influenced both psychology and literary 
naturalism to a greater degree than each influenced the 
other. However, where the psychologists drew primarily on 
Darwin's ideas, many novelists found Spencer's ideas more 
appealing.54 Aligned with Comtean positivism, Spencerian 
evolutionism seemed to promise hope: though natural law
prevailed, the end-result was human perfection. As we will 
see, Theodore Dreiser drew heavily on these ideas.
In the final section of this chapter, we will examine
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Theodore Dreiser's Sister Carrie. The novel, written in 
1900, was Dreiser's first, and, though it was published over 
the objections of Frank Doubleday (of the Doubleday 
publishing company), it was commended by writers Frank Norris 
and William Dean Howells as "a breakthrough in American 
realism. "55
Theodore Dreiser (1871-1945)
Like many of his contemporaries, Theodore Dreiser was a 
Spencerian first, a positivist second. Dreiser, for example, 
believed Spencer's "Unknowable" (the source of evolutionary 
change) could be found in the composition of "chemisms" 
within the blood that determined temperament, attitude, 
personality traits.56 In addition, he believed Spencer's law 
of inevitable progress ought to serve as a guiding principle 
for alleviating social injustices and social inequities; for 
then, he writes, "all mankind will conform to laws which he 
has written down, as they were given to him by the One whose 
work is creation, and whose all-covering generosity has given 
the world a mind so philosophic as that of Herbert Spencer."57 
Comte, however, provided another perspective: the idea that 
nineteenth-century culture marked a passage to the stage when 
science would control the world.
The principal themes of Dreiser's work have been stated 
succinctly by John Rathbun and Harry Clark: "Life was flux;
stratification and stasis were bad; man was a complex of 
chemical compounds sympathetically reacting to variations in 
the physical environment... Free will was a superstition."58 
The mind of humankind was either mechanistic or organic. 
Spencer's theories seemed to suggest both. Either mind
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operated, according to the mechanics of force and motion (and 
thus determinism prevailed) or mind operated as one with the 
great organism of life, wherein all life processes were 
interconnected pulsations of the living whole (and thus 
determinism prevailed) .59
The theme of Sister Carrie is brought out in the context 
of a battle between instinctual desires and free-will. 
Free-will, rationality, knowledge, judgment are all of piece, 
Dreiser would assert; evil, instinct, passion, ignorance 
compromise human existence: We are never wholly free; we are
ever beset. Resolution is not granted the reflective 
consciousness any more than knowledge guarantees success. 
These themes are central to Sister Carrie.
The novel begins with Carrie's trip to Chicago to live 
with her sister and her sister's husband. On the train, 
Carrie meets a salesman who promises to introduce her to the 
city. Always wanting more from life than she has at any 
moment, Carrie eventually leaves her sister to live with the 
salesman; leaves the salesman to live with a man who 
represents wealth and status; leaves him to become a 
successful actress. The novel ends as she waits for the 
fulfillment of her dream. And Dreiser, ever the moralist, 
comments:
Oh, the tangle of human life! How dimly as yet we see. 
Here was Carrie, in the beginning poor, unsophisticated, 
emotional; responding with desire to everything most 
lovely in life, yet finding herself turned as by a 
wall....Not evil, but longing for that which is better, 
more often directs the steps of the erring. Not evil, 
but goodness more often allures the feeling mind unused 
to reason.60
Like Henry Adams, Dreiser imagines the world comprised
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of forces in perpetual opposition, neutral as to the destiny 
of humankind. There might be God, but God does not control 
absolutely. The very randomness of the forces, their base 
neutrality, ensures that success is but a chance event. As 
Henry Adams's identity was solely taken up with his search 
for "education," the heroine of Dreiser's story is solely 
taken in by desire. The following passage is the clearest 
example of Dreiser's ideas and thus it is the only one I will 
quote from his work. This passage occurs as Carrie prepares 
to leave her sister's house; Dreiser intends that the reader 
understand that her action follows desire, rather than 
reason:
Among the forces which sweep and play throughout 
the universe, untutored man is but a wisp in the wind. 
Our civilization is still in the middle stage, scarcely 
beast, in that it is no longer wholly guided by 
instinct; scarcely human, in that it is not yet wholly 
guided by reason. On the tiger no responsibility rests. 
We see him aligned by nature with the forces of life--he 
is b o m  into their keeping and without thought he is 
protected. We see man far removed from the lairs of the 
jungles, his innate instincts dulled by too near an 
approach to free-will, his free-will not sufficiently 
developed to replace his instincts and afford him 
perfect guidance. He is becoming too wise to hearken 
always to instincts and desires; he is still too weak to 
always prevail against them. As a beast, the forces of 
life aligned him with them; as a man; he has not yet 
wholly learned to align himself with the forces. In 
this intermediate stage he wavers--neither drawn in 
harmony with nature by his instincts nor yet wisely 
putting himself into harmony by his own free-will. He is 
even as a wisp in the wind, moved by every breath of 
passion, acting now by his will and now by his 
instincts, erring with one, only to retrieve by the 
other, falling by one, only to rise by the other--a 
creature of incalculable variability. We have the 
consolation of knowing that evolution is ever in action, 
that the ideal is a light that cannot fail. He will not 
forever balance thus between good and evil. Where this 
jangle of free-will and instinct shall have been 
adjusted, when perfect understanding has given the 
former the power to replace the latter entirely, man
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will no longer vary. The needle of understanding will 
yet point steadfast and unwavering to the distant pole 
of truth.61
The conscious mind is presented as a battleground of 
competing forces: free-will and reason oppose instinct and
desire. Desire will out in those in whom free-will is not 
"sufficiently developed to...afford him perfect guidance."
But time promises success; "[humankind] will not forever 
balance thus between good and evil. Where this jangle of 
free-will and instinct shall have been adjusted, when perfect 
understanding has given the former the power to replace the 
latter entirely," there will be no indecision and no 
conflict.
Like Howells, Dreiser gives us little insight into 
Carrie's conscious thoughts. Like Howells, Dreiser expects 
us to infer Carrie's thoughts from her behavior and from the 
narrator's interpretive presence. Unlike Howells, Dreiser 
presents a character who is beset by forces beyond her 
control, by instinctual desires operating in accord with 
natural law. This, of course, is a central theme of 
naturalist literature. Howells's character was lost because 
he would not engage in the kind of reflection that would 
yield information about the world; Dreiser's character was 
lost because instinct overpowered reason.
Discussion: Part II
It is correct to assert, as Ryan has, that there is an
absence of a centering, coherent self in naturalist
literature: Henry Adams searches for meaning to replace his
sense of alienation; he finds it in the conscious act of 
interpretation. Charlotte Gilman finds her sense of self
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
190
restored in conscious acts of affirming work. "Carrie," 
caught between a rational will and instinctive desire, 
affirms a "self" (even if temporarily) in every desire. In 
the works I have discussed, Adams, Gilman, and Dreiser appeal 
to a consciousness that has neither defined boundaries nor a 
central core. Henry James, William Dean Howells, and 
Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, in contrast, consistently appeal to 
a consciousness whose boundaries are the physical being and 
whose core is the self; all thought streams outward from that 
core. A brief comparison will reveal the difference. From 
Chapter 4, Elizabeth Stuart Phelps describes a wakeful night:
Visions which he would just then have gone blind to 
forget electrotyped themselves upon the half-lit room. 
Long odorous country twilights, the scent of honeysuckle 
about a farm-house door, the pressure of confiding 
fingers on his arm, the uplifting of a young face, the 
touch of trustful life, pursued him rather with the 
force of sensations than reflections. With these came 
other ghosts, incoherent fancies, aimless fevers, 
nameless dreams.62
Contrast this with a passage from Henry Adams:
Nothing forbids one to assume that the man-meteorite 
might grow, as an acorn does, absorbing light, heat, 
electricity--or thought; for, in recent times, such 
transference of energy has become a familiar idea; but 
the simplest figure, at first, is that of a perfect 
comet...which drops from space, in a straight line, at 
the regular acceleration of speed, directly into the 
sun, and after wheeling sharply about it, in heat that 
ought to dissipate any known substance, turns back 
unharmed, in defiance of law, by the path on which it 
came. The mind, by analogy, may figure as such a comet, 
the better because it also defies law.63
Though both passages consist of a series of visual images, 
the quality of those images differ. For all its melancholic 
sentimentality (though, perhaps, because of that), Phelps's 
passage conveys passivity: the conscious self falls victim
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to the remembered past. Adams's passage, in contrast, 
conveys motion, change, action: the consciousness is
portrayed as a force to be reckoned with, equal to the forces 
of Nature, and no less powerful. In literary naturalism we 
see revealed what John Rowe refers to as "an incomplete self 
repeatedly transformed by the effort of consciousness to know 
itself," a self that can only be known through a series of 
conscious acts perpetuated upon the world.64 Indeed, this 
conception of consciousness is fundamentally akin to that of 
the late-nineteenth-century psychologists, who, following 
William James, concluded that consciousness had a crucial 
role in ensuring survival. It is consciousness, asserted 
James, that selects out of a "theatre of possibilities" those 
ends that are favorable to the organism and consciousness it 
is that represses those ends that are not. "Every actually 
existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a 
fighter for ends. of which many, but for its presence, would 
not be ends at all."65
By the turn of the twentieth century, the idea that 
consciousness acted upon the world to achieve certain ends 
would become the focus of experimental research. For 
example, in 1901 Joseph Jastrow, following James, would 
declare in his presidential speech before the American 
Psychological Association that psychology was a "science of 
mental function." not content. Later, in 1903, James Rowland 
Angell declared that "(c)onsciousness is not merely 
epiphenomenal, but is really an efficient agent in the 
furtherance of the life activities of the organism."66 As we 
have seen, the literary naturalists had already taken up this
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view.
Though these conceptual similarities suggest cross- 
disciplinary influence, there is little evidence that turn- 
of-the-century psychologists drew their ideas from naturalist 
literature. For example, William James did not reference any 
of the works we have discussed in his Principles of 
Psychology (1890)67: a survey of the index and footnotes 
reveal instead a wide-ranging knowledge of philosophical and 
psychological work of the period, as well as several 
references to Romantic literature, including the works of 
Jane Austen, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and John Makepeace 
Thackeray. James's work published after the Principles shows 
a similar pattern: In the edited volume William James.
Writings 1878-1899, amid the usual references to philosophers 
and psychologists, the explanatory Notes reveal once again 
James's preference for Romantic literature; citations to 
Tennyson, Emerson, Longfellow, Laurence Sterne (Tristram 
Shandy) , and Walt Whitman abound.68 Though this brief survey 
does not rule out the possibility that literary naturalism 
exerted an indirect influence on James's thought, the 
possibility is unlikely. All that is known about James's 
work and style strongly support his extraordinary sensitivity 
to the interplay of ideas and his scrupulousness in the 
matter of citations. It would be out of character (and, from 
his perspective, unnecessary) to overlook (deliberately or 
accidentally) any connections to the wider cultural arena in 
which he worked. Moreover, a brief survey of the indexes and 
footnotes of the works of James Mark Baldwin and George 
Trumbull Ladd fail to reveal references to any literary
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tradition, suggesting that that influence, if it existed at 
all, was of little importance in their work.
Similarly, there does not seem to be any direct link 
between the work of the late-nineteenth century psychologists 
we have examined and the works of the literary naturalists we 
surveyed in this chapter. Though Henry Adams's Education. 
does suggest familiarity with the philosophical and 
historical traditions, no references, however indirect, 
suggest that his ideas were based upon psychological works of 
the time. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, as we have noted, was 
all too well acquainted with the popular notion of 
"neurasthenia" and the accepted medical treatment; there is, 
however, nothing in her work to suggest an acquaintance with 
the ideas perpetuated by Ladd, Baldwin, and James, despite 
her belief in active employment as an antidote for mental 
anguish. And Theodore Dreiser's tale of Carrie's battle 
between desire and free-will is more closely aligned with a 
Spencerian consciousness (see Appendix) than a Jamesian one.
All this is to suggest that cross-disciplinary influence 
in this latter period (1885-1910) is an unlikely and 
unsupportable assumption. It seems more reasonable to assume 
that these two disciplines, engaged at this time in forging 
their own traditions, drew on ideas that had become common 
currency in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
specifically, the evolutionism of Charles Darwin and Herbert 
Spencer (see Appendix). Perhaps it is even more to the point 
that these novelists and psychologists show at this time a 
pronounced differential preference for these ideas: though
acquainted with the work of Spencer, most psychologists (not
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least the psychologists we have examined) took up Darwin's 
concept of evolutionary adaptation as an overriding theme.
The novelists, in contrast, though acquainted with Darwin's 
work, were more inclined to the Spencerian concept of psychic 
and cultural competition. We saw this theme in Adams's 
concept of the mind/consciousness as a force in competition 
with other natural forces; in Gilman's belief in competing 
conscious acts; and in Dreiser's concept of the competition 
between free-will and instinctual desire. In the next 
chapter, these differences will be treated in some depth.
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CHAPTER 7
THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
"Never Know When It Might Come in Useful"
There is a story about a man named Nasrudin, who sometimes 
took people for trips in his boat. One day a fussy pedagogue 
hired him to ferry him across a very wide river. As soon as 
they were afloat, the scholar asked whether it was going to 
be rough.
"Don't ask me nothing about it," said Nasrudin.
"Have you never studied grammar?"
"No," said the boatman.
"In that case, half your life has been wasted."
The boatman said nothing.
Soon a terrible storm blew up. The boatman's ferry was 
filling with water. He leaned over toward his companion. 
"Have you ever learned to swim?"
"No," said the pedant.
"In that case, schoolmaster, all your life is lost, for 
we are sinking."1
As Robert Ornstein points out, the two characters in 
this story represent two different ways of understanding 
consciousness. The scholar, ever rational, concerned with 
logical form and insistent on perfection in language use 
(though, perhaps, not in the social realm), represents the 
analytical, scientific approach. The boatman, aware that 
form is of little concern when survival is concerned,
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represents the creative and pragmatic view. These two 
perspectives are paralleled in the psychological and literary 
approaches to consciousness with which this study has been 
concerned. The psychologists and philosophers, rationalists 
all, approached mind and consciousness in terms of specific 
operations that could be introspectively observed, described, 
and classified, often in minute detail. Objectively, 
consciousness takes the form of an entity with independent 
existence composed of identifiable parts. The novelists, 
realists and naturalists, approached consciousness as that 
aspect of human function responsible for the relation of 
individual to the conditions of life. Consciousness, 
subjectively perceived, assumes the form of a vital, active 
life-force, capable of movement in time and capable of 
generating movement in space.
It is the nature of science and literature, broadly 
conceived and commonly apprehended, that they pursue 
independent courses. Ideally, science opts for explanation, 
description, prediction, and control. Literature, in 
contrast, seeks to impress, and (occasionally) to instruct. 
The crucial difference is not the source of ideas, but its 
textual representation, the rhetorical "trappings." The 
novelist contextualizes experience, enriches it, through a 
powerful interplay of metaphor and emotion-laden analogy.
The scientist, as we will see, begins with metaphor, a 
theoretical context that envelopes and, thus, explains the 
phenomena of experience.
Recent scholarship has questioned the claims of complete 
objectivity in scientific description and fact-gathering.
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For example, Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper have stated that all 
scientific practice begins with an imaginative construction 
of the to-be-observed events. Pointedly, these philosophers 
suggest that scientific observation is colored by this 
imaginative construction--the theoretical context--that 
allows the scientist to "select out" relevant observations. 
Kuhn, in particular, has suggested that scientific research 
programs are based on acts of faith which their adherents go 
to great lengths to protect.2 Michel Foucault goes further in 
suggesting that all thought (scientific and literary) is 
enveloped within a conceptual system defined and maintained 
by a culture; accordingly, Foucault would expect similarities 
between disciplines scientific and literary so different in 
intended outcomes.3
We have found similarities. In the first period of 
this study (1865-1885), we discovered that both psychological 
and literary models of consciousness drew on ideas that had 
been set forth by the Scottish philosophers of the early 
eighteenth century, represented in this review by Thomas 
Reid. Specifically, both models included the idea that 
consciousness consists of both immediate, sensory experience 
and the capacity to reflect on that experience, as memory and 
the present sensory experience coalesced. Both models 
incorporated the idea that consciousness is the source of a 
unified self-concept, whether given in the moment, or given 
in reflection. And both models of consciousness were 
grounded in the belief that consciousness is the means by 
which humankind is made aware of the operations of the mind 
and the eternal presence of Higher Power. From both the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
204
literary and psychological perspective, we are presented with 
a consciousness that has the capacity to transcend the 
present moment.
Perhaps the most fundamental similarity in the literary 
and psychological models of this early period is that both 
traditions approached consciousness as though it was entirely 
contained within the physical body and limited to acts within 
that body. There was little concern in either discipline 
that consciousness would act upon the external world in 
particular ways that would, in turn, fundamentally alter the 
nature of consciousness itself. In the post-Civil War 
period, for all the talk of consciousness as a "perceiver" of 
mental acts; for all its representation as an affectively- 
toned sensory series; for all that, consciousness was 
conceived as a stable, constant, whole, a mere responder. It 
was this view of consciousness that would change dramatically 
in both disciplines just before the turn of the century.
There were differences as well. From this same world­
view (which corresponded with what was understood as 
"reality"), the novelists developed a consciousness that was 
to foreshadow the "stream of consciousness" perspective of 
the next generation of psychologists. Granted that the idea 
of a conscious stream had been already expressed by Reid (see 
Figure 1). It is clear, however, that that stream is not 
what Reid meant when he referred to consciousness. In Reid's 
formulation, consciousness is a separate power of the 
Understanding, endowed with the capacity to observe the mind. 
By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, however, that 
"stream" would be become the focal point of the development
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of the new psychology.
Indeed, given the intuitive "rightness" of the idea that 
consciousness appears to us as an on-going series of mental 
events, it is all the more surprising that the 
philosopher/psychologists of the early period were so 
apparently certain that their classificatory schema 
accurately reflected the way the mind-system worked. The 
most likely reason for this is that these men, most of whom 
were writing in response to Locke and Hume, were so intent 
upon dividing the mind into mental "powers" rather than 
"sensations," that they were apt to consider every mental 
aspect they could discover as a power of one sort or another; 
accordingly, consciousness was the power of internal 
observation. A "power," if we consider the term in its most 
literal sense, could not also be a stream.
My point is that the model of mind and consciousness 
advanced by the Scottish philosophers (and those who followed 
their example) emerged out of a set of ideas that had less to 
do with mind/consciousness as experienced and much more to do 
with the rhetoric of refutation.4 In order to oppose Locke's 
sensationalism and Hume's skepticism, Scottish philosophy 
re-establish certainty and God within the human mind. As 
John O'Donnell explains it:
Mental science...constituted the psychological 
linchpin that made plausible arguments from analogy that 
joined the natural and moral universes. It endeavored 
to prove that man's non-material mind was capable of 
comprehending natural and moral laws both intuitively 
and inductively....Protestant Scholasticism therefore 
depended ultimately upon a fundamentally conservative 
psychology.5
Indeed, because they were vitally interested in specifying
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the means for solving epistemological problems (within the 
Scottish moral tradition) , they were less inclined to to take 
notice of, and to describe, the consciousness of their 
experience.
The novelists, in contrast, unencumbered by these 
particular motives, described a consciousness of conflicting 
aims and emotive significance. As we have seen, however, the 
literary works we have examined in this study, were the 
product of motives no less powerful. Elizabeth Phelps and 
William Dean Howells, for example, intended that their work 
should make a statement about what they perceived as the 
dangerous and unjust conditions of post-Civil War society: 
the role of women in American culture; the perceived excesses 
of a capitalist economy. The difference is that these 
conditions were grounded in a realistic appraisal of American 
society as much as they reflected any personal bias. Even 
so, we have seen that a moral conservatism prevailed in the 
literary realm as well. This conservatism is revealed in the 
dominant characteristic of American realism: the
internalization of action with a central reflective 
consciousness and the presence of a moral dilemma that would 
be resolved by story's end. In Henry James's work, this 
method would be sufficient unto itself.
In the second period of this study (1886-1910) (the 
period in which consciousness, rather than mind, was 
considered the "proper" subject-matter of a new American 
psychology), psychologists were less concerned with the moral 
question and more concerned with establishing a science of 
the mind that paid heed to recent advances in knowledge of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
207
brain structure and function. Evolutionary theories (Darwin 
and, to some extent, Spencer) provided a context in which 
questions that had not been asked before effectively re­
focused the nature of the investigation.6 No longer 
constrained by the necessity of devising an account of mind 
in accord with Protestant theology, psychologists now 
confronted the possibility that mind and consciousness were 
little more than supernumerary additions to a physiological 
process. The new psychology was thus a concerted response 
to the challenge to traditional assumptions about freedom and 
the will posed by evolutionists and physiologists alike. The 
models of mind/consciousness of this later period reflect the 
tension between the desire to incorporate the latest 
scientific advances and the desire to provide a firm 
foundation for belief in individual freedom and the 
individual will. As O'Donnell states the matter:
By defining the science of psychology as the study 
of consciousness, by insisting that the principle method 
of psychology was introspection.. .and by adopting the 
axiom of psychophysical parallelism, the new 
psychologists had assumed in principle what they feared 
more radical reductionists would deny in fact.7
The problem facing psychologists became one of reconciling 
evolutionary biology to traditional conceptions of 
humankind's moral freedom. It is for this reason, O'Donnell 
asserts, that the focus of inquiry shifted from intrapsychic 
mechanisms (classification and analysis of the structure of 
mind and consciousness) to psychic-environmental interactions 
(classification and analysis of the function of mind and 
consciousness).8 The shift from structure to function 
enabled psychologists to establish a conceptual link between
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mind and consciousness as the subject of psychological 
inquiry and mind and consciousness as grounded in anatomical 
structures. As a theoretical construct, consciousness--as an 
on-going stream of sensory and conceptual acts--more easily 
accorded with the physiological facts.
A similar shift occurred in the literary realm. 
Consciousness, no longer conceived as an internal response to 
environmental conditions, was portrayed as actively engaged 
in interpreting the world; indeed, it was conceived as a 
force no less powerful and effective than those forces which 
seemed to threaten human existence at every turn. The 
struggle played out in literary naturalism is thus grounded 
in a struggle for self-affirmation. The novelists, 
abandoning the moral conservatism that led the psychologists 
to assert the biological origin of the self-concept, 
established a context in which the "self" was continually re­
interpreted in light of new evidence. Far from reflecting a 
disappearance of the self (as Ryan suggests), naturalist 
literature invoked the image of a self continually in- 
process . We have seen evidence of this in Henry Adams's 
search for "identity" within a world conceived as ruled by 
change and variation. We have seen this in Charlotte 
Gilman's assertion that consciousness and behavior were 
intimately linked (one is led to consider her breakdown as a 
particularly adaptive response to abnormal conditions). And 
we have seen the idea of self-in-process in Theodore 
Dreiser's portrayal of Carrie's successive attempts to find 
fulfillment of her desire.
It is this self-affirming quality of naturalist
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literature that Donald Pizer recognizes as its central theme.9 
It is, perhaps, one alternative to the position adopted by 
the psychologists of the same period: that is, the idea that 
the self was grounded in evolutionary and biological 
processes. Indeed, the evidence would suggest that there was 
a compelling need in the late nineteenth-century to affirm 
the self as a viable force in the universe, at least in the 
social science and literary traditions. The difference 
between them was not so fundamental as one might, perhaps, 
expect; a matter of degree, rather than of kind. The 
psychologists, always more conservative, hoped to sustain the 
image of a unified self; the novelists prepared to envision a 
self that evolves.
HazQ Sides of £h£ Same Coin: She Psychology - Li t erature Debate
Despite recent attempts by literary historians to
redress the traditional view that science (more generally)
and literature are diametrically opposing modes of thought,10
there remains a reluctance on both sides of the debate to
acknowledge the possibility that the traditions have much in
common. Hayden White, for example, in assessing the tendency
of literary criticism to invoke the methods of science to
lend authority to scientific pronouncements, suggests that
certain disciplines, particularly those most self-conscious
about their scientific status, tend to be more exclusionary
than others regarding inter-disciplinary "encroachments."
"The problem, " he writes,
has to do with the fragmenting of humanistic studies 
into discrete disciplines which must feign to aspire to 
the status of sciences without any hope of achieving the 
kind of procedures developed in the physical sciences 
for the resolution of conflicting interpretations of the 
specified objects of study. The result of this
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circumstance is that, in order to enable research in any 
field of humanistic studies, investigators must 
presuppose that at least one other field of study or 
discipline is effectively secured, that is to say, is 
effectively free of the kind of epistemological and 
methodological disputes that agitate their own area of 
inquiry.11
From this perspective, it is natural to expect that 
psychology would identify itself with the methods and even 
form of the physical sciences and in doing so, would disavow 
any connection to the literary tradition. This is not to 
suggest that psychologists of the late nineteenth century had 
no firm grounds for doing so. The purpose of science is to 
accumulate certain knowledge about a specified subject area; 
one expects that observation, classification, and analysis 
will culminate in a model that effectively takes into account 
all matter of topics and relation that comprise that domain. 
If this study is any indication of the general condition of 
psychology, it would suggest that psychologists have 
regularly "borrowed" models from other disciplines or domains 
of inquiry and then attempted to make the facts of their 
experience accord with the model.
This is not an indictment of either psychology or its 
method. (Similar methods have been used by biologists, 
physicians, and physicists.12) Rather, I am pointing out that 
psychology--as a science--is informed by extra-disciplinary 
concerns and that those concerns strongly influence and even 
limit the focus of inquiry. In the natural sciences, because 
of the nature of the phenomena with which they are concerned, 
Nature fairly shouts her agreement or disagreement with the 
scientist's model. In psychology, Nature's voice is much 
softer, at times, barely audible. The psychologist is more
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easily led to overlook these small voices and there is every 
reason to expect that the facts of experience will take their 
place within the model with little more than a whimper.13
This anthropomorphic account is certain to elicit 
vigorous responses from the more methodologically-minded.
And I grant that it is only partially true of psychology as a 
whole, and certainly more true of psychology in the 
nineteenth century than of twentieth-century psychology. 
However, my point is to establish a context in which 
psychology and literature will be seen as two sides of the 
same coin--as attempts to understand the human condition that 
are informed by and dependent on ideas drawn from the wider 
culture and which are brought into being by adherence to a 
prescribed set of conventions.
This "double-aspect" perspective is not without its own 
pitfalls: There is an opportunity for a too-easy neglect of
important differences between the two traditions. For 
example, nowhere in this discussion have I attempted to 
account for the significant impact of statistical procedures 
on the analysis of psychological phenomena. And nowhere have 
I discussed changes in conceptions of "style" and "form" that 
marked the transition from literary realism to literary 
naturalism. Taking the double-aspect view as my central 
theme, I will focus on similarities, rather than differences, 
and attempt to provide a model in which correspondences can 
be understood.
The Rhetoric of Real ism
In the introduction to his Cosmologies of Consci ousness r 
E. C. Barksdale proposes that the history of human
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consciousness involves attention to both the facts of science
and the "facts" of experience:
A history of human consciousness which bases the 
development of life and awareness of self on biological 
facts alone would be incomplete. A series of evaluative 
statements on that most subjective and personal 
possession of every human being--his consciousness-- 
without reference to facts would be inadequate.14
Similarly, the history of the concept of consciousness
entails a history of its representation in scientific
discourse as well as its representation in literary
discourse.15 When considered as discourses, rather than as
modes of apprehending the world (each more or less
"correct"), the boundaries between science and literature
become blurred and the simple oppositions of fact and value,
objectivity and subjectivity, deduction and intuition no
longer seem sufficient to sustain a distinction between the
two.16 In this context, the double-aspect view, advocated
also by Barksdale, becomes a singularly compelling way of
making sense of both differences and similarities.
In Barksdale's account, it is clear that he envisions
science and literature as existing on a continuum defined by
the conceptual oppositions of objectivity on one end and
subjectivity on the other.17 Science, in its purest form (if
such pure form there be) would take its place on the
objective end; literature (art, poetry, music), in its purest
form, would take its place on the subjective end. The image
he conveys is particularly useful when it is considered that
there exist sciences (such as psychology?) that may contain
more of the subjective than, say, physics; and forms of
literature (documentary?) that contain more of the objective.
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Placement on the continuum would, accordingly, represent the 
proportion of objective/subjective which comprised any one 
tradition or, in another sense, the proportion of the 
discourse common to a discipline that could be traced to 
subjective or objective sources.
With this concept of a continuum in mind, I submit that 
in the late nineteenth century, in both literary and 
psychological discourses on consciousness, the 
objective/subjective dimensions were represented almost 
equally, with the preponderance of objectivity associated 
somewhat more with the literary tradition than with the 
psychological tradition. My reason for this conclusion is 
straight-forward: American psychologists were intent upon
fitting the facts of their experience to models that were 
informed by and limited to a prescribed agenda which 
entailed: adherence to "proper" (that is, traditional)
scientific procedures and methods; and, the compelling need 
to ensure that the application of those procedures to the 
mind would not result in devaluation of mind, soul, God, the 
individual man or woman, free-will or moral responsibility. 
(This, of course, is the reason why Locke's and Hume's ideas 
failed to gain support in America until after the turn of the 
century.) Both these ideas influenced the development of the 
new psychology far more than the mental "facts" with which 
they were concerned.18
The novelists, in contrast, though equally concerned 
with moral issues, were much less concerned with the methods 
of science, classification and analysis. Their more 
profoundly social agenda were well served by representing
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consciousness as, for example, a series of emotive events.
In the latter period, toward the end of the nineteenth 
century, the second generation of novelists explored the 
feelings of alienation and fragmentation they experienced.
The psychologists of that period, however, were still 
concerned with the tension between consciousness conceived as 
a biological process, and consciousness conceived as evidence 
of humankind's freedom to choose, though by that time the gap 
between literary representation and psychological 
representation had begun to close.19
As I have attempted to show, psychologists and novelists 
drew on a number of ideas common to nineteenth-century 
culture: the notion of free-will, moral responsibility, and
duty to God; the evolutionary ideas of Herbert Spencer and 
the evolutionary theory of Darwin; the opposition of free­
will and determinism; the idea that the individual self must 
be accounted for (and must count for something); the 
knowledge that advances in human physiological function 
encroached upon the vision of humankind as a free agent (the 
mind/body problem); feelings of alienation and fragmentation 
in the last quarter of the century; the possibility of a 
supernatural aspect to consciousness that suggested unknown 
capacities for human knowledge; the idea that consciousness 
served an adaptive function. These ideas were "realities" no 
less real than the measurable entities of the physical world, 
for they strongly influenced the problems with which the 
emerging disciplines of literature and psychology were 
concerned.
Kearns has suggested that the metaphors of mind and
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consciousness in the nineteenth century evolved from mind-as- 
entity to mind-as-sentient-being. His analysis also suggests 
that novelists adopted the mind-as-sentient-being metaphor 
somewhat earlier than psychologists. The results of this 
study are in agreement. This study, however, because it is 
founded on a more detailed analysis of psychological and 
literary texts, suggests several reasons for Kearns's 
results.
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discussion of the metaphorical source of Darwin's thought in 
his Darwin on Man: A Psychological Study of Scientific 
Creativity (London: Wildwood House, 1974); Gerald R. Holton, 
The Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to 
Einstein (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1973) .
13 It may be that the "true" history of psychology (if
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there be such a history) is to be found less in the 
succession of events and discoveries, the efforts of "great" 
men and great women, than in the succession of changes 
wrought upon psychology by the adoption and rejection of the 
models that have framed inquiry.
14 E. C. Barksdale, Cosmologies of Consciousness.
Science and Literary Myth in an Exploration of the Beginnings 
and Development of Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Scherikman 
Publishing, 1980), p. 4.
19 As George Levine points out, however, the 
transformation of science into discourse seems to suggest 
that science can no longer be considered the repository of 
certain knowledge, but rather as one means by which knowledge 
is conveyed (see George Levine, ed., One Culture. p. 4).
16 Thomas Kuhn, "Comment on the Relations of Science and 
Art," The Essential Tension: Selected studies in Scientific 
Tradition and Change (Chicago, Illinois: University of 
Chicago Press, 1977, p. 340. Cited in George Levine, ed.,
One Culture. p. 4.
17 E. C. Barksdale, Cosmologies of Consciousnessf p. 47.
18 Given the state of psychological experimentation at 
the time, these "facts" spoke softly, indeed.
19 This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that 
there is a concrete and measurable reality "out there" that 
is the source of objectivity and an unmeasurable reality 
"within" that is the source of subjectivity. Such a model of 
consciousness was proposed by Barksdale in connection with 
the development of consciousness. The first level of 
consciousness consists of sensations and impressions that 
enter consciousness from the external world. Barksdale 
refers to this level as the primary world. "The adult world 
of early days or that of the modem infant, the person waking 
up...or the fanatic in a mob all share a tendency toward 
unity," he writes, "toward non-differentiation of thought, 
toward non-reflection, toward the immediacy of gut-level 
experience." Modern humans spend much of their waking days 
in reflective thought, according to Barksdale, and the 
capacity to realize it is the "I" who sees and hears is the 
core of self-awareness. The distinction between simple and 
reflective consciousness is retained even in this twentieth- 
century work.
Beyond this, according to Barksdale, there are three 
more levels: the world of secondary imagination, "the realm 
of subjective thought, the interior private world of the 
emotions," the source of creativity; a tertiary level "which
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involves the higher brain functions...the power to formulate 
hypotheses." And, finally, the quartemary level, 
the channel of consciousness used to view the other conscious 
levels.... the congruities and the incongruities, the pauses, 
and the onrushing sequences...rationalization, goals, 
purposes. (E. C. Barksdale, Cosmologies of Consciousness. pp. 
36-38.)
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Appendix
The Literary Heritage: 
Transcendentalism. Spencer and Taine
The Transcendentalists of early nineteenth-century New
England were less concerned with epistemological issues than
with establishing the presence of God - the Over-Soul -
within human experience. Under the influence of Hegel and
German idealist thought, they reaffirmed the idea, which Reid
had proposed, that mature reflection (in their words,
"intuition") would lead the human spirit beyond the confines
of earthly existence to the perception of "infinite nature,
and infinite futurity, to that infinite God in whom we, and
all things, live, move, and have our being."1
Richard Hildreth, although well known among nineteenth-
century Americans for his commitment to Unitarianism, offers
a succinct account of the Transcendental point of view:
The knowledge, however, to which Religious feelings 
lead, is not according to the new theology, a knowledge 
in any respect like that which we obtain through the 
medium of the understanding, by employing the sense, in 
the observation of outward nature, or the faculty of 
reflection in observing mental operations. That kind of 
knowledge which goes to make up the physical and moral 
sciences...is confined to our relations to outward 
material objects, to the operations of the intellect 
itself, and to our social relations.... [The knowledge 
of religious feeling] is above the understanding; it is 
transcendental. It is perceived by a faculty which has 
been given the name of self-consciousness, or the 
transcendental reason, a sort of intuition, a faculty of 
which Locke and his followers have denied the existence, 
and which they have explained away as an operation of 
memory repeating the lessons of childhood, or as mere 
play of the imagination.2
The Transcendentalists were not much impressed with Reid's
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moral philosophy; although they believed he had corrected
some of the errors of Locke and Hume, they did not believe he
went far enough in describing the power of consciousness to
transcend experience.
In the Transcendentalist vision, consciousness was that
which contained Sensibility, Activity, and Reason and in
Reason was contained all the ideas of the Absolute as well as
all the purely intellectual facts. It was through Intuition,
rather than Reason alone, however, that the transcendent
experience was made possible, as this journal entry from
Emerson shows: "We live in succession, in division, in parts,
in particles," he writes:
Meantime within man is the soul of the whole; the wise 
silence, the universal beauty, to which every part and 
particle is equally related; the eternal One....We see 
the world piece by piece, as the sun, the moon, the 
animal, the tree; but the whole, of which these are the 
shining parts, is the soul....And so always, the soul's 
scale is one; the scale of the senses and understanding 
is another.3
Following in the German/Kantian tradition, Emerson 
distinguished between Reason (which underlies the 
transcendent experience) and Understanding (which was bound 
to sensory experience and the external world). This passage 
affirms the idea that knowledge of God and God's work was 
beyond the reach of sensory functions and the understanding. 
True knowledge, or knowledge beyond appearance, could be had 
only by those who learned "to detect and watch that gleam of 
light which flashes across his mind from within."4 The 
metaphor is tellingly similar to the one adopted by Hickok in 
his description of consciousness as the illuminating 
"revealer" of the conte -.s of mind, but, for the
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Transcendentalists, that "gleam of light" was Reason.
There is some of the Transcendental spirit in literary 
realism--the sense, for example, that reason offers a clear 
path toward resolution of the difficulties of daily life.
The consciousness portrayed in literary realism is wholly 
contained within the experiencing subject {the reader will 
recall, for example, Masie's experience of "knowing most"). 
Though the power of "reflection" defined by Reid does capture 
the internalized action characteristic of realist fiction, so 
too, does the Transcendental "intuition." What is 
transcended in realist literature, however, rarely leads to 
the timeless form of the Over-Soul.
Evolutionary Positivism 
Both Herbert Spencer and Hippolyte Taine may well be 
considered two of the most important influences on late 
nineteenth-century literature. There is some evidence that 
each of the authors whose work is the subject of this study 
were acquainted with the ideas of these men, in general, if 
not in specifics. Both Spencer and Taine promoted a 
positivistic ideal: the belief that social progress was
linked to the growth in scientific knowledge, exclusive of 
metaphysics and religious overtones.5 
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)
One of the most influential systems of thought in mid­
nineteenth- century America was that of Herbert Spencer, whose 
pre-Darwin evolutionary ideas were widely disseminated in the 
popular press around mid-century both under his own name and 
by such popularizers as John Fiske and Edward Youmans, who 
served as editor of the Popular Science Monthly for many
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years, William Graham Sumner, and Andrew Carnegie. Although 
Spencer's work was regarded in the post-Darwin years 
(approximately 1865-1900) with more derision than respect, in 
the period before Darwin published his Origin of Species 
(1859), his Synthetic Philosophy caught the imagination of 
scientists, theologians, writers, psychologists. Even 
William James used Spencer's Principles of Psychology as a 
textbook for his course on Physiological Psychology during 
187 6-1877, though James was prone to regard Spencer's concept 
of development--"from incoherent heterogeneity to coherent 
homogeneity"--as an oversimplification.6 Spencer's 
description of consciousness as an internal sequence of 
states--feelings, sensations and their relations7--is a clear 
postscript to Reid's description of the "train of thought." 
For this reason, Spencer's model of consciousness is included 
in this study.
In a chapter titled "The Dynamics of Consciousness" from 
the second volume of his Principles of Psychology. Spencer 
defines consciousness as an internal sequence of states 
consisting (primarily) of feelings (including pleasure and 
unpleasure) and both visual and auditory sensations and their 
relations.3 These states of consciousness are continually 
changing, continually in flux. "Thus," writes Spencer, " a 
discussion in consciousness proves to be simply a trial of 
strength between different connexions...- a systematized 
struggle serving to determine which are the least coherent 
states of consciousness." The fundamental law of 
consciousness, according to Spencer, is that "the least 
coherent states of consciousness separate while the most
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coherent remain together."9 (This illustration represents a 
direct application of a "survival of the fittest" metaphor.) 
The basis of the sense of personal identity, argues Spencer, 
is an extraordinarily "coherent" cohesion of conscious 
states.
Figure 4 is a representation of Spencer's concept of 
consciousness. The horizontal dashed line represents the 
"train of thought" (consciousness). The horizontal solid 
line represents the movement in time: consciousness is on­
going. The symbols {*, ~, +, !) represent feelings, 
memories, visual sensations, and auditory sensations, 
respectively. Symbol combinations are explained in the 
diagram. Vivid states, those that compel our attention, are 
enclosed in circles; faint states are unenclosed. The diagram 
is intended to depict the Spencerian notion of competing 
ideas within consciousness.
The Spencerian consciousness bears only a faint 
resemblance to Reid's "perceptual act" or Hickok's "inner 
light." Rather, Spencer describes a consciousness that 
appears as a microcosm of the social world- -a world in which 
"discussion" identifies cohering elements; in which there is 
a continual struggle ("a trial of strength") between 
different relational aggregates. Spencer repeatedly refers 
to the "broad procession" of conscious states, which "slide 
by restlessly," "moving in parallel," as pedestrians on a 
crowded city street.
The Spencerian consciousness v/as neutral as to God, or 
mankind's spirituality, or the prioritizing of faculties, 
Spencer does not suggest that consciousness should serve
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morality or the state or even that it should (necessarily)
reflect actual conditions of the real world. That it does r
in fact reflect those conditions is no more than what must
occur given the assumption Spencer makes that inner and outer
must correspond: "(E)ach change in the objective reality,"
he writes, "causes in the subjective state a change exactly
answering to it."10 We have seen this idea before, in Thomas
Reid's assertion that our perceptions correspond exactly to
the "nature and conditions" of real-world objects. "The
Realism we are committed to," Spencer asserts,
is one which simply asserts objective existence as 
separate from, and independent of, subjective existence. 
But it affirms neither that any one mode of this 
objective existence is in reality that which it seems, 
nor that connexions among its modes are objectively what 
they seem. Thus it stands widely distinguished from 
Crude Realism; and to mark the distinction it may 
properly be called Transfigured Realism.11
As we will see, the idea that neither the external world nor
the inner world had any prior claim to the "real" is a
prominent theme in late nineteenth-century literature--both
the new realism and the later naturalism.
Spencer's influence on late nineteenth-century 
literature is profound.12 There are likely many reasons for 
this, but the most obvious one is that Spencer's psychology 
was popularly known (at least in its superficial aspects) and 
thus served well those writers who wished to establish a 
particular psychological context for their work. Moreover, 
his psychology was decidedly a social psychology, his 
evolutionary consciousness was a social consciousness, and 
this extension of traditional psychological theorizing to a 
v/ider context was particularly useful for the early realist
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novels of experience.
Yet, it is rash to assume that Spencer's detailed 
analysis of consciousness was the source of the new realist 
model: Popular culture (then, as now) drew on generalities
from such work as Spencer's work, not specifics. Spencer's 
work may simply have served to reinforce the idea that 
consciousness itself may develop over time, in Spencer's 
words, from an "indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a 
definite, coherent heterogeneity."13 Nonetheless, his 
"survival of the fittest metaphor" is an apt metaphor for a 
consciousness often portrayed as engaged in the working 
through of a moral dilemma. As we have seen, these ideas 
were also foreshadowed by Reid, though not under the banner 
of consciousness.
H.ippojLyte Taine (1828-1893)
Spencer's Transfigured Realism is well within the 
positivist tradition. He rejects metaphysical assumptions in 
principle, maintains a respectable 'scientific' neutrality, 
and presents an account of consciousness that is more 
descriptive than explanatory. Hippolyte Taine, noted 
nineteenth-century historian, literary critic, and 
philosopher-psychologist, explicitly and unreservedly applied 
positivist principles to the analysis of consciousness. His 
analysis of consciousness deserves to be quoted in full 
because it serves as a fitting review of the present study:
(W)e picture consciousness as the glance of an 
internal eye, directed to a present internal event, just 
as we picture memory as the glance of an internal eye 
directed to a past event. Metaphors lend their aid; in 
fact, psychologists continually speak of consciousness 
as of a spectator or internal witness which observes, 
compares, takes notes on the various conceptions, 
imaginations, and representations passing in review
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before it. The truth is that in such a case there are 
not two events in my mind, my conception on the one 
hand, and, on the other, an act by which I am acquainted 
with it, but one single event, my conception itself. We 
split it in two because it has two phases, the first, in 
which it appears an external object or past event...the 
second, in which, being rectified, it appears an 
internal and present event, an optical phantom, then 
included in ourselves.14
Taine's account of consciousness parallels Spencer's 
account in the main (though not, perhaps, in specifics).
Both these men argue for a dual-level consciousness, whether 
of a "faint or vivid" series or of a first (externalized) or 
second (internalized) phase. (We have seen this idea of 
"faint and "vivid" expressed by William James.) Indeed, 
Taine (and Spencer) argue for a single stratum of 
consciousness which contains both strong and weak sensory 
elements, a model of consciousness that is more conversant 
with Kearns's "mind-as-sentient-being" metaphor than with 
that of "mind-as-entity" which informed the work of the 
Scottish philosophers and their followers.
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Appendix Notes
 ^ Richard Hildreth, "A letter to Andrews Norton," 
reprinted in Perry Miller, The Transcendentalists. An 
Anthology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), 
pp. 222-223.
3 Richard Hildreth, "A letter to Andrews Norton."
3 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays. First Series (1841), 
from Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson. ed., william 
H. Gilman (New York, Signet; 1965) pp. 257-280, 281, 283 (my 
italics).
4 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays. First Series, p. 258.
5 Auguste Comte named this movement positivism in the 
early nineteenth century, though many of his ideas had been 
expressed centuries earlier by Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, 
and David Hume. The basic tenets of Comtean positivism 
included rejection of hypotheses, unobservable entities, and 
metaphysical explanations. There are many descriptions of 
Comtean positivism. A very brief review is given by Thomas 
Leahey, A History of Psychology. Main Currents of 
Psychological Thought (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp. 146-148.
6 William James, Manuscript Lectures (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), p. xxxi. The edition of 
Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychology (2 vols.) to which 
I shall refer throughout this text is a reprint of the 1899 
(3rd) edition published in Osnabruck by Proff &Co., 1966 as 
part of A System of Synthetic Philosophy.
7 Spencer's dynamic consciousness contains two such 
autonomous but somewhat interdependent states. In the vivid 
series. relations are absolute and uniform, either when they 
predicate relations of a general nature or when they 
predicate relations among particulars. In the vivid states, 
an identifiable antecedent cannot always be determined or 
observed. In the faint series. relations among the elements 
are easily disrupted, either by will or through the intrusion
of other impressions. There are always identifiable
antecedents in consciousness for the consequent emergence of 
the faint series. (Herbert Spencer, System, vol. 1, p. 461).
8 Herbert Spencer, System, vol. 1, pp. 447-453.
9 Herbert Spencer, System, vol. 1, p. 450.
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10 Herbert Spencer, System, vol. 1, p. 494.
11 Herbert Spencer, System, vol. 1, p. 494.
12 John W. Rathbun and Harry H. Clark, American Literary 
Criticism. 1860-1905. pp. 86-90.
12 Cited in Paul F. Boiler, Jr., American Thought in 
Transition, pp. 50-51.
14 Hippolyte Taine, Qn Intelligence (London: L. Reeve, 
1871), p. 262.
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